Sitrep for March 23-27, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces are attempting to seize areas they had previously claimed as "liberated." At present, assault troops are engaged in fighting east of the town of Kupiansk, near the village of Synkivka, as well as in the villages of Petropavlivka, Kurylivka and Kivsharivka.
According to a map released by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces on March 16, and a statement by Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, at the command post of the Group of Troops "South," Russian forces need to capture only a small remaining area on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, just south of the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi. This appears to be the situation Russian troops are now trying to replicate on the ground, which helps explain the recent intensification of fighting in this sector.
On the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, Russian forces continue efforts to straighten the frontline in order to secure their flanks. Advances have been reported near the village of Zaliznianske (which had a population of just two people as of 2001). From there, Russian troops are expected to move toward the villages of Rai-Oleksandrivka, Nykonorivka and Malynivka, aiming to reach staging positions for a further offensive directly against the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, which appears to be their main objective for this year.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, Russian forces are continuing to build up in the villages of Berestok and Illinivka, using them as staging points for entry into the town of Kostiantynivka. Assault troops are also infiltrating from the direction of the villages of Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillia. According to the Ukrainian Telegram channel Shalin, Russian troops are already appearing in the town center. Footage shows Ukrainian soldiers destroying a building during close-quarters combat in which Russian assault troops had taken shelter. According to Playfra, they reached the area from the southeast. As a result, the contested area now extends into the center of Kostiantynivka.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF are gradually extending the "gray zone" westward and northwestward from the village of Hryshyne.
While active fighting continues this week, the frequency of reported mechanized assaults has decreased compared to the previous week. We assess that armored vehicle attacks may resume in waves, with short pauses in between, in the near future.
Meanwhile, Ukraine continues discussions on military reforms aimed at improving mobilization efforts and reducing desertion rates. Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced these plans following meetings with soldiers. However, the impact of such reforms remains uncertain given the protracted nature of the war. As the conflict enters its fifth year, societal war fatigue appears widespread, with fewer volunteer fighters willing to join frontline units.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
From March 22 to 27, Ukrainian drones carried out daily raids on the Leningrad region. Strikes were reported on ports in Ust-Luga, Primorsk and Vyborg, targeting oil facilities and a shipbuilding plant, while residential buildings were damaged in Vyborg and Kronstadt. Additionally, on March 24 and 25, reports emerged of drones crashing in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Based on this, some experts and pro-war correspondents concluded that Ukrainian drone flight routes may have passed through European airspace—specifically over Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and then across the Baltic Sea (rather than through Belarus and Russia, as is more typical). This has been strongly denied by Michael Kofman, while Lithuanian officials stated that a UAV likely heading toward Primorsk may have deviated from its course due to electronic warfare. We do not know what actually happened, but if an agreement on the use of NATO countries’ airspace by Ukrainian drones does exist, it is likely that all parties involved would deny it.
Drone strikes on Russia’s border regions continue. For example, in the Belgorod region on March 25, an FPV drone attacked a motorcycle in the hamlet of Semeyny (15 km [9.32 mi] from the Russia-Ukraine border), killing the 18-year-old driver. This appears to be an extremely rare case of a motorcyclist being targeted so far from the border.
In the town of Grayvoron, a drone struck a car: the driver sustained multiple shrapnel wounds, while a female passenger was killed. In the village of Voznesenovka in the Shebekinsky district, on March 26, a drone hit a private house, injuring a seven-year-old girl, who suffered blast trauma and a blind shrapnel wound to the leg, while her mother sustained barotrauma.
Russia, in turn, continues to strike Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia). In particular, on the morning of March 24 in the Kharkiv region, a commuter train was hit: one passenger was killed, while the driver and assistant driver suffered acute stress reactions.
The Air Forces of the AFU published an unusual evening report on Russian strikes, stating that between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. on March 24, Russia launched 556 UAVs, of which 541 were shot down. Including overnight attacks, a total of 948 strike drones were launched over the course of the day—a new daily record. The previous record was set on Sept. 7, 2025, when the RuAF deployed 810 drones and 13 missiles.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia has moved on to the second phase of its attacks on infrastructure, targeting water supply systems, dams, reservoirs and logistics networks. With the end of winter reducing pressure on the power grid, Russian forces appear to be shifting toward targets that will be more vulnerable in warmer months.
In the Donetsk region, on March 23, the Russian Aerospace Forces struck a dam near the village of Raihorodok, north of Sloviansk, with two air-dropped bombs. According to local authorities, the destruction of the hydroelectric complex left only a two-week water supply.
In the War on the Rocks podcast, Michael Kofman and Rob Lee argued that, with the onset of warmer weather, Russia is likely to shift its focus toward strikes on Ukraine’s defense factories and companies. Attacks on urban water supply systems are also considered likely, in an apparent effort to deprive civilians of access to water. This would echo earlier attempts to leave them without heat and electricity during the winter.
According to Rob Lee, Russia plans to produce 127,000 Geran drones in 2026, nearly doubling its current annual output of around 70,000. However, the Russian leadership's plans often fail to materialize. For example, in 2024, there were plans to expand the army and form 14 divisions, but ultimately, no more than two were created. Nevertheless, satellite imagery suggests that production capacity is expanding at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, with new workshops appearing. Currently, it seems unlikely that negotiations will stop the war, as neither side is willing to compromise on key issues. Given reports that irreversible Russian losses exceeded recruitment in December and January, resulting in a gradual depletion of forces, it is possible that manpower shortages will eventually constrain offensive operations and cause the frontline to stabilize. Even in such a scenario, however, Russia would still have the ability to carry out airstrikes, especially with inexpensive drones. According to analysts, in March–April 2026, Russia’s defense industry is planning to increase production of jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 UAVs although financial constraints could hinder the implementation of these plans.
Russia is also increasingly using ballistic missiles. Kofman noted that the Russian army has formed dedicated units equipped with S-400 SAM systems that specialize exclusively in ground strikes. They use modified 48N6 (RM-48U) target missiles, which were originally designed for air defense training. In decommissioned surface-to-air missiles like the 5V55 or 48N6, used in the S-300PM and S-400 SAM systems, the warhead is reportedly replaced with measuring instruments or ballast. This creates additional challenges for Ukraine, since these are still ballistic targets that must be intercepted with expensive missile defense systems.
Strikes against emergency service infrastructure are ongoing, with fire stations in particular being targeted. The State Emergency Service of Ukraine reports that these attacks are deliberate.
In the early hours of Mar. 26, an oil-laden "shadow fleet" tanker was attacked in the Black Sea. The vessel, owned by a Turkish company and sailing under the flag of Sierra Leone, sustained the strike without any reported oil spill. Notably, previous Ukrainian operations had targeted only empty oil tankers. According to Turkey’s Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, preliminary assessments indicate the attack was carried out by an unmanned underwater vehicle.
On Mar. 24, Ukrainian UAVs conducted a successful strike against targets in Crimea, including a Bastion coastal defense missile system, which—according to Ukrainian intelligence—also included 3M22 Zircon missiles. Footage shows a secondary detonation, confirming a direct hit on stored munitions. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the MoD of Ukraine reported that two missiles and one launcher were destroyed, while a second launcher was damaged. The Ukrainian Air Force last reported the use of Zircon missiles against Ukrainian territory on Mar. 14. Intercepting such missiles remains highly challenging and requires PAC-3 interceptors for the MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems.
The Washington Post, citing anonymous sources, reported that the United States may redirect weaponry originally ordered for Ukraine under PURL—specifically anti-aircraft missiles—to the Middle East. The report was written in a manner suggesting that the associated funding would also be diverted, a claim that has ignited a lively online debate. However, Colby Badhwar, an analyst with The Insider [independent Russian investigative media outlet], along with other experts, contends that the article’s phrasing is technically flawed. When the US sells defense materiel directly from its own stockpiles, the resulting revenue is invariably used for replenishment, making any talk of "redirecting" or "appropriating" those funds inaccurate. For their part, NATO officials stated that all American weaponry for Ukraine financed by allies has already been delivered or is continuing to arrive.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi has reported that during the critical early months of the year that set the pace for equipment deliveries through 2026, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense did not finalize a single contract for armored vehicles. While such vehicles are currently reaching the army, they are doing so under the terms of last year’s agreements. New orders will only be issued once the General Staff submits a formal assessment of armored vehicle requirements, an update not anticipated until the second half of the year. Should agreements be reached in July, the first shipments would likely not begin until year’s end at the earliest. Manufacturers identify a primary cause for the cessation of orders: a sharp contraction in Ukrainian defense outlays. This fiscal tightening comes amid the potential collapse of a 90 billion euro [$104 billion] European Union credit program, currently stalled by a Hungarian veto linked to the suspension of oil deliveries via the Druzhba pipeline.
On the evening of March 23, the Russian company Bureau 1440 deployed the first 16 satellites for its Rassvet communications constellation, a project frequently described as a domestic alternative to Starlink. While the Kremlin plans for the constellation to grow to 292 satellites by 2030 and eventually reach a total of 383, space analyst Georgy Trishkin, who runs the Tekhasskiy Vestnik [Texas Herald] Telegram channel, observed that a viable system requires a sustained series of launches. The 16 satellites currently in low-Earth orbit may suffice for testing and intermittent communication windows, but they are insufficient for a fully operational network. Moreover, high-speed satellite internet requires a robust terrestrial infrastructure of base stations across the globe to relay signals to the wired web—a capability not yet established for Rassvet. The system also currently lacks the compact terminals required for use on the battlefield. Expanding the satellite fleet, constructing ground infrastructure, and developing portable hardware will be exceptionally costly at a time when the Russian budget is under significant strain. In a recent closed-door meeting with prominent business figures, President Vladimir Putin reportedly suggested that they voluntarily assist in financing the war effort.
According to the Memorial Human Rights Defense Center, law enforcement practice in Russia is changing: Article 275.1 of the Criminal Code ("confidential cooperation"), often described as "treason-lite" due to its relatively mild penalties, is increasingly being used as an intermediate step toward bringing full-scale high treason charges. Law enforcement agencies have not abandoned Article 275.1 but instead use its vague wording in cases where the evidentiary basis for "full" treason is initially weak. However, a recent trend toward mass reclassification has emerged: cases initiated under Article 275.1 are being reclassified under Article 275 during the investigation process or after sentences are overturned. As a result, the classification becomes more severe and sentences increase severalfold, even though the underlying actions, such as correspondence or photography, remain the same. It is worth noting that people accused under these articles are often those who have communicated with bots associated with the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion, as well as those who have fallen victim to phone scammers and, under their influence, carried out acts such as arson attacks on draft offices or railway infrastructure.
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