dispatches
Yesterday

Sitrep for July 17-20, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On July 6, Robert "Madiar" Brovdi, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, announced the start of Operation MoLoChKa, which stands for "Moscow will fall through Crimea." The operation involves numerous strikes against Russian vessels in the Azov and Black Seas. On July 18, Brovdi revealed the military impact of the operation. The Russian Armed Forces are redeploying Rubicon UAV units, as well as air defense units, from the frontline to the coast (the Atesh movement reported this on July 16). The redeployment is intended to protect the "shadow fleet," as well as bridges and other infrastructure.

Based on open sources, we cannot yet confirm this, but we expect objective surveillance footage to emerge soon. Assuming the deployment information is accurate, the question arises as to the directions from which the drone operators were deployed and whether the AFU can exploit the RuAF’s vulnerabilities. In some areas, it is possible that the Russian army's rear areas will be exposed. In this case, Ukrainian drone operators will be able to more successfully target the enemy's logistics and military facilities. We also expect the strike campaign against tankers and other vessels to intensify further during the war at sea.

Additionally, on July 19, drones attacked the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) marine terminal near Novorossiysk; two sea tankers, the ASIA and NISSOS IOS, were damaged. On July 20, another tanker, the NELSA, was attacked while loading. Since the CPC terminal is located some distance from the Port of Novorossiysk, where Russian military ships are based, we believe this attack was targeted. This is not the first attack on the consortium's facilities. At the end of November 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan protested the attacks, and on July 19, the ministry condemned another one. It is worth noting that the terminal primarily serves Kazakhstan and the United States, exporting virtually no Russian oil. In February 2026, the US State Department warned Ukraine against strikes affecting American interests. Ukraine does not accuse Kazakhstan of directly assisting the Russian Federation, unlike Belarus, which provides direct assistance.

The General Staff of the AFU reported that, in the early hours of July 18, Ukrainian forces struck a Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol vessel operated by the Border Service of the Federal Security Service [FSB]. The statement further noted that two vessels of this class had been hit over the preceding two days. These patrol boats are tasked with securing the Black Sea and are equipped to defend against attacks by unmanned surface vessels. Their targeting therefore appears to be part of preparations for future Ukrainian USV operations against tankers, Russian naval vessels—including those in the port of Novorossiysk—and potentially even the Crimean Bridge. A similar pattern was observed earlier, when Ukrainian forces systematically targeted Russian air defense systems in the occupied territories of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to enable UAVs to operate with greater freedom and strike logistical infrastructure.

In response to these Ukrainian attacks, Russian forces have continued striking container ships and bulk carriers, including those transporting grain from Ukrainian ports. Footage released by Russian sources suggests that RuAF drones are also employing automatic target acquisition or guidance technology. The videos show the designated point of impact highlighted by a small green targeting box. Notably, both sides appear to prioritize the ship's bridge rather than its central hull, aiming to maximize casualties among the crew and destroy expensive navigation and communications equipment. Damage to other sections of a vessel is generally less difficult to repair.

In addition to UAVs, the RuAF have also begun employing air-launched missiles against civilian shipping. On July 19, three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles hit the Golden Leo, a civilian bulk carrier transporting corn, in the Odesa region. The attack ignited a fire aboard the ship. Ten of the vessel's seventeen crew members were killed, including a Ukrainian pilot as well as citizens of Syria and India. Russia was evidently willing to expend expensive cruise missiles to carry out what appears to be a retaliatory strike.

Over the past several days, Ukrainian forces have also conducted UAV strikes against several of Wildberries' largest logistics warehouses. On July 18, drones struck Wildberries facilities in Kotovsk, Tambov region—a major regional logistics hub—and in Elektrostal, Moscow region, one of the company's largest distribution centers nationwide. In Kotovsk, seven employees working the night shift were killed and another twenty-four were injured. In Elektrostal, fifty-seven people were wounded, one of whom later died from injuries sustained in the attack. In nearby Noginsk, four additional civilians were reportedly injured by the falling debris of what may have been intercepted drones. In an official statement, Volodymyr Zelenskyy explicitly described the strikes as retaliation for Russia's attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

At around 4:00 a.m. on July 20, UAVs struck a Wildberries warehouse in the city of Podolsk in the Moscow region, sparking a major fire.

Some of the drones were apparently intercepted and crashed into residential areas of the city. Footage also emerged showing walls scarred by prefabricated shrapnel from interceptor munitions. One of the drones struck the upper floors of a residential high-rise. The available footage contains no audible explosion—only the sound of the impact—after which leaking fuel ignited, triggering a fire.

In addition to the Wildberries warehouse, Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in Podolsk and a warehouse in the Yuzhnye Vrata Industrial Park in the city of Domodedovo, Moscow region, during the overnight attack. Governor Andrey Vorobyov said that 10 people, including one child, were injured in the drone raid across the region.

It is worth noting that Russia has repeatedly struck Nova Poshta [a private Ukrainian postal and courier company] terminals with missiles and glide bombs, destroying them and often causing civilian casualties. Although Wildberries is used to purchase dual-use and military-related goods, that does not make all of its warehouses legitimate military targets. This is the same standard we have consistently applied to Ukraine’s Nova Poshta, and we take the same view of warehouses in Russia.

Wildberries is Russia's largest online marketplace, and purchases made by volunteers and military personnel account for only a small fraction of the company's overall business. Drone manufacturers, meanwhile, do not buy components individually through online marketplaces; they purchase them wholesale from China and ship them via Russian Post or other logistics companies.

All such strikes constitute war crimes because they provide no significant military advantage. They are part of an ever-escalating spiral of violence, in which Russian strikes prompt Ukrainian retaliatory attacks, which are then branded as terrorist acts in Russia and used to justify further reprisals.

Even if Russian soldiers were completely deprived of volunteer support and the ability to purchase equipment and components through online marketplaces, it would not bring combat operations to a halt, although it would make them more difficult. The same applies to fuel: disruptions to its supply have only a limited impact on military operations.

In response to the strikes on Wildberries warehouses, the RuAF have targeted Ukrainian logistics facilities. In the early hours of July 19, they destroyed the large AMTEL logistics center in the Kyiv region, and later that day struck a Nova Poshta terminal in a suburb of the city of Kharkiv.

In the early hours of July 18, two Iskander ballistic missiles were deployed against the territory of Ukraine; neither was intercepted. In the early hours of July 19, one of the most massive ballistic strikes was launched against Kyiv: 25 Iskander ballistic missiles or S-400 SAM system missiles were deployed (17 were intercepted) and 10 Zircon hypersonic missiles (none were intercepted). In the previous sitrep, we assumed that the AFU had received a small batch of PAC-3 anti-aircraft missiles. During the attack, a factory and warehouses of the Ukrainian company UKRTAC, which produces military gear and personal protective equipment, were destroyed—unlike the previous warehouses, this one is a legitimate military target.

Strikes on Russian warehouses may have a political impact. According to reports on the hacked correspondence of Ksenia Sobchak, a Russian public figure, TV anchor, journalist, and socialite who is the daughter of Putin's former boss, (assuming the correspondence is genuine), the Moscow administration's sharp reaction to any footage of fires is evident, even if the footage does not directly show attacking drones and explosions. At the same time, we do not expect that a strategy of long-range strikes can compel Putin to freeze the war or at least to an agreement on a mutual cessation of long-range strikes. We understand the emotions of Ukrainians and the desire for revenge, but we believe that strikes on Russian cities will not lead to any military effect.

Despite the fact that we classify attacks on Wildberries warehouses as war crimes, we do not expect that the perpetrators will face appropriate punishment.

With Trump’s rise to power, the practice of permissiveness based on the right of might is only expanding, and any departure from laws, rules, and norms is forgiven for the victors. For example, Ahmad al-Sharaa, who was one of the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch) under the pseudonym Abu Muhammad al-Julani and spent years on the most-wanted terrorist lists worldwide, is now a respected partner, visiting the UN Assembly and meeting with Trump at the White House.

The war in Ukraine is increasingly resembling the "war of the cities" format from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when combat operations reached a stalemate and were reduced to mutual missile strikes on cities, causing numerous casualties. Unfortunately, such a war can last a very long time. The New Yorker, citing a military source in Moscow, reported that events are moving precisely toward that scenario. We believe that, in effect, the "war of the cities" has already begun.

We still see no reasons for mobilization: neither a one-time mass draft nor a gradual draft over several months would ensure a sharp acceleration of Russian advances on the frontline. Mobilization will not enable the Russian army to achieve a strategic breakthrough and quickly complete the capture of the Donbas. Even with an increase in manpower, the tactics of small assault groups and gradual "infiltration" will not lead to a significant acceleration of the advance. Returning to attacks by mechanized columns will not succeed when the frontline is saturated with drones, and Russia's ability to supply new units with armored vehicles is limited.

At the same time, mobilization carries political risks and damage to the economy, while its absence will not lead to sudden significant Ukrainian successes. We consider the reports of roundups in the Penza region or quotas for sending workers to the frontline at enterprises in Buryatia [Russia's constituent republic] to be signs not of an impending mobilization, but of approaching deadlines for the governors. They will be evaluated based not only on the percentage of votes for United Russia [Putin's ruling party] but also on their ability to fulfill the recruitment plan for the war.

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