Sitrep for April 10-13, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
On April 10, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of two settlements for the first time since the beginning of the month: the border village of Myropilske in the Sumy region (north of the village of Hrabovske) and the village of Dibrova in the Donetsk region (north-west of the village of Fedorivka Druha, in the Sloviansk direction—not to be confused with the village of Dibrova west of Yampil).
DeepState also marked another advance by the Russian Armed Forces in the border zone—this time near the village of Veterynarne in the Kharkiv region, north of the village of Kozacha Lopan. It was there, according to the analysts, that video was filmed of another war crime—the execution of four captured Ukrainian servicemen.
In the Zaporizhzhia region, the RuAF advanced south of the town of Huliaipole and captured the village of Myrne. Apparently, this became possible, in part, because the units of the 225th Assault Regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which holds positions in this area, are extremely exhausted. Not far from Myrne, a video was recently filmed showing a Russian T-80BVM tank reportedly shelling Ukrainian positions—judging by the footage the forest lines were hit with indirect fire from a distance.
In the Kupiansk direction Russian troops continue attempts to advance north and east of the town. Footage has emerged taken at the town monument sign on the eastern outskirts of Kupiansk, with a comment from a Russian serviceman saying that soldiers have arrived at positions in Kupiansk and are mopping-up basements and houses. This format is typical for official video reports from the Russian MoD; however, the substance of this video directly contradicts claims of the complete capture of the town.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
When Vladimir Putin announced the Easter ceasefire, it was initially unclear whether it applied to ground combat operations or was limited solely to the suspension of long-range aerial strikes. However, in a subsequent statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense dated April 12, it was clarified that the ceasefire included a halt to ground combat operations. Nevertheless, as with previous ceasefires, UAV strikes, small-arms fire and localized engagements continued to occur.
Notably, the Ukrainian Air Force did not publish a report during the ceasefire period: following the report for April 11 (prior to the ceasefire), the next report covered only the period from 00:10 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on April 13. This likely indicates that the Ukrainian side acknowledged a limited effect of the ceasefire, with no reported strikes involving missiles, Shahed-type UAVs or aerial bombs during the declared timeframe.
At the same time, according to our Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure Summary, at least 17 people were killed and 99 wounded over the weekend on both sides of the frontline. This level of casualties is not significantly different from typical weekend figures.
By our estimates, at least 11 individuals were wounded during the Easter ceasefire period:
- The Sumy Regional Prosecutor’s Office reported that on April 11, during the ceasefire, a UAV strike on a civilian vehicle in the Svessa community wounded a 59-year-old man. In the Hlukhiv community, three medical personnel were injured in a drone strike on an ambulance
- In the Kharkiv region, according to the prosecutor’s office, four UAV strikes using Gerbera and Molniya types targeted the village of Zolochiv on the morning of April 12. A 32-year-old man sustained burns, while a 63-year-old woman suffered an acute stress reaction
- Governor of the Kursk region Alexander Khinshtein reported that on April 11, after 4:00 p.m. and during the ceasefire, a UAV struck a gas station in the town of Lgov, injuring three civilians: a one-year-old child sustained shrapnel wounds to the head, the child’s mother suffered blast-related injuries, and a man sustained a thigh injury
- Governor of the Belgorod region Vyacheslav Gladkov stated that on April 12, a UAV strike on a vehicle along the Yasnye Zori–Oktyabrsky road caused a man to suffer blast trauma and shrapnel wounds to the chest; he was later released for outpatient treatment
In summary, the Easter ceasefire did not result in any fundamental reduction in civilian casualties, despite the apparent absence of long-range strike activity.
Ukraine is increasingly employing operational-tactical middle-strike drones in its aerial campaign. On April 10, Lasar’s Group reported strikes against an S-300V SAM system launcher and guidance station positioned in the Russian rear in the Zaporizhzhia direction. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces released a compilation of strikes targeting warehouses and arsenals located 100 kilometers [60 mi] or more from the frontline.
Clément Molin, a French researcher, continues to track these long-range operations. As previously noted, his data indicates that March 2026 was the first month in which the number of long-range drones launched by Ukraine exceeded those deployed by Russia. He further estimates that since the beginning of the year, the AFU have carried out 415 geolocated drone strikes using FP-1 and FP-2 models against targets in occupied territories more than 20 kilometers [12 mi] from the frontline, with the majority occurring since February. He noted that these attacks frequently target radar installations and air defense units, effectively paving the way for subsequent raids on facilities in Crimea.
On the frontline, Hornet UAVs from the company Swift Beat—referred to by pro-Russian Telegram-channels as the Martian II—are seeing increased use. Last week, footage emerged of one such drone shot down over the Donetsk region, as well as clips showing strikes on a boat carrying Russian soldiers on the Dnipro River west of Kherson, and on a Zoopark-1M counter-battery radar system. In the footage of the latter strike, the interface displays the label "VEH/ARM," suggesting the drone may be equipped with machine-vision technology capable of identifying and potentially homing in on military hardware.
Reports have also surfaced regarding a makeshift Russian air defense system mounted on a Ural truck chassis and armed with R-77 air-to-air missiles. Western allies have previously adapted air-to-air missiles to ground launchers in a similar fashion, resulting in "FrankenSAM" projects or the British-made Raven systems supplied to the AFU. The emergence of such improvised equipment points to a shortage of standard air defense systems and munitions, including the S-300V4 and S-400, the Tor and Buk SAM systems and the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system.
Estonia will not detain Russian shadow fleet vessels in the Baltic Sea due to the risk of military escalation.
Sources of The New York Times, in an article on potential Chinese supplies of MANPADS to Iran, reported that Russia is assisting Iran with food, satellite data and non-lethal military supplies. According to US officials, Putin is wary of falling out with Trump, and therefore Moscow is not supplying Tehran with offensive or defensive weapons.
On April 12, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s party Fidesz, which had been in power since 2010, lost the elections. The involvement of Donald Trump and JD Vance in the campaign on their side likely worked against them. The opposition center-right party Tisza, led by Péter Magyar, is projected to secure a constitutional majority—more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Although Magyar had opposed sending Hungarian troops or weapons to Ukraine, Politico reported that, in an effort to improve relations with Brussels, he is likely to unblock an EU loan to Ukraine worth €90 billion. At the same time, on March 8, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stated that he would continue to block the provision of the EU loan to Ukraine if Orbán were to lose the election.
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