Sitrep for April 13-24, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On April 20, Yuliia Kyriienko-Merinova, a journalist from Ukraine’s Television News Service (TSN), reported a deterioration in the situation in the Sumy region, noting that four Russian incursions had been recorded along Ukraine’s border. Small groups of Russian Armed Forces personnel are advancing from the east and north, and assault actions have begun in some areas. Kyriienko-Merinova described the potential partial encirclement of the city of Sumy as the most unfavorable scenario.

However, the current situation in the Sumy direction does not pose an immediate threat to the regional center, a view also shared by analysts from DeepState. As previously noted, the largest Russian foothold is located near the village of Yunakivka. Fighting there began about a year ago, and there has been no significant advance for quite some time. We do not consider this position, along with the other small footholds, to pose a real threat to Sumy, since any further advance toward the city would require far greater forces than those needed to establish a border foothold.

The Russian Ministry of Defense reported the capture of the village of Veterynarne in the Kharkiv region, where, according to DeepState, a video showing the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war was recorded earlier this month. The capture of Veterynarne, located north of the village of Kozacha Lopan, indicates another minor advance in the border area.

In the Lyman direction, according to researcher Playfra, Ukrainian forces have installed barbed wire near the village of Staryi Karavan on the bank of the Siverskyi Donets River. This could pose a significant obstacle for Russian infantry and vehicles, though drones can effectively patrol such fortified areas. Russian forces are attempting to establish positions along the river that would allow drone operators to strike Ukrainian logistics in the city of Sloviansk.

In the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction, the RuAF are gradually advancing from Riznykivka through Kalenyky toward Rai-Oleksandrivka. Elevation maps show that the first two villages are located in a narrow lowland that extends to Rai-Oleksandrivka. The outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka are already in the contested zone.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, footage has emerged showing the destruction of Russian ground robotic systems used for logistics support and munitions resupply. While imagery of Ukrainian robotic systems appears more frequently in open sources—and Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that Ukrainian forces have successfully seized positions using unmanned ground systems—the RuAF also routinely deploy such platforms. Following the introduction of whitelisted Starlink terminals, as previously reported by military analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, production of these systems in Russia has significantly slowed down. This is attributed to the fact that Starlink Mini terminals had served as an optimal communications solution for such platforms. Additional reporting from Aleksey Chadayev, head of the Ushkuynik research and production center, indicates that the loss of Starlink connectivity has resulted in major operational disruptions for these robotic systems due to communications failures.

According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian forces are attempting to intensify offensive operations from the direction of Chasiv Yar, specifically from the Novopivnichnyj neighborhood, toward the villages of Viroliubivka and Novodmytrivka. These efforts appear to be aimed at facilitating the advance of Russian units pushing toward Kostiantynivka from the south and southeast. According to DeepState, Russian forces have recently been making sustained attempts to infiltrate the town, employing large numbers of infantry. The most intense activity has been recorded in the southeastern residential areas of Kostiantynivka. Analysts also report ongoing attempts by Russian troops to seize Novodmytrivka. Ukrainian drone operators report a significant manpower shortage within the AFU along this sector of the frontline, limiting their ability to contain Russian assaults. Although UAVs are actively engaged in efforts to suppress advancing forces, the sheer volume of Russian infantry is gradually eroding Kostiantynivka’s defenses. In addition, the town remains under constant artillery and air strikes. By systematically destroying structures that could serve as defensive positions, Russian forces are further degrading Ukraine’s ability to hold the line.

Reports of significant infantry concentrations near Kostiantynivka carry additional weight amid an ongoing debate over dwindling recruitment for the RuAF and claims from the Ukrainian command that, since December 2025, Russian losses have outpaced enlistment. Janis Kluge, a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, calculated that recruitment for the RuAF in the first three months of 2026 fell 20 percent compared to the same period in 2025. Nevertheless, there is currently no evidence that this decline has markedly impacted the frontline, nor can we confirm Ukrainian reports of high casualty rates in recent months. It is entirely possible that the AFU’s current plight in the Kostiantynivka direction is driven primarily by a shortage of Ukrainian personnel, stemming from either mounting losses or slowing recruitment.

In a further development regarding ground-based robotics, Jakub Janovsky, an OSINT researcher and administrator of the Oryx project, announced that the group will stop tracking losses of reconnaissance UAVs, "ground drones," and certain light vehicles, such as UAZ-452 Bukhanka vans and Ulans. The decision follows the rapid proliferation of these systems; since late 2025, ground robots have been deployed on the frontline in numbers too vast for objective, systematic counting. The Oryx project faced a similar shift in 2022 when it maintained separate tallies for Mavic-style drones and specific MANPADS. While aerial drones gained prominence in 2023 and fiber-optic drones surged in 2024, the current phase of the war is defined by the mass adoption of robotic systems. Meanwhile, unmanned surface vessels, which once exerted a significant influence on the Black Sea, are now reported far less frequently.

In the Pokrovsk direction, the Russian MoD claimed the capture of the village of Hryshyne, northwest of the town of Pokrovsk. This aligns with our observations over the past several weeks, which showed Russian soldiers advancing steadily through the village toward the north and northwest. A recent Ukrainian airstrike on Russian positions in a building in central Hryshyne further suggests that the village has likely fallen under Russian control.

In the Huliaipole direction, Russian forces have advanced south of the village of Zaliznychne, in the vicinity of the village of Myrne. As we previously reported, this sector is held by elements of the Ukrainian 225th Assault Regiment. The apparent depletion of their resources has likely enabled RuAF to intensify their advance along this section of the front.

In the Orikhiv direction, southeast of Orikhiv in the Zaporizhzhia region, the village of Mala Tokmachka is located. The southeastern outskirts of the village have long been considered contested and are regularly targeted by Russian forces. Fighting in this area has been reported for over a year by pro-Russian blogger Boris Rozhin on Channel One [Russian state-owned TV channel]. In mid-April, Mala Tokmachka gained attention due to a viral video. According to Playfra, Russian forces launched another attack south of the village on April 21, which was unsuccessful. The most recent confirmed advance in this area, according to DeepState, dates back to January 2026.

General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, again claimed during a recent briefing that Russian forces have fully captured the Luhansk region. This marks at least the fifth such statement and is unlikely to reflect the situation on the ground. Small areas of the region, the villages of Hrekivka and Nadiia, and two villages named Novoiehorivka, appear to remain outside Russian control, although there have been no recent reports of active offensive operations there.

Gerasimov also announced the completion of efforts to clear Ukrainian bridgeheads east of the Oskil River in the Kupiansk direction. Previously, he stated that a 2×3 km [1.24x1.86 mi] area near the village of Novoosynove (close to the village of Kivsharivka) remained under Ukrainian control. This assessment also appears inconsistent with battlefield realities, and it remains unclear how long it would take for Russian forces to align their claims with actual conditions on the ground.

Meanwhile, the AFU are also facing difficulties in the Kupiansk direction. It has been reported that personnel from the 14th Brigade and the 10th Corps have been holding positions for an extended period without rotation or adequate supplies. Available footage shows signs of severe exhaustion. The situation appears to stem from the fact that these troops were operating as attached units, having been reassigned from their parent formations to another command that failed to provide sufficient logistical support. An inspection from the General Staff of the AFU found that resupply of the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oskil River is currently carried out either by UAVs or by small watercraft crossing the river, which is significantly more difficult. As a result, these troops were holding positions without sufficient food or water, while brigade leadership reportedly concealed the true situation from higher command, including the loss of certain positions. Following the inspection, the commanders of the 14th Brigade and the 10th Corps were dismissed.

Gerasimov also stated that fighting was ongoing in the suburbs of Kostiantynivka, including in the villages of Illinivka and Novodmytrivka. This aligns with reports from the ground but contradicts his earlier claim that Russian forces control 60% of the town. Additionally, Gerasimov claimed that urban combat is now underway in Orikhiv. If accurate, this would imply that Mala Tokmachka is already in Russian rear areas—a claim that does not correspond to the current situation.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of April 20, during a UAV raid on Tuapse, one person was killed and another was wounded. The strike hit the Tuapse Oil Refinery’s tank farm, causing an oil spill and what was described as "oil rain." Following a previous strike on April 16, a fire at the refinery burned for several days.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published satellite imagery showing the aftermath of a strike by R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles on the Atlant Aero plant in Taganrog in the early hours of April 19. One building was destroyed and another was damaged. During a previous strike on the same facility of Jan. 13, 2026, one building had also been seriously damaged.

Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military expert and an assistant to the Minister of Defense, reported that his home was among the targets of an aerial attack on the Kyiv region in the early hours of April 20. His house was destroyed and he was injured. This is not the first assassination attempt on a Ukrainian public figure. On May 1, 2025, Serhii Sternenko, another assistant to the Minister of Defense, was attacked. On March 29, 2022, a missile strike hit the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration building, killing 36 people. According to Vitalii Kim, Head of the Mykolaiv Regional Military Administration, the missile was intended to strike his office. We also reported on the death of Oleksii Vadaturskyi in August 2022.

On the morning of April 22, the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU reported eight FP-2 drone strikes on a command post and a "Mobile Operations Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation" facility in Donetsk. The strikes killed 12 Russian law enforcement officers and injured 15 others. Previously, there had been no information about such a unit within the known structure of the FSB’s central apparatus. This unit may be newly formed or have been incorporated after the annexation of the Donetsk region.

President Zelenskyy announced that ten-year contracts have been signed with three Middle Eastern countries—the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar—for the joint production of drones.

According Beskrestnov, Russian drones are using Starlink terminals that were previously installed in Ukrainian drones. The Vyorstka media outlet published an article about the registration of these terminals via front persons, or "drops." First, the devices are delivered to Ukraine for verification and activation. Then, they are transported to Russia via Europe or Crimea.

Colby Badhwar, a columnist for The Insider [independent Russian investigative media outlet], said that the manufacturer of the Swedish Gripen fighter jets failed to win an aircraft supply contract for the nineteenth time. This time, Peru chose to purchase F-16 fighter aircraft instead. Badhwar believes that the Gripen is the worst of the fourth-generation fighters. However, we believe that things are not so bad and that Ukraine could successfully use these aircraft as a form of airborne air defense. Different countries have different requirements and budgets, and the Gripen was designed to be a compact, relatively inexpensive and easy-to-maintain fighter for air forces with limited resources.

The Times reported that despite promises by Keir Starmer, the British government has not seized vessels from Russia’s "shadow fleet" due to concerns that maintaining them would cost tens of millions of pounds. The case of the Matthew, a vessel detained by Irish authorities in 2023 with cocaine on board, was cited as an example of the enormous expenses. Its maintenance, security and docking have cost over £10 million thus far. The New York Times also reported that the Trump administration spent $47 million over three months to store a single tanker carrying Venezuelan oil seized on Dec. 10. In countries governed by the rule of law, authorities cannot simply confiscate and sell such vessels or their cargo without lengthy legal proceedings.

The Council of the European Union has formally approved a €90 billion loan for Ukraine. The first installment is expected to be disbursed as early as May. Earlier, it was reported that Hungary and Slovakia were blocking the loan, demanding the restoration of oil supplies through the Druzhba pipeline. On April 22, however, Hungary and Slovakia announced that the flow of Russian oil had resumed.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian media outlets, citing sources within the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that UAVs attacked the Samara pumping station of the Druzhba oil pipeline in the early hours of April 21.

Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy received information "via unofficial sources" from Russia about the suspension of Kazakh oil transit to Germany via the Druzhba pipeline, effective May 1. A refinery in the city of Schwedt processes this oil and supplies up to 90% of fuel deliveries to Berlin and the federal state of Brandenburg. Berlin’s airport, in particular, receives 80 percent of its aviation fuel from this refinery.

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov reported new cooperation agreements with Spain, including on the provision of long-range artillery ammunition for the AFU.

On April 21, the SBU detained employees of the Territorial Center of Recruitment and Social Support (TCK) in the city of Odesa on suspicion of extortion. According to the case materials, the employees would detain people on the street, force them into a TCK service minivan, and demand money. If their demands were refused, the employees would use violence and threaten to send the victims as "assault troops to forward positions" on an expedited basis.

Ukrainian milblogger Tatarigami claims that cases of harsh mobilization ("busification") account for only a small fraction of the 15,000-17,000 people recruited each month. However, each incident receives significant media attention, creating the impression that it is common practice.

The Ukrainian Navy published a video on April 23 showing the destruction of a Russian unmanned surface vessel near the coast of the Odesa region.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

Three conscripts from the 50th Separate Railway Brigade, stationed in the town of Svobodny in the Amur region, were deceived into signing contracts. The young men were first asked to sign what they were told was a safety document, after which they were offered new positions and assured that this had nothing to do with entering into military service under contract. It later emerged that they had in fact signed military contracts. In 2024, we reported on similar cases in the Chelyabinsk region.

In previous sitreps, while urging evasion of statutory military service, we mentioned that, according to statistics from the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, real prison sentences are not imposed for evading regular conscription; penalties for draft dodgers typically consist of fines or, in rare cases, suspended sentences. No later than April 20, this government body was supposed to publish data on criminal convictions in Russia for 2025; however, it failed to do so. Furthermore, on the morning of April 21, all reports for previous periods dating back to 2005 disappeared from the department's website.

The Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that it had prevented an alleged act of terror targeting the leadership of the Roskomnadzor [Russia's internet censorship agency]. According to the agency, seven "supporters of right-wing radical and neo-fascist ideology" were recruited via Telegram and planned to blow up a car. The alleged 21-year-old leader of the group reportedly resisted arrest and was killed. Arrests were also carried out in Moscow, Ufa, Novosibirsk and Yaroslavl. During searches, law enforcement officials said they discovered explosive devices, grenades, and "paraphernalia of Ukrainian military formations." The Pervy Otdel [Department One] human rights project noted that the symbols shown in the released video appeared to be associated not with right-wing groups, but with left-wing radical movements.

The SBU and the National Police of Ukraine reported that they had prevented planned "school shootings" allegedly organized by Russian intelligence services in the Kirovohrad and Odesa regions. According to Ukrainian law enforcement, Russian handlers contacted minors via social networks to recruit and instruct them. In the Kirovohrad region, a 15-year-old student reportedly assembled an improvised explosive device and planned an attack on a lyceum; explosives, weapons and digital evidence were seized. In the Odesa region, an 11-year-old boy was stopped at the recruitment stage, before weapons intended for the attack could be delivered to him.

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