Sitrep for March 20-23, 2026 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Russian mechanized assaults continue across multiple sectors. In particular, on March 20, the DeepState project reported that in the Lyman direction, near the village of Shandryholove, Ukrainian forces repelled such an attack after detecting enemy vehicles with drones.
The 3rd Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine later published a post titled "The Third Army Corps of the AFU repelled a large-scale Russian offensive in the Lyman-Borova direction." The post referred to the repulsion of a large-scale assault in the Lyman direction on March 19. In our view, describing this as having "repelled an offensive" may be misleading. It should not be interpreted as the collapse of the Russian Armed Forces' broader plan to advance on the town of Lyman and then toward the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the north. Recently, there has indeed been an uptick in Russian offensive activity involving armored vehicles. Despite repeated setbacks, commanders are likely to keep sending one column after another into attack. However, as we have noted before, we see this as a temporary shift. In the near future, this approach is likely to give way again to infiltration tactics using small assault infantry groups (sometimes with light vehicles), which allow for sustained offensive operations throughout most of the year. For that reason, it would be inaccurate to attribute any broader shift in Russian tactics to the actions of the 3rd Army Corps. Overall, infiltration remains the primary method of the Russian military, though commanders sometimes revert to launching mechanized assaults with armored columns, especially with the arrival of warmer, drier weather.
According to the 3rd Army Corps, in preparation for these offensive actions, the RuAF struck crossings over the Oskil River in an effort to disrupt Ukrainian logistics, established their own crossings and carried out mine-clearing operations on roads. Footage has also been published showing a Russian airstrike on the dam of the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant—non-operational since 2022—reportedly carried out using a FAB air-dropped bomb equipped with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK).
The AFU continued their mop-up operations in the town of Kupiansk. According to pro-Russian military correspondent Vladimir Romanov, Russian troops who had been holding out inside the city’s Central District Hospital were killed. Until recently, these personnel had been completely encircled, following a successful Ukrainian counterattack in the Kupiansk direction, with resupply reportedly conducted via UAVs. Russian forces made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to break through to the encircled unit. In January, the AFU conducted an airstrike on the hospital. Russian propaganda outlets characterized the strike as friendly fire, although pro-war correspondents indicated that the encircled troops were in fact Russian assault forces.
On the Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole) axis, an attempted mechanized advance was also recorded, departing from the northern outskirts of the town of Huliaipole and likely maneuvering toward the villages of Staroukrainka or Zelene. The column was detected upon departure and engaged with fires before reaching its objective.
Both sides continue to employ light mobility platforms in offensive actions. AFU soldiers, using motorcycles and ATVs, conducted an assault on Russian positions in the vicinity of the village of Solodke in Zaporizhzhia region, just south of the administrative boundary with Dnipropetrovsk region. Pro-Russian sources, however, claimed the attack occurred northeast of the village of Ternuvate.
As the trees begin to show their leaves in April, combat operations are expected to intensify further. In May, "Dracarys" drones, which are designed to drop incendiary mixtures onto forest lines to destroy enemy positions, may appear on the frontline.
On the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, Russian troops are gradually straightening their frontline by consolidating territory between their salients near the villages of Fedorivka Druha, Riznykivka and Zakitne. They continue attempts to advance from Riznykivka toward the village of Rai-Oleksandrivka, where the AFU have established a defensive line stretching from Kalenyky to Rai-Oleksandrivka, Zapovidne (known as Nykanorivka until 2024) and Malynivka.
According to the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi, the General Staff of the AFU is planning to discontinue training recruits abroad and move all training exclusively to Ukrainian territory. Formally, this is explained by the lack of up-to-date experience among Western instructors in conducting modern warfare. We find it surprising that training programs in the West have not been updated over all these years.
Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who regularly visits Ukraine, including for meetings with Ukrainian military personnel, commented on the news, saying he considers the move both normal and potentially beneficial for the AFU. Due to a serious manpower shortage, Ukrainian brigades urgently need to replenish losses, and there is simply not enough time for prolonged training. It would therefore be better for recruits to spend an additional two weeks integrating within their brigades rather than training abroad. Otherwise, they may not achieve sufficient unit cohesion before being sent to the frontline.
The 7th Rapid Response Corps of the AFU and the Russian Volunteer Corps have released footage demonstrating experimental use of Hypershell X Pro lower-limb exoskeletons. These lightweight exoskeletons, costing around $1,000, facilitate walking by assisting the push-off motion at the hip joint. In contrast, full-scale heavy exoskeletons with ground support, for example, those produced by Delta, enable users to lift and carry significantly heavier loads than an average person.
We do not expect exoskeletons to be used directly on forward positions, where they are unlikely to provide significant advantages. More likely, they would require frequent maintenance and repairs due to moisture, dust and mud, and could also hinder the rapid application of a tourniquet in case of injury. However, they may prove useful in rear areas, especially given the growing proportion of older servicemen. Indeed, in the footage from the 7th Corps, the devices are used by middle-aged artillery personnel. Nevertheless, even their relatively low cost (by exoskeleton standards) may limit large-scale procurement.
On March 20, near the village of Nadiivka (known as Nadezhdinka until 2024) in the Donetsk region, a Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter was shot down by a Ukrainian FPV drone. The helicopter reportedly managed to land in territory controlled by Russian forces, after which the two crew members were killed by additional FPV drones. The helicopter had been tossing unguided rockets, a maneuver that is typically of limited effectiveness but requires flying close to the frontline, exposing the crew to significant risk. If the Russian Aerospace Forces continue to employ Sukhoi Su-25 Grach (Frogfoot) attack aircraft in a similar manner, as seen in a recent video released by the MoD, it is possible that such an aircraft could eventually be downed by a Ukrainian drone positioned in the right place at the right time.
A second Ka-52 attack helicopter has also reportedly been lost, along with its commander, though details of that incident remain unclear.
On March 20, a privately owned light aircraft, an Alto NG, crashed near Kolomna in the Moscow region, killing the pilot and a passenger. It is believed that the aircraft may have been shot down by Russian air defense after being mistaken for a Ukrainian UAV. Photographs of the wreckage—though not conclusive—appear to show markings consistent with prefabricated shrapnel from a surface-to-air missile. This is not the first such incident. In September 2024, air defense units fired upon a light aircraft in the Murmansk region, and in December 2024, a missile from a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system struck an Embraer 190 passenger aircraft operated by Azerbaijan Airlines, which subsequently crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On March 22, Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that over the past week Russia had used 1,550 drones, 1,260 air-dropped bombs and two missiles against Ukrainian territory. The week prior, 86 missiles had been used. Although this reduction came as a surprise, it would be premature to link the sharp decrease in missile usage to successful Ukrainian strikes on facilities associated with missile production (such as the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Udmurtia or the Kremniy El plant in Bryansk). As an alternative explanation, it may be assumed that the RuAF have concluded their winter campaign of large-scale strikes on energy infrastructure and will accumulate missiles during the spring-summer period for use in the next winter.
On March 21, in the village of Smorodino in the Belgorod region, four women were killed and another was injured as a result of a strike on a post office building. The pro-government Telegram channel Baza reported that the post office had been attacked by a UAV, but the crater left behind appears too large for a drone warhead—most likely, the strike was carried out using a missile. It is also possible that this was the result of a Russian FAB air-dropped bomb. It is worth noting that the Russian Aerospace Forces regularly drop such bombs over the Belgorod region, which in most cases do not detonate. However, in May 2024, one such munition did explode upon impact, causing the collapse of an entire apartment entrance.
Video footage has emerged showing a Swedish Saab Erieye ASC-890 AEW&C aircraft operating over Ukrainian airspace. The delivery of these aircraft was first announced in May 2024, with official confirmation of transfer reported in October 2025. The ASC-890 significantly enhances Ukraine’s air situational awareness, enabling more precise detection, targeting and guidance of airborne threats—marking a critical upgrade to Ukraine’s integrated air defense and strike coordination capabilities.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
On April 1, the spring deployment period for conscripts begins. Since last year, the Russian authorities have introduced increasingly new methods of enlisting people into the army, and losses in December and January likely exceeded recruitment rates. We therefore expect conscription efforts to intensify this year alongside restrictions on leaving the country and other limitations. According to lawyer Timofey Vaskin from the human rights organization Shkola Prizyvnika [Conscript School], in February and March, conscripts who received draft notices were more frequently banned from traveling abroad. Lawyers recommend that young men in at-risk groups obtain two international passports, transfer property to relatives, and, if necessary, register as individual entrepreneurs or self-employed in advance. In previous years, we observed military unit commanders being issued quotas to pressure conscripts into signing contracts and being sent to the war.
It is worth noting that, according to statistics from the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, real prison sentences are not imposed for evading regular conscription. Therefore, we urge the use of any possible means to evade regular conscription: receiving a fine or, in rare cases, a suspended sentence is far preferable to death or serious injury in the war. Furthermore, conscripts sent to Russia’s border regions, which are not considered a "special military operation" zone, are regularly killed in missile or drone strikes. For assistance in avoiding conscription, we recommend contacting trusted organizations such as the Idite Lesom! [Flee through the woods/Get lost you all] Telegram channel, the Kovcheg [Ark] project and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors, a human rights organization supporting those who refuse to perform military service.
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