Sitrep for March 30-April 4, 2026 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The duration of the full-scale war has now exceeded 1,500 days, and there are currently no indicators that it could even be frozen in the coming months.

In recent days, Ukrainian society has been actively discussing a mechanized assault by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Pokrovsk direction. On March 31, a column of armored vehicles, operating under the cover of dense morning fog (as also acknowledged by the Russian Ministry of Defense), attempted to attack Russian positions south of the village of Hryshyne but was halted by strikes from Russian UAVs. The column included an Abrams tank, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Subsequently, footage was published resembling typical aftermath videos of Russian mechanized assaults, showing drones finishing off disabled military equipment abandoned along the road.

The video triggered a significant reaction. Ukrainian Defense Ministry advisor Serhii Sternenko criticized the operation conducted by the 425th Skelia Assault Regiment, comparing it to Russian mechanized assaults that often become easy targets and result in heavy losses. We would note however that the released footage (reportedly from the Rubicon UAV unit) did not show large numbers of killed personnel.

The Skelia Regiment responded sharply, stating that Sternenko’s conclusions were based solely on adversary-provided information that did not fully reflect the specifics of the operation. According to the regiment, the objective of the assault was to unblock certain Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk. They reported the loss of four armored vehicles near the objective and two soldiers killed in action, while the remaining personnel withdrew using a fifth vehicle. The statement also included a challenge for critics to visit the unit and demonstrate more effective combat methods in practice.

It is worth noting that, according to the DeepState map, nearly all of Pokrovsk is under the control of the Russian Armed Forces, with the exception of a very small contested zone. As early as March 30, project analysts assessed that the capture of Hryshyne was only a matter of time, and that Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad were already under Russian control. They also reported the presence of artillery positions on the southern outskirts of these towns. Even if these were mortar positions, this still indicates effective Russian control over the urban areas. In this context, it remains unclear why AFU positions are still being maintained in Pokrovsk; any remaining personnel should likely have been withdrawn earlier.

Additionally, the Skelia Regiment released a video response to Sternenko’s criticism, showing a large group of soldiers and two Bradley IFVs assembled in open terrain. A spokesperson again invited critics to visit the unit’s deployment area and assess the situation firsthand. It is worth noting that such troop concentrations are highly dangerous in wartime conditions, even when located away from the line of contact.

Analysts from DeepState also weighed in on the situation, identifying the primary failure during the attack as a breakdown in coordination between units. The column advancing toward Pokrovsk blundered into minefields—first Ukrainian, then Russian. Had there been proper synchronization with the AFU brigade holding that section of the frontline, the Skelia Regiment might have been guided toward a safer route. Journalists from the Kyiv Independent reached out to the command of the 7th Air Assault Corps, which oversees the Pokrovsk direction; officials stated they were reviewing the incident but declined to comment on the actions of the Skelia Regiment.

Contributing to the ongoing debate regarding the relevance of armored vehicles in modern warfare, Michael Kofman and Rob Lee noted on the War on the Rocks’ "Russia Contingency" podcast that Ukraine is currently experimenting with ways to restore battlefield mobility. Advancing in small infantry groups has proven agonizingly slow. According to the analysts, mechanized assaults can be made more effective if Ukrainian drones are deployed in sufficient numbers to identify and suppress enemy UAV operators, antennas and Wi-Fi bridges, while simultaneously crippling logistics through artillery and drone strikes. By timing an offensive for a moment when enemy drone pilots are unable to mount a defense, Ukrainian forces can catch these UAV operators by surprise, potentially forcing a hasty retreat. While a column detected at a distance is easily targeted, one that reaches the threshold of enemy positions undetected presents a far greater threat. Coordination across different branches of service remains the linchpin of such operations.

The podcast also highlighted that while the RuAF possess the resources to strike across multiple axes, the AFU remain forced to prioritize its defenses selectively. In the summer of 2025, for instance, the Dobropillia direction emerged as a weak point; to seal a breakthrough there, the AFU were compelled to redeploy forces from the Kupiansk and Pokrovsk directions, resulting in vulnerabilities that the RuAF exploited to advance in the town of Kupiansk and Pokrovsk. Similarly, in late 2025, Russian forces breached Ukrainian lines near the town of Huliaipole, necessitating the deployment of "emergency" brigades. The situation is exacerbated by a shortage of such units along the frontline, forcing a constant rotation of these "emergency" forces to the most volatile sectors.

Lee observed that the AFU have become more proficient in utilizing middle-strike drones—those operating at operational-tactical depths, such as the FP-2. Over the past two months, these UAVs have successfully targeted numerous Russian air defense systems.

The discussion further noted diverging tactical approaches among various AFU units. In the Dnipropetrovsk region, some units utilize small squads of three or four infantrymen who advance from tree line to tree line, covering 500 to 1,000 meters a day [0.8-1.6 mi]. Upon reaching these forest lines, they clear and consolidate their positions before moving forward. Ideally, such a group requires support from two teams of Vampire [Baba Yaga] heavy bomber drones, two DJI Mavic reconnaissance teams and two FPV drone teams. This requirement for drone operators to vastly outnumber infantry explains the recruitment surge for specialized drone units in both the AFU and the RuAF.

Furthermore, Lee suggested that the AFU likely rely on Western intelligence to suppress Russian UAV operator positions. Such suppression creates a narrow window for an assault while the enemy is partially "blinded," though the RuAF typically manage to resupply from the rear within a day or two. The primary challenge for "emergency" brigades is that they often lack the luxury of time for such thorough preparation, having only a day or two rather than weeks. Many counterattacks are conducted by just one or two companies; in Kupiansk, for example, fewer than 100 personnel were involved. Ultimately, Lee concluded that success hinges on meticulous planning, deception and the ability to exploit local vulnerabilities—all of which require seamless communication between units.

The situation in the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction has raised concerns for both analysts following their trip to Ukraine. Ukrainian defenses on the eastern flank appear to be weaker than expected. As previously noted, the RuAF have made noticeable advances near the villages of Nykyforivka, Fedorivka Druha, Pryvillia and Minkivka. On the northern and southern flanks, however, their offensive is progressing much more slowly. It is therefore possible that the original plan to encircle the agglomeration may prove too difficult for Russian forces to execute, in which case they may shift to gradually infiltrating the city of Kramatorsk from the east, much as they are currently attempting to do in the town of Kostiantynivka.

Among other topics, Kofman and Lee discussed the shutdown of Starlink terminals used by the RuAF. Kofman, like us, believes that the introduction of whitelists did not lead to a total collapse within the Russian army. The resulting disruption lasted only a couple of weeks before Russian units adapted, including by finding workarounds. That said, the Starlink restrictions have had a negative impact on the development and production of Russian ground drones. Starlink Mini terminals—a relatively inexpensive version of the system—are particularly well suited for establishing communication links between ground robots and their operators or command posts. The limited ability to deploy them on a large scale has hindered the rapid development of such systems. The analysts also suggest that it was the Russian military’s use of Starlink terminals on long-range drones that prompted the Ukrainian leadership to take active steps to restrict terminal usage. At present, Russian troops are laying fiber-optic cables to provide communications in rear areas close to the front and are setting up Wi-Fi bridges, while Ukrainian forces are in turn trying to detect and destroy them as quickly as possible.

Summing up the interim results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, Kofman noted that since the start of the operation, the AFU have recaptured as much territory as the RuAF had taken over the course of three months.

It is also noted that the main challenge facing Ukrainian reconnaissance drones comes from Russian airspace surveillance radar systems and interceptor drones, which detect and shoot them down. In our view, the arrival in Ukraine of relatively inexpensive ERAM missiles could have a notable impact on the dynamics of the war.

Rob Lee and Ukrainian drone operator Dmytro Putiata (Kriegsforscher) have started a blog titled Two Marines. After analyzing the situation on the frontline, they predicted an increase in Russian mechanized attacks on Kostiantynivka in April. According to information they have received, the 70th Motor Rifle Regiment, the 6th Motor Rifle Division and the 136th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the RuAF have recently been checking the readiness of their vehicles for attacks.

Overall, Kofman and Lee believe that cautious optimism can be maintained. Russia has set its sights on controlling the remaining parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions but has yet to achieve this goal, despite announcing the recapture of the Luhansk region once again. Advances come at a very high cost for the RuAF, while Ukraine continues to hold the frontline. Despite a gradual retreat, neither operational nor strategic breakthroughs are occurring or anticipated. While there are still personnel issues in the AFU, Kofman and Lee are optimistic about Mikhail Fedorov’s new team and expect them to succeed in resolving problems with mobilization and desertion.

Various analytical projects have begun summarizing their results for March. According to DeepState, Russia captured 160 square kilometers of territory, which is 27% more than in February.

At the same time, according to the pro-Russian Slivochnyy kapriz [Creamy caprice] Telegram channel, the pace of advances slowed in March. This is related to its calculation methodology, which we discussed earlier: in February, according to their data, Russia captured twice as much territory as estimated by DeepState. The Finnish independent group Blackbird Group has not yet published its results.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On April 1, the Ukrainian Air Force again published two reports on Russian strikes over the past day. From 6 p.m. on March 31 to 8 a.m. on April 1, 298 drones were shot down or suppressed, while from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on April 1, 345 drones were shot down or suppressed. We have not previously observed such massive daytime attacks.

According to a report by the Ukrainian Air Force dated April 3, covering the period from 6 p.m. on April 2 to 2 p.m. on April 3, none of the ten Iskander ballistic missiles used against Ukraine were intercepted. It can be assumed that Ukraine is experiencing a shortage of PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for Patriot systems due to the war in the Middle East. Another possible explanation is that the strikes are hitting cities that simply do not have Patriot systems.

The Financial Times reported that Trump threatened to stop arms supplies to Ukraine under PURL if Europe does not help open the Strait of Hormuz.

During a Shahed drone raid on the Kyiv region on April 3, several videos were recorded clearly showing a drone diving precisely at buildings. One video shows a drone diving at a residential building in Obukhiv, where five people were injured, including a 14-year-old teenager. Another video shows a drone diving at the grounds of a school in Vyshneve, Bucha district, where a security guard was killed and eight more people were injured. While these videos seem to unequivocally demonstrate the targeting of residential areas, another video taken during the same raid shows a drone diving equally precisely into a field.

Pro‑Russian sources posted a video of Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions with TV seekers striking two mobile fire teams of the AFU in the Sumy region.

According to Monstas, the percentage of intercepted Russian UAVs has been gradually increasing. In October, 79% of drones were intercepted. This percentage increased to 83.5% in November, 80% in December, 83.5% in January, 87% in February and 90% in March. Monstas attributes this increase to the wider use of interceptor drones.

The past week proved calamitous for Russia's Air Force. On 31 March a Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft crashed, with the pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] posting a mourning notice implying both aircraft and its crew were lost.

On the same day, an Antonov An-26 came down in Crimea, killing all 29 people on board, including three crew members. As BBC sources claim, among the deceased was Lieutenant General Aleksandr Otroshchenko, commander of the Northern Fleet's mixed aviation corps and former commander of the 45th Air Force and Air Defense Army, becoming the fifteenth Russian general killed in the war.

Six Northern Fleet staff officers were also reportedly killed, including one believed to be the corps’ radar officer. The cause of the crash is unclear. We believe the most likely cause is pilot error, though it could also have been a technical malfunction or friendly fire. While it is unlikely, it is not impossible, that the aircraft was shot down by Ukrainian air defense systems. It is worth noting that in February 2024, a Beriev A-50 AEW&C aircraft was downed in the Krasnodar region by a Ukrainian S-200 SAM system missile.

Finally, on April 3, news emerged of the loss of a Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jet during a training flight in Crimea. The crew could not extinguish an engine fire, which resulted in the loss of the aircraft. Both pilots ejected safely, but the aircraft was destroyed.

In the early hours of April 2, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Kirovske airfield in Crimea, hitting an Orion UAV storage warehouse, a ground-surveillance radar and a non-operational Antonov An-72P transport aircraft—an ex-Ukrainian airframe long inactive. The reason for striking it is unclear to us (during raid preparation, the USF should have studied the airfield and its equipment)—it may have been done to earn points for destroying enemy hardware.

As previously noted, a key AFU weakness is poor coordination between disparate forces: drone units under the USF component often act independently of frontline corps commanding individual frontline sectors. Such units focus on their own tasks of inflicting maximum damage on Russian infantry and military equipment. The corps, meanwhile, have operational-tactical tasks related to stabilizing the frontline, holding defensive lines and repelling potential counterattacks. Similarly, assault troops, such as the Skelia Regiment and the 1025th Regiment report directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi and likewise operate without corps-level coordination.

The Swedish Coast Guard detained the Shadow Fleet tanker Flora 1 after it left a 12-kilometer [7.5 mi] oil slick off the country’s coast. An investigation into an environmental crime has been launched. According to MarineTraffic, the Sierra Leone-flagged vessel departed on March 31 from the Russian port of Primorsk with an unclear destination. The Astra Telegram channel reports that the vessel has changed its flag at least nine times and is subject to sanctions from the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand and Ukraine.

RFI published an investigation into the "shadow war" between Russia and Ukraine in Africa. The first part of the report, citing sources in Libya, claims that more than 200 Ukrainian specialists and officers are stationed in western Libya with the government's consent. According to the report, they were responsible for the attack on the Russian gas carrier Arctic Metagaz in the Mediterranean Sea on March 3. The second part of the investigation states that Ukrainian forces attacked the oil tanker Qendil in the Mediterranean in December 2025. Ten senior Russian intelligence officers were allegedly on board, disguised as sailors. Two of them were reportedly killed, including Major General Andrey Averyanov, head of the 29155th military unit subordinated to the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RuAF] and engaged in sabotage operations abroad Major General Andrey Averyanov, head of the 29155th military unit subordinated to the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RuAF] known for engaging in sabotage worldwide. We find the story of a disguised general traveling aboard a slow-moving tanker highly implausible. Christo Grozev, a Bellingcat investigative journalist who specializes in the GRU, has also suggested that the information in the article may be fabricated and that Averyanov is alive and well. Despite the second part of the investigation casting doubt on the first, we do not question the presence of Ukrainian specialists in Libya. We had assumed their involvement in the attack on the gas carrier even before this investigation was published.

We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.