Sitrep for Feb. 13-16, 2026 (as of 11:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The Ukrainian Armed Forces continue an offensive operation on the eastern flank of the Zaporizhzhia axis (formerly the Huliaipole direction). Attempts to induce chaos among Russian forces have not succeeded: no panic withdrawal, collapse of defensive lines, or even a significant loss of command and control has been recorded, despite the shutdown of unregistered Starlink terminals. This may have caused some delay in reaction times, but according to our data, the Russian Armed Forces were not caught by surprise.

Ukrainian forces are conducting active offensive operations, including using armored vehicles. Expert assessments vary: some characterize the activity as area-clearing operations and tactical-level counterattacks, while we assess it as an offensive operation of an operational-tactical scale. At the same time, the redeployment of forces from the Pokrovsk direction has not yet affected the situation north and northwest of the town of Pokrovsk.

In summary, the available information indicates that the AFU have achieved certain successes in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. According to researcher Playfra, Ukrainian forces cleared the settlement of Ternuvate and liberated the village of Kosivtseve, as well as the village of Pryluky and part of Varvarivka. To the best of our knowledge, they have already forded the Haichur River and are advancing along its eastern bank. In our view, this indicates a higher level of seriousness in the counteroffensive actions than mere clearance of specific positions and consolidation to strengthen the defensive line. In the latter case, it would make sense to use the river as a natural defensive barrier and establish a defense along it.

In addition, Ukrainian forces are attacking in the areas of the villages of Vyshneve, Yehorivka and Verbove, generally toward the village of Uspenivka, with further attacks eastward toward the villages of Berezove and Ternove. Thus, three main axes of Ukrainian counterattacks are evident. The AFU are making gradual advances; however, it is reasonable not to expect these to be immediately reflected on analysts’ maps, as the new frontline has not yet fully stabilized. Some of these advances may remain limited to fighting within the contested zone, and the RuAF may well recapture some of the newly liberated positions relatively quickly. Most likely, in the coming days Ukrainian counterattacks will primarily result in an expansion of the contested zone. Some observers believe that, at present, all Ukrainian actions remain within the contested zone, i.e., on territories that the RuAF had not yet brought under full control.

French researcher Clément Molin analyzed new satellite data and marked newly identified airstrike and artillery strike locations over recent days, demonstrating that Ukrainian strikes against Russian forces (shown as black circles) have shifted eastward compared to those he published ten days earlier. This indicates that the line of contact has been pushed back during recent counterattacks. Similarly, Russian strikes against Ukrainian positions (white circles) on the updated map are also located farther east, effectively showing that the red zone has been displaced relative to Molin’s map based on data from ten days prior

Russian forces counter the AFU by striking their logistics: an air attack was recorded north of Verbove on the bridge over the Vovcha River in the village of Kolomiitsi.

To demonstrate that the Russian army has no issues with military field communications, the Russian MoD released a video dedicated to the work of signalers restoring a severed wired communication line in the Zaporizhzhia region. It is worth noting that such lines do not provide internet access but only enable wired communication for exchanging information and reporting the tactical situation to headquarters.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, some time ago, according to Playfra, dense fog again allowed Russian forces to infiltrate the outskirts of the town of Kostiantynivka, as well as the villages of Berestok and Illinivka. Ukrainian forces are now mopping-up these infiltrated assault troops. As usual, the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz project interprets video footage of infantry appearing in Kostiantynivka as evidence of Russian military advances and adjusts the frontline on its map accordingly. However, if the infantry was quickly cleared by enemy forces, it means they failed to gain a foothold in this area and were unable to expand their control zone. In the long term, such premature infiltrations lead to Slivochny Kapriz to attribute the capture of significantly more territory to the RuAF in its monthly advance assessments than has actually been seized.

In the Pokrovsk direction, according to the Ukrainian Officer Telegram channel, Russian troops have fully captured the town of Rodynske and are appearing in Bilytske. It is worth noting that their main objective is to reach the town of Dobropillia in order to push the frontline farther away from Pokrovsk to the north and northwest. This would place Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad within Russian rear areas, where headquarters, drone operator units, and possibly field ammunition storage facilities could be positioned.

In the Kupiansk direction in the Kharkiv region, Russian officials claim to have captured the town of Kupiansk along with several settlements to its north and east. Contrary to the widespread belief that Russia’s Aerospace Forces would not drop air-dropped bombs on territory it officially considers under its control, data from Clément Molin show that numerous recent strikes in this sector have targeted areas that Russia itself has declared captured.

In our view, this may be because commanders at the level of individual force groupings are well aware that the situation reports submitted to the General Staff—and later voiced publicly by Valery Gerasimov, Andrey Belousov and Vladimir Putin—do not reflect the actual situation on the ground. As a result, they continue to approve airstrikes on targets located in areas officially described as already seized.

Peace Talks

A new trilateral meeting between Russia, the United States and Ukraine is scheduled for Feb. 17-18. Presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky has been appointed to lead the Russian delegation. We do not expect significant progress to come from these talks.

At the Munich Security Conference, held on Feb. 13-15, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that the war would end only when Russia is exhausted either economically or militarily. Poland’s Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski made a similar statement, saying that the outcome of the war will be determined not by negotiations, but by the question of "who breaks first."

Emmanuel Macron. President of France, said that a transparent channel of communication with Russia should be restored. According to him, Europe needs to be in a "strong position" in order to negotiate with Russia in the future. To achieve this, European countries should actively develop their defense capabilities, particularly in long-range systems.

For now, however, in our assessment, European officials remain unprepared for a direct confrontation with Russia and fear an outbreak of World War III. NATO forces have yet to update their tactics and are not prepared to combat the RuAF with modern methods. During exercises in Estonia last year, several small Ukrainian unmanned systems units reportedly routed two NATO battalions.

A poll by Politico found that while Western publics are, in principle, supportive of increasing defense budgets, they are not willing to do so by raising public debt, cutting social services, or increasing taxes.

During the conference, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that in December alone, the RuAF lost 35,000 soldiers killed and seriously wounded. In January, there were fewer Russian assaults and, according to him, Russian irrecoverable losses amounted to about 30,000 personnel. Both figures seem quite plausible.

At the end of January, Minister of Defense of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov stated that the strategic goal of the AFU is to kill 50,000 Russian soldiers per month. This may correspond to approximately 70,000-80,000 killed and seriously wounded. It seems impossible to us to double the scale of Russian losses, as this would require a significant increase in the size of the AFU, which are already experiencing difficulties with personnel recruitment.

Zelenskyy also reported that Ukraine does not have many FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles; one major production line was destroyed by the RuAF, but it has already been relocated. This refuted the statements of Fire Point company representatives who claimed to have achieved large-scale production as early as fall. The use of these missiles is very limited, so a noticeable quantity should have accumulated in warehouses at such production levels.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

It is worth noting that last week we published a major report with statistics on attacks against civilian infrastructure in 2025. We assume that if current trends persist, the number of casualties this year will be even higher. According to data collected by our volunteers, at least 223 people were killed and at least 1,340 others sustained injuries of varying severity in January 2026 as a result of attacks and strikes on civilian infrastructure on both sides of the frontline. In January 2025, at least 153 people were killed and 1,034 were injured.

Among the numerous strikes on residential buildings in Ukraine last week, we noted several hits that resulted in the deaths of entire families with children in the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv regions.

UAV strikes by Ukraine against civilian vehicles in the border areas of the Bryansk and Belgorod regions are continuing, with fatalities and injuries reported.

The RuAF are attacking civilian vehicles with drones in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions.

Drones dropping munitions continue in the area of the city of Kherson.

Strikes on energy infrastructure continue: on Feb. 13, the RuAF attacked facilities in the Mykolaiv region, resulting in the emergency shutdown of the thermal power plant. On Feb. 15, Ukrainian UAVs targeted energy facilities in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions. Electricity supply has already been restored in the Bryansk region. In Belgorod, however, according to Vyacheslav Gladkov, governor of the Belgorod region, centralized hot water supply will be suspended until the end of the heating season due to damage to energy facilities.

In addition, Gladkov urged residents of the Belgorod region, especially those living in border villages, to avoid wearing "camouflage, military, or green clothing" due to the increased frequency of drone attacks. Since the very beginning of the invasion, it was clear that it was dangerous for local residents to appear near the border dressed in such clothing, as Ukrainian drones might mistake them for military personnel. It seems unusual that this issue has remained relevant for more than three years, and that Gladkov has only now addressed the population. It is worth noting that in 2024, authorities in the Kursk region made a similar request.

On Feb. 15, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin reported a Ukrainian UAV raid on Moscow. Eyewitness videos show the drones flying unusually high. It is unclear what this may be related to. It is possible that they were attempting to establish a communication channel via relay stations.

On Feb. 16, 2024, Alexei Navalny was killed in a Russian prison. On Feb. 14, 2026, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands officially confirmed that he had been poisoned. Five independent laboratories detected the toxin epibatidine in Navalny’s biological samples that had been taken abroad by his family after the murder. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the findings of the European laboratories as troubling and added that Washington has no grounds to doubt them. Russian President’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the accusations of Navalny’s poisoning are biased and unfounded.

On Feb. 16, memorial events for Navalny were held in many Russian cities; four people have been detained in Saint Petersburg, Volgograd and Moscow.

Navalny opposed the war and supported recognizing Ukraine’s 1991 borders, which would include returning Crimea to Ukraine.

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