Sitrep for April 24-May 2, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kupiansk direction, according to researcher Playfra, Russian forces have been actively attempting since January to infiltrate from the village of Pishchane into the village of Kurylivka, which lies directly adjacent to the western outskirts of the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi. As a result, infantry units are gradually moving into the area from Kurylivka, advancing building by building. A similar pattern of infiltration is taking place in the village of Kivsharivka, south of Kurylivka, although the concentration of the Russian Armed Forces there is lower than around Kurylivka. It appears that Russian forces are attempting to split the Ukrainian foothold east of the Oskil River into two, making it easier to push the Armed Forces of Ukraine back across the river.

The Kostiantynivka direction remains one of the priority axes for the RuAF, and the situation for Ukrainian forces in the town of Kostiantynivka is becoming increasingly difficult. According to DeepState, Russian troops have advanced to the east and south of the town.

Footage from the area around Kostiantynivka shows a road littered with destroyed ground robots, as well as leaning or collapsed poles that once supported anti-drone nets (as previously mentioned, the AFU have been creating such protected "corridors" for logistics, while the RuAF are attempting to destroy them). A structure based on wooden poles can hardly be considered reliable, since the poles can be relatively easily knocked down by UAV strikes; however, it can still provide some degree of protection for vehicles.

The Russian side is actively employing ground robotic systems, including various modifications of the Courier UGV, capable of deploying smoke screens or equipped with automatic grenade launchers or drilling tools. The latter are used to install poles when building engineering structures (such as overhead netting along roads). In conditions where enemy drones disrupt the work of equipment and construction crews at distances of up to 15 kilometers [9,32 mi] from the line of contact, ground robots can partially replace human labor.

General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the AFU and current ambassador to the United Kingdom, shared his views on modern warfare with a media outlet. He said that, with the current level of technological development, large-scale breakthroughs have become virtually impossible, unlike tactical operations, such as the capture of specific positions. Neither side can secretly concentrate forces for an operational-level breakthrough over distances of 100, 150 or 200 kilometers [62, 93 or 124 mi], and once the enemy detects signs of a buildup, it will attack those forces. Consequently, the current war has effectively reached a stalemate, and the slow pace of advance seen today by the RuAF could take decades. Therefore, what happens in the rear areas, beyond the reach of tactical drones, has become more important. Here, Zaluzhnyi appears to be alluding to strikes on defense industry facilities, oil refineries and ports.

Rob Lee, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, disagreed with the former commander-in-chief’s remarks and pointed to Ukrainian offensive operations near Kupiansk and in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. These operations demonstrate that such maneuvers are possible, even at the brigade and regiment level, with as few as a company of infantry available. Breakthroughs are achievable even in such cases if the AFU have the capacity to exploit initial gains. Lee argues that it is unnecessary to concentrate all forces in one place. With proper planning, a force of one to two companies can suffice to initiate an operation. Then, larger numbers of troops would be required to expand the breakthrough. He believes all of this is feasible with careful operational planning, thorough rehearsal of maneuvers, effective reconnaissance, and the strategic use of firepower. Strong coordination between different units and branches is also essential.

We agree that the two aforementioned AFU operations were successful, but they were conducted at the tactical or operational-tactical level, not the operational or strategic level. While it is possible to initiate a breakthrough with relatively small forces, expanding it requires bringing up much larger forces. Once these forces are relatively close to the line of contact, they inevitably become targets for the enemy’s UAVs. In our view, Lee’s arguments reinforce Zaluzhnyi’s thesis that breakthroughs at the strategic level are impossible and that only tactical or operational-tactical ones are feasible.

With the onset of a new month, several analytical projects have again released data on the rate of Russian advances. The pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz project reported that in April the rate of advance of the RuAF nearly doubled in April compared to March: 329 square kilometers [127 square miles] in April versus 166 square kilometers [64 square miles] in March. However, according to estimates by analysts at DeepState, the rate of Russian advance in April was slightly lower than in March: 141 square kilometers [55 square miles] versus 160 square kilometers [61 square miles], respectively. Last year, the first four months were also characterized by relatively low rates of advancement, followed by a sharp increase in May and June. The current discrepancy in assessments may be explained not only by alignment with one side or the other, but also by differences in methodology, particularly in how captured territory and the contested zone are calculated.

A separate issue concerns manpower within the RuAF. Although, according to Ukrainian data, Russian losses have consistently exceeded recruitment since December (the exact margin remains unclear), this trend has not yet been reflected on the frontline. There have been no new offensive operations by the AFU, while Russian forces continue a slow advance despite an apparent manpower shortfall and the resulting emergence of more vulnerable sectors along the line. It is likely that in May-June, when frontline activity traditionally increases and attempts to breach defensive lines intensify, it will become clearer whether the manpower situation will escalate into a serious crisis for the RuAF.

Dmitry Medvedev [Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council] stated on April 29 that since the beginning of 2026, 127,000 people in Russia have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense, and another 10,000—with volunteer formations. In late March, Medvedev said that over 80,000 people had signed military service contracts since the start of the year. Thus, on average, about 27,000 people per month signed contracts before the beginning of April, and around 47,000 signed contracts in April (excluding volunteer fighters). This is not the first time that Russian officials' statements have contradicted their previous claims. Currently, there are no signs of a twofold increase in recruitment. Even if this sharp increase occurred, it has not yet affected the frontlines.

According to Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin’s adviser Yury Ushakov, the two leaders agreed on a ceasefire for Victory Day during a phone call. Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not give direct consent to the ceasefire, suspecting that Putin wants to ensure several hours of safety to hold the parade. In turn, the Russian president’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov stated that the ceasefire would be implemented regardless of Ukraine’s position, which caused confusion on our part.

Based on the experience of previous "ceasefires," we expect that the "ceasefire" on May 9 may lead to a slowdown in combat operations on the frontline, but overall fighting will continue. It is possible that Russia will refrain from long-range air attacks on that day.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of May 1, Ukrainian drones once again struck Tuapse. A fire broke out on the territory of the maritime terminal, and at least one fuel tank caught fire at the Tuapse oil refinery. This marks the fourth raid in recent weeks targeting the terminal and refinery, which together form Rosneft’s production complex in Tuapse.

At the same time, Russian forces appear to have repeatedly attacked the city of Odesa over the past week in response to the strikes on Tuapse. In the early hours of April 27, Russian drones also targeted the port of Chornomorsk. A 6,000-ton sunflower oil storage tank was damaged, causing a spill into the sea. During a strike on Odesa in the early hours of May 1, fires broke out in two high-rise buildings.

Footage has been published showing the use in Ukraine of a previously unseen air defense system, referred to as the Stash system, which closely resembles the Tempest air defense system and also uses Hellfire missiles. Based on its appearance, the Stash system may incorporate Israeli-made RADA radar systems, which are widely used in Ukraine.

Following a diplomatic scandal, an Israeli importer refused a vessel carrying grain from occupied Ukrainian territories.

The General Staff of the AFU stated that as a result of a drone attack on the Shagol airfield in the Chelyabinsk region on April 25, two Sukhoi Su-57 multirole fighter aircraft and one Sukhoi Su-34 of the Russian Aerospace Forces, as well as one additional unidentified aircraft were hit. The extent of the damage cannot be independently confirmed. Since the aircraft were later relocated, it can be assumed they were not destroyed.

Footage has also emerged showing the simultaneous deployment of UMPB (Universal Inter-Branch Gliding Munition) and air-dropped bombs equipped with UMPK (Universal Gliding and Correction Module) from a Su-34 bomber of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Previously, the maximum number of guided air-dropped bombs carried by such a bomber was four.

According to an Agence France-Presse article, Ukrainian authorities claim that Russian forces are deliberately striking Ukrainian cities during the daytime to increase civilian casualties. We agree that Russia is waging a campaign of terror against Ukrainian civilians, a topic we have addressed repeatedly in our own materials. However, based on our data, these daytime strikes are not occurring in isolation, but rather as a continuation of nighttime attacks. These attacks appear to be aimed at exhausting the military personnel defending against the raids, as well as the civilian population. At other times, we continue to observe nighttime strikes as before. It can be assumed that these daytime attacks are experimental in nature, for now.

Eight months after the first reports about them appeared, researcher Dnipro OSINT analyzed the results of the use of FP-5 Flamingo missiles. According to open-source data, of the 23 recorded launches across six attacks, only six missiles reached the general target area, and just two resulted in confirmed direct hits. Verified successes include strikes on a GRAU arsenal in Kotluban in the Volgograd region and a facility producing Iskander ballistic missiles in Votkinsk. Analysts concluded that the strike on the facility was accurate. However, a missile failed to hit its target at the Kapustin Yar military test range.

As we have noted repeatedly, the claims made by Fire Point appear exaggerated. Both the timelines and production volumes almost always differed significantly from what was promised in press releases.

A video has been published showing a Russian FPV operator inspecting a Ukrainian "mothership drone" (either an FP-1 or an FP-2) that had fallen into a body of water. The drone was equipped with a Starlink terminal and carried FPV drones on its wings. As we noted in our previous sitrep, Russian drones have been using Starlink terminals that were previously installed on Ukrainian UAVs and not removed from the "whitelists" in time. Any Ukrainian drones with such terminals that are not completely destroyed after crashing or landing may now be of interest to Russian drone operators.

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