Sitrep for July 20-24, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Ukrainian Defense Minister Resigns
The shake-up in Ukraine’s military leadership continues to dominate recent headlines. General Yevhen Khmara remains acting defense minister. On July 22, following prolonged discussions and meetings with military personnel—and driven partly by public pressure—Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and Chief of Staff Anatoliy Hnatov. They were replaced by Major Generals Mykhailo Drapatyi, the former commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Ihor Skybiuk, the former commander of the Air Assault Forces, respectively. Both officers enjoy strong reputations, with Drapatyi in particular drawing widespread praise, including from Ukraine's former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, and Rob Lee, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Because the commander-in-chief directly oversees the conduct of the war, the specific reforms Drapatyi chooses to pursue will be critical. If he departs from Syrskyi’s approach and instead adopts Fedorov’s strategy, it would signal a radical shift. It is worth noting that the former defense minister advocated for "straightening the frontline"—withdrawing from militarily insignificant areas that consume vital resources to retreat to pre-fortified positions.
The primary demands of protesters were the resignation of Syrskyi and the reinstatement of Fedorov as defense minister, and demonstrations have persisted following Drapatyi’s appointment. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has sought to keep Fedorov on his team by offering various positions, including deputy prime minister for military technology. However, Fedorov has rejected compromise roles, insisting he will return only as head of the Ministry of Defense—one of the few positions offering meaningful influence over the war effort and the authority needed to combat procurement corruption.
Meanwhile, the Russian pro-war community, which celebrated Fedorov's initial resignation, has reacted far less favorably to Drapatyi’s appointment as commander-in-chief.
Frontline Situation Update
In the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions, the AFU continue to put pressure on the Russian Armed Forces.
In particular, videos have emerged showing Ukrainian positions near the village of Muravka in the Donetsk region, close to the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region. On July 23, DeepState also reported that Ukrainian forces had pushed Russian soldiers back from the village of Filia in the Dnipropetrovsk region, south of Novopavlivka.
At the same time, the AFU have long been conducting attacks along the Tolstoi–Voskresenka line and have been reported operating near the village of Myrne. Their apparent objective is to reach the banks of the Mokri Yaly River. It remains unclear whether the AFU will attempt to cross the river and enter the village of Komar, or instead continue advancing south along the river.
It is worth noting that, since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian forces have conducted counteroffensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction with the aim of reaching the road linking the village of Uspenivka and the village of Velyka Novosilka near the village of Temyrivka in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the borders of three regions meet. Doing so would have complicated the position of the RuAF in the Huliaipole direction.
Although the AFU advanced to the villages of Berezove, Ternove, and Zaporizke, they failed to cut the road. At present, they are exerting pressure on Russian forces along a broad front of roughly 50 km [31 mi], stretching from the village of Zlahoda (known as Pershotravneve until 2024) to the village of Muravka. The AFU may be attempting to pin down Russian forces in this sector, as it is directly connected to the Huliaipole direction, where the RuAF continue their offensive near the village of Zaliznychne.
By forcing the Russian command to redeploy troops there from the Orikhiv direction, the AFU also weaken the Russian offensive in that sector.
We continue to assess these southern sectors as not being priorities for the RuAF. The AFU's counteroffensive operations in the areas discussed above have no significant impact on the overall course of the war. However, they allow the Ukrainian side to claim tactical successes and the liberation of territory. As a result, when territorial changes are calculated on a monthly basis, these gains partially offset Russian advances on other sectors of the front.
Russia's priority remains the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction, where its main forces are committed. By contrast, the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions are held by Russia's 29th Combined Arms Army. As a result, a relatively weak army with only a single permanent brigade is responsible for a front approximately 50 km [31 mi] wide. By comparison, the considerably stronger 5th Combined Arms Army is responsible for a sector only about 20 km wide in the Huliaipole direction.
Despite the deployment of the 69th Brigade and the 120th Naval Infantry Division to reinforce the 29 CAA in the spring, the AFU continue to make gradual gains in these sectors.
Based on this information, we conclude that the weakening of Russian positions on the southern axis is not primarily the result of logistics strikes or the worsening fuel shortage that began in late spring. Rather, the AFU identified a sector where Russian defenses were comparatively weaker and concentrated their efforts there. Since this sector is not a priority for the RuAF, no significant reinforcement of its defenses occurred. The deteriorating logistical situation has further weakened Russian forces. Throughout the first half of the summer, however, it neither led to a collapse of the frontline nor produced any other major changes.
In about a week, various monitoring projects will publish their assessments of territorial changes in July. We expect the RuAF's net territorial gains to be either close to zero or even negative.
Russia's MoD claimed that its forces had completely taken control of the town of Bilytske, located north of the town of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region, using armored vehicles.
Around the same time, footage emerged showing Ukrainian FPVs striking Russian tanks near the village of Mayak, east of Bilytske.
One of the tanks had less improvised slat armor than usual, but it was equipped with an Arena-M active protection system, which is designed to intercept incoming threats by firing countermeasures at them. This is the first time a tank equipped with the Arena-M system has been observed deployed on the frontline rather than in footage from factories or training grounds. While the Arena-M system does not appear to engage the incoming drone in this video, it is possible that earlier drones were intercepted or that the APS was not functioning properly. The outcome of the attack remains unknown; therefore, it is not yet possible to assess the Arena-M system's effectiveness.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
As noted by pro-Russian milblogger Kirill Fyodorov, a July 19 post by the Ukrainian National Police about the airstrike on Sumy included photographs of a damaged warehouse containing boxes bearing the logo of the drone manufacturer Vyriy, as well as boxes of generators.
The police later deleted the post containing these photographs. For the Russian pro-war community, the fact that the strike hit a warehouse that was, at least in part, used for military purposes serves as justification for all strikes on Sumy and the resulting civilian casualties. Reports indicate that seven air-dropped bombs with Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) were used in the attack. One person was killed after a bomb struck a private house, and five others were injured.
On the morning of July 20, the Russian Aerospace Forces struck a residential building in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk region, with a UMPK-equipped air-dropped bomb. The attack killed 2 people and injured 16 others. A further strike on July 23 killed three more people and injured 28. It is worth noting that Pavlohrad is approximately 90 km [56 mi] from the frontline, whereas glide bombs are typically employed at distances of no more than 40-50 km [25-31 mi] from the frontline. It is therefore possible that the weapon used was actually the UMPB-5. As we reported in February, its range is up to 160 km [100 mi], or up to 200 km [125 mi] when equipped with a jet engine. Another possibility is that this was a different experimental long-range variant of the UMPK-equipped air-dropped bomb.
On July 21, a strike with guided air-dropped bombs on the city of Zaporizhzhia killed 3 people and injured 21 others. An additional 3 people were injured in a separate UAV strike.
Over the past weekend, reports indicated that 57 civilians were killed, including 41 in Ukrainian-controlled territory, while 403 people were injured. In recent weeks, we have consistently recorded approximately 20-30 civilian deaths and around 100-200 injuries per day. By comparison, according to BBC News Russian, they have documented at least 200 Russian soldiers killed per day on average over the past two years.
On July 20, the General Staff of the AFU claimed to have struck three tankers, a railway bridge, and six air defense systems. When reading such statements, it is important to remember that "struck" does not necessarily mean "destroyed." In this context, it is also worth noting that although Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU Robert "Madiar" Brovdi stated that Ukrainian strikes had disabled 75% of the Kerch ferry crossing's capacity and that the surviving ferries had been damaged and could no longer operate at full capacity, this does not mean that ferry traffic has ceased entirely. We examined Sentinel satellite imagery and found that at least one vessel continues to operate between Kerch and Port Kavkaz.
Another important issue is the impact of strikes on Russian oil refineries. According to the Kommersant daily newspaper, citing an analysis by Platts Analytics, refineries with a combined annual capacity of around 40 million tons of crude oil have resumed selling fuel on the Saint Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange after scheduled and emergency repairs. However, other oil refineries with a combined capacity of more than 45 million tons have yet to resume operations. As a result, wholesale trading volumes have increased, unmet demand has decreased and conditions at some gas stations have improved. Since Ukraine began its campaign of strikes on Wildberries’ warehouses, the number of attacks on oil refineries has declined significantly, although smaller plants continue to be targeted. This is most likely due to the resource constraints that Ukrainian forces are facing. Nevertheless, in the absence of further strikes on major oil refineries, they are gradually beginning to recover. The Russian government has already announced a partial stabilization of the fuel market. At a meeting chaired by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, officials set priorities for delivering fuel and petroleum products. As expected, government agencies, defense industry companies, Russian Railways [Russia's fully state-owned railway company], the civilian fleet and agricultural producers are to receive fuel first. Crimea and other occupied territories, as well as the Kaliningrad region, will be next in line.
Although oil refineries can still be considered civilian infrastructure, there is now an international consensus that strikes on them are a normal and necessary part of war to put pressure on the Russian economy. However, we continue to expect that fuel shortages will not halt Russian defense production. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine has reported that the Rostec state corporation has increased missile production. The Russian leadership will only cut spending on waging war only as a last resort.
The Vyorstka media outlet interviewed several servicemen about the fuel crisis. They said they were increasingly encountering fuel shortages on the frontline and lacked enough gasoline even for military vehicles. One serviceman said that in the past, units took whatever fuel they needed to carry out their missions. Now, however, they are now limited to no more than 20 liters per vehicle per day. Another serviceman estimated that fuel deliveries for military vehicles had decreased by one-third. A third serviceman said that gasoline deliveries to positions had declined from 20 liters to between 10 and 15 liters. Other Russian soldiers also confirmed that fuel deliveries had decreased.
It is unclear to us which gasoline-powered military vehicles they are referring to since tanks and infantry fighting vehicles use diesel fuel. They may be referring to UAZ Bukhanka vans or Lada Nivas. We would also caution against basing an entire analysis solely on complaints from individual Russian soldiers without independently verifying the information. One possible explanation for temporary fuel shortages in some sectors of the frontline is that unit commanders are exploiting the regional crisis by siphoning off fuel and selling it on the side.
On July 23, the price of Brent crude oil surpassed $100 per barrel for the first time in six weeks. This increase was driven by several factors, including reports of a potential closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an additional halt in shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, and the suspension of crude oil shipments by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. As we noted in our previous sitrep, the CPC terminal primarily serves Kazakhstan (accounting for approximately 80% of the country's production) and the United States. The terminal exports virtually no Russian oil. The rationale behind the strikes is unclear because stopping supplies of a competitor to Russian oil only increases Russian budget revenues.
Videos have been published showing several Ukrainian UAV strikes on ground surveillance radars in Yeysk, Krasnodar region.
It is reasonable to assume that these strikes are intended to clear the air defense zone in the Sea of Azov of anti-aircraft weapons, allowing Ukrainian drones to continue their campaign of strikes against Russian tankers. Notably, the strikes have targeted not only tankers, but also grain carriers. Moreover, Ukraine convened an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on July 22 due to Russian strikes on civilian vessels in the ports of Odessa, Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi, and Izmail.
Russian Miratorg Agribusiness Holding reported three attacks on warehouses in the Bryansk region. One facility sustained serious damage to several production buildings and a large area was engulfed in flames, though there were no casualties. At a second facility, a security guard was injured by shrapnel during a drone attack. A UAV attack damaged a feed truck that was being unloaded at a pig farm, but the driver was unharmed.
The Ukrainian military claims that the target of the strikes was fuel depots. However, we have not yet seen any convincing evidence of this.
Over the past week, the AFU has increasingly targeted gas stations in Belgorod and the Belgorod region. Approximately 20 gas stations have been attacked in the past five days. We view this as a continuation of the "tit for tat" strategy. Until recently, Russia was constantly striking Ukrainian gas stations with Shahed-136 [Geran-2] loitering munitions. The targeting of gas stations in Russian border regions (and occupied territories) is likely in retaliation for this.
We agree with political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov's assessment that the strikes on Wildberries mark a new phase in the evolution of the Russo-Ukrainian war—a phase of symmetrical terror. The policy of "forcing nations into peace" has now become bilateral. Exerting pressure on the civilian population by launching massive strikes against civilian infrastructure (even if it has dual-use functions) has become a fundamental task for the AFU, just as it has been for the RuAF over the past several years. From the perspective of the total war now being waged by both sides, there are effectively no illegitimate targets anymore. However, it should be remembered that an approach to warfare with no rules cuts both ways. The symmetry that has emerged in the conflict implies that both sides are now violating the laws and customs of war to an equal extent. This makes appeals to those norms little more than meaningless propaganda.
It is worth noting that although Wildberries does indeed list dual-use goods, including fiber-optic spools for drones, the mere presence of such listings on the marketplace's website does not mean that all of its warehouses were stocked with these items and therefore constituted legitimate military targets. Sellers may not store such goods in Wildberries warehouses at all, instead using the company's logistics network to deliver them to customers only after an order has been placed. We believe that such strikes have no meaningful impact on the course of the war but may create the false impression that tangible steps are being taken to bring about a Ukrainian victory, while in reality they only prolong the conflict.
On July 23, a Russian Post distribution center in the village of Nechayevka, Voronezh region, originally built to handle AliExpress deliveries, was struck. A Wildberries warehouse, which was also attacked that night, is located nearby; however, the strike on it did not result in a fire.
Some media outlets noticed a draft order on the Portal of Draft Regulatory Legal Acts governing the organization and conduct of civil defense within the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) and reported that Rosgvardia had been ordered to begin preparing in advance for mobilization and martial law. In reality, the new document simply brings Rosgvardia's internal regulations into line with federal legislation. In the summer of 2025, the State Duma amended the wording of the civil defense law. The law subsequently defined civil defense as a system for preparing to protect the population from hazards during mobilization, martial law and wartime. Previously, the law referred to protection "during or as a result of military conflicts, as well as during emergencies." We see no indication that Rosgvardia is preparing for mobilization. This is merely a routine administrative procedure.
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