Sitrep for Jan. 24-26, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

For approximately one month, a noticeable operational pause has persisted along the frontline. In recent days, the Russian Armed Forces have made little to no territorial gains. The most significant developments have occurred in the Kharkiv region in the Vovchansk direction. According to available reports, Russian forces have seized the village of Starytsia, located west of the town of Vovchansk. Earlier reports also indicated advances southwest of Vovchansk toward Symynivka, which the Russian Ministry of Defense has already claimed as captured, as well as limited movement eastward near the village of Vovchanski Khutory.

With the onset of sustained freezing temperatures, several rivers near the frontline have formed ice cover. Satellite imagery confirms ice formation on narrow sections of the Siverskyi Donets River, potentially enabling limited logistical use. While the ice is unlikely to support armored vehicles or heavy transport, river crossings by light vehicles, all-terrain vehicles and infantry on foot appear feasible.

In the Pokrovsk direction, fighting continues for control of areas northwest of Pokrovsk. Russian forces persist in attempts to infiltrate the village of Hryshyne, frequently resulting in losses from Ukrainian UAV strikes. Efforts to seize the town of Rodynske are also ongoing. Despite remaining one of the most active sectors of the front, this direction has seen minimal confirmed territorial changes over the past several weeks.

UkraineViews, a newly launched platform, compares frontline maps from multiple sources. At present, it does not include the pro-Russian platforms Slivochny Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] and Divgen, though these are expected to be added later.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Ukrainian forces struck RuAF positions in Tyotkino in the Kursk region, with air-dropped glide bombs—reportedly AASM Hammer. One of the targets was a building housing Russian drone operators.

Video has been released showing Russian Shahed-drone strikes on two Ukrainian helicopters in the Kirovohrad region near Kropyvnytskyi: a Mil Mi-8 transport helicopter and a Mil Mi-24 attack helicopter, the latter now used primarily to counter Russian unmanned aerial vehicles. According to the Ukrainian Telegram channel Soniashnyk, the Mi-8 was damaged but remains operational, while the other helicopter was destroyed. The Ukrainian military analyst Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov concluded that the attacking drones were equipped with Starlink terminals. His assessment is based on evidence that the UAVs were guided by operators during their terminal approach, while no relay drones were detected that could have formed an airborne mesh network linking the operators to the loitering munitions.

In the early hours of Jan. 24, Russian forces carried out another large-scale air assault on Ukrainian cities, again focusing primarily on Kyiv and the surrounding region. For the first time in months, the attack included 12 Kh-32 supersonic cruise missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat initially reported the use of the older Kh-22 missiles, but the Telegram channel Polkovnyk Henshtabu later identified them as Kh-32, apparently based on debris. The strike also involved Zircon and Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 48N6DM surface-to-air missiles from the S-400 system used in a surface-to-surface role—following a ballistic trajectory—and Kh-59/69 type guided air-launched cruise missiles, as well as nearly 400 drones. One of the missiles fired at Kyiv was reportedly manufactured on Dec. 19, 2025. One civilian was killed in the capital and four were wounded; another four people were injured elsewhere in the Kyiv region.

Although the Kh-32 is classified as a cruise missile, it flies at extremely high speed on a near-ballistic trajectory, making effective interception possible only by SAMP-T systems and Patriot batteries equipped with PAC-3 interceptors. The Kh-32 is derived from the Kh-22, an anti-ship missile developed during the Cold War for striking US aircraft carriers. Such missiles carry warheads weighing nearly a metric ton [2,200 lbs] but are not highly accurate—an acceptable limitation when targeting large vessels like aircraft carriers, where the point of impact is largely irrelevant given the weapon’s destructive power. When used against cities, however, this lack of precision is catastrophic. In January 2023, a Kh-22 missile destroyed an entire section of a residential building in Dnipro, killing at least 46 people. The Kh-32 variant has a warhead smaller by about 20 percent and improved accuracy.

During a massive combined nighttime attack on Jan. 24, nearly the entire city of Chernihiv was left without power, while over 800,000 subscribers in Kyiv lost electricity, leading to disruptions in water and heating supply. Power outages were also recorded in other regions, including the Kharkiv region. In the city of Kharkiv, 31 civilians were injured.

That same evening, Ukraine  carried out retaliatory strikes against Russia. According to Belgorod region Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, a HIMARS strike—likely 20 rockets—damaged energy infrastructure in Belgorod, reportedly targeting the Belgorod TPP, with no casualties.

Energy facilities in Taganrog and Perm were also hit.

As in previous cases, the damage to Russian energy infrastructure remains vastly smaller than the sustained toll on Ukraine’s power grid.

Western Assistance

Ukraine has received French Rodeur 330 UAVs, which are capable of flying distances of up to 500 km [311 mi] and remaining airborne for up to five hours. However, they can carry a warhead of only 4 kg [8.8 lbs]. These drones can be used for reconnaissance missions or as loitering munitions. Such a small warhead is not capable of causing significant damage, but it can strike a small concentration of infantry or a vehicle. In this respect, the Rodeur-330 is comparable to Russia’s Lancet drone, which also carries a relatively small warhead. As a rule, long-range strike drones require a larger warhead in order to deliver more effective attacks deep behind enemy lines—for example, against ammunition storage facilities. For comparison, the Shahed-type loitering munition carries a warhead weighing up to 90 kg.

The German media outlet WELT has published a video report from the production facility of Flamingo cruise missiles at FirePoint’s factory. A co-owner of the company stated that production currently stands at three missiles per day, with plans to increase output to seven per day. It is worth noting that as early as August 2025, company representatives claimed they would reach this production rate by October. Meanwhile, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] has identified only four confirmed cases of Flamingo missile use, involving a total of about nine missiles. It remains unclear why, given the claimed production rate of around 90 missiles per month, these weapons are used so infrequently. One possible explanation is that FirePoint’s statements about the advance purchase of thousands of AI-25 engines do not reflect reality, and that the announced production figures may refer to airframes or missiles not yet equipped with engines.

Peace Talks

On Jan. 24, trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi concluded. Axios and the Agentstvo [Agency] independent media outlet collected comments from officials on all sides. US representatives expressed optimism, stating that the parties had managed to move onto a track that could help narrow differences on the key contentious issue of territorial control. One US official even stated that if the next trilateral meeting in Abu Dhabi proves more successful, it could lead to talks between the sides in Moscow or Kyiv—for the first time in many years. Ukrainian representatives described the talks as "constructive," but used more cautious language. One official said that although "significant progress" had been made, it remains unclear whether Putin truly wants to end the war and whether he will grant his negotiators the authority to reach an agreement. According to a source at a Russian state agency, the meeting was not without results. The negotiations are expected to continue in the coming week,  though prospects for a breakthrough remain limited.

Well-known Ukrainian volunteers and experts in unmanned systems, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov and Serhii Sternenko, have become advisers to Ukraine’s new Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov. These appointments underscore Ukraine’s priority on accelerating the development of the unmanned component of its armed forces.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

It is worth noting that by November 2025, the formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the RuAF had been completed, and their intensive staffing efforts were already underway. In January, active recruitment for contract service began among students in many educational institutions. Students are promised "guaranteed discharge" and reinstatement at their universities after one year of service; however, in practice they sign a standard MoD contract, which has been open-ended since the fall of 2022.

The MoD’s Telegram channel publishes daily posts calling for people to join the unmanned systems forces.

Parents of soldiers performing statutory military service from Tyumen have reported that contracts were signed on behalf of their sons without their consent. In October 2024, a similar situation occurred with conscripts from the 90th Tank Division stationed in the Chelyabinsk region, who discovered that commanders had signed contracts for them after noticing deposits into their bank accounts. Although the prosecutor’s office demanded that these contracts be terminated, the military unit refused to comply.

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