Sitrep for Aug. 7-10, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation UpdateÂ
In the Zaporizhzhia region, in the Orikhiv direction, Ukrainian strikes were recorded against a suspected Russian position in the northwestern part of the village of Mala Tokmachka. Based on this, as well as the presence of Russian assault troops on the outskirts of the town of Orikhiv, some observers concluded that Mala Tokmachka may already be under the control of the Russian Armed Forces (in which case, the soldiers would have reached these positions from the southeastern part of the village). However, we consider it much more likely that the assault troops advanced toward Orikhiv from the village of Robotyne via the village of Novodanylivka (a similar route is shown on the map produced by the pro-Russian Slivochnyi Kapriz project). If so, it is premature to speak of the capture of Mala Tokmachka; the RuAF are attacking the village from the southeast and northwest simultaneously. Nevertheless, there have still been no significant changes in this direction, and the gradual infiltration continues.
Fighting also continues in the Donetsk region in the Chasiv Yar direction, east of the town of Kostiantynivka. According to Andrii Babichev, a Ukrainian serviceman with the 93rd Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the author of the Moto Life UA video blog, the 24th Brigade has withdrawn from the town of Chasiv Yar and is now striking Russian troops in the town with drones. The DeepState project has also reported Russian advances in this direction. According to its map, however, Chasiv Yar has still not been fully captured. Apparently, as in some other cases, the map is updated with a delay. It is worth noting that the Russian MoD announced control of the town about a year ago. The AFU in the Chasiv Yar direction are effectively semi-encircled and in relatively unfavorable positions, so withdrawing from them could be part of the new Ukrainian command's strategy of straightening the frontline. However, we cannot yet be certain that all AFU units have left Chasiv Yar, since Babichev's comments only establish that one brigade has withdrawn.
In the Pokrovsk direction, according to Playfra, the RuAF have fully captured the town of Rodynske, and Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from their last positions in the town. The fighting for the town lasted for almost a year. Initially, Russian assault troops gradually infiltrated the town, with many of them being killed or captured. The survivors then managed to accumulate in shelters and begin advancing, gradually taking control of Rodynske. Despite the high casualties and the fact that this tactic is time-consuming, the RuAF continue to employ it and are gradually making advances in some sectors where Ukrainian forces lack the numbers needed for effective defense. Therefore, while the appearance of the first small assault groups does not mean that a settlement is about to fall, it should not be taken lightly.
As a result of sustained strikes and shelling, Rodynske has been almost completely destroyed. Nevertheless, the RuAF will likely attempt to use the town to deploy drone operators, communications antennas, jammers, observation posts, temporary supply depots and personnel. This would support further advances toward Dobropillia and the village of Vodianske. RuAF personnel have also been observed near the villages of Svitle (south of Vodianske) and Chernihivka (formerly Krasnoiarske until 2024), northeast of Vodianske. It remains unclear whether the AFU are also “straightening” the frontline in this sector by withdrawing beyond Vodianske.
As former Ukrainian Marine Dmytro Putiata noted, Russian forces in the Dobropillia direction have begun using drones equipped with 50-kilometer fiber-optic spools more extensively. Moreover, the quality of the fiber-optic cable reportedly appears to be significantly better than what is currently available to the AFU, although Putiata did not specify the exact differences.
In addition, commenting on the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of the Arena-M active protection system, Putiata stated that Ukrainian servicemen who have encountered the system in combat consider it to be fully functional. According to reports, the active protection system once intercepted seven drones attacking a tank, while on average it took 15 to 20 FPV drones to defeat a single tank during attacks. By comparison, several dozen drones were reportedly required to attack the so-called "turtle tanks" (or "barn tanks"). However, tanks fitted with such massive improvised protection cannot conduct combat operations effectively; they are primarily capable of transporting a small number of soldiers while attracting enemy drone activity. Tanks equipped with the considerably more expensive active protection systems, by contrast, remain combat-capable. They can traverse their turrets and engage targets with their main guns. Their primary limitation is that they cannot carry infantry riding on the armor. The main drawback of the active protection system is its limited ammunition load.
On Russia’s priority Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, the RuAF destroyed another bridge in Sloviansk over the Kazennyi Torets River, geolocated in the Khimik neighborhood. This bridge is considerably smaller than the previous one, meaning that the AFU may well be able to replace it or install temporary structures across the destroyed section. Strikes against bridges intended to disrupt logistics are part of preparations for further intensification of attacks against the urban agglomeration.
Pro-Russian military blogger Kirill Fyodorov released footage showing what he described as the deployment of a "Russian Bayraktar." In the recording, captured by a pair of unmanned aerial vehicles, one drone conducts video surveillance and provides laser designation—with the crosshairs tracking a moving target in a tree line—while the second drone drops a guided munition onto the target. One of the few known Russian drones that drops laser-guided munitions is the Orion, also known as the Inokhodets. The Orion is a relatively large drone, much like the Bayraktar, meaning it can easily be shot down—which is precisely why Bayraktars are now used exclusively over the Black Sea. If the drone in Fyodorov's video is indeed an Orion, it is likely that Ukrainian air defenses were virtually absent in that area.
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Development Marat Khusnullin claimed that traffic on the R-280 highway, the land bridge to Crimea, has "more or less recovered." According to him, around 7,000 vehicles, including nearly 3,000 trucks, now travel along the R-280 daily. He also said that he receives daily reports of vehicles being struck, primarily fuel tankers. Meanwhile, French researcher Clément Molin, who continues to tally strikes on trucks, including those traveling along the R-280, recorded 240 confirmed truck strikes across all occupied territories during the first week of July. Based on his infographic and our rough estimate, fewer than half of the confirmed strikes occurred on the R-280, meaning fewer than 120 per week. Khusnullin, however, claims that more than 20,000 trucks travel along the highway over the same period. During the first six days of August, Molin recorded 167 vehicle strikes. Although we cannot independently verify these figures, the two-order-of-magnitude difference is still significant. We also do not know whether Khusnullin’s figures include military trucks and civilian vehicles used by Russian troops.
Thus, the AFU does not have effective fire control over this highway or other roads in the occupied territories. However, it is also difficult to say that traffic has returned to normal, as traveling along these routes remains highly dangerous.
We continue to believe that destroying trucks carrying supplies for residents of Crimea and other occupied territories has no direct impact on the war. Disrupting military logistics on the scale confirmed so far is insufficient to halt combat operations. Even if Russian troops were left with virtually no supplies, they would still be forced to continue fighting, albeit less effectively. Thus, given the AFU’s current capabilities, these strikes have so far failed to produce a visible effect on the frontline. The most important result that strikes on military logistics in this area could achieve for Ukraine would be a reduction in attacks on civilians, particularly the so-called "human safari" in Kherson. Nevertheless, during the first half of the summer, we observed the opposite: an intensification of attacks against civilians in frontline areas.
Western Assistance
Turkey is preparing to sell Ukraine a substantial batch of relatively old American weaponry. According to a transcript of a congressional session, the US State Department requested permission from Congress on August 3 to re-export the American weaponry listed below.
Because Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the review period for such an application is 30 days; if no objections are raised during this time, Turkey will receive the right to make the sale. Whether this transaction will be financed under the PURL mechanism remains unknown. There is little doubt that the deal will be approved, and Ukraine is set to receive the following types of weaponry:
- 70 first-gen ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (featuring inertial guidance only) with a range of up to 165 kilometers, potentially equipped with cluster munition warheads;
- 12 M270 multiple launch rocket systems;
- 2,524 M26 227mm rockets featuring DPICM (dual-purpose improved conventional munition) cluster warheads for the M270 and HIMARS;
- 47,000 M509A1 203mm artillery shells with a range of up to 47 kilometers, also equipped with DPICM submunitions, which can be fired, for instance, from Soviet-era 2S7 Pion self-propelled cannons or Greek M110A2 self-propelled howitzers (which reportedly appeared in service with the AFU in the spring).
Ukrainian forces are expected to continue striking launch sites and drone hubs, such as those located at the Donetsk airport.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine will continue to receive SAM missiles for Patriot air defense systems under the PURL mechanism. At the same time, the quantities of deliveries remain unknown and are still insufficient. According to sources, Lockheed Martin produces around 55 PAC-3 missiles per month, so even transferring half of the production output to Ukraine would not be enough to meet its needs.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Over the past weekend, Russian forces once again used (1, 2) ballistic missiles, which apparently once again could not be intercepted, likely due to a shortage of air defense assets. As a result of strikes on a private house in the village of Pukhivka, Kyiv region, three people were killed (1, 2), including a four-year-old child, while three others were injured, including a teenager. In Kyiv, one person was killed and four were injured.
Following the massive attack on Kyiv and the surrounding region on Aug. 5, during which warehouses belonging to numerous private companies storing exclusively civilian goods were destroyed, the shelves of the Fora and Silpo supermarket chains were left empty (1, 2).
British volunteer Richard Woodroffe has once again posted a video showing drones purchased with donations for the AFU packed in Nova Poshta boxes. In January, he had already filmed a video showing packaged drones at one of the postal operator's terminals. Woodroffe now claims that he uses Nova Poshta boxes solely for convenience and delivers the shipments himself. We believe he is not the only person who may use Nova Poshta's services to ship military cargo, but this does not make all of the company's terminals and warehouses legitimate military targets. If it is known that a specific truck is carrying drones for the AFU, or if the exact section of a warehouse where they are stored has been identified, a strike on such a target could be considered justified.
Researcher Status-6 drew attention to a video of a Ukrainian attack on the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, in which gunfire from a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system can reportedly be heard. Its rounds can be seen hitting a civilian vehicle. Previously, tail-fin fragments from Pantsir-S1 missiles had repeatedly fallen on residential buildings, streets and vehicles. However, to our knowledge, this is the first time the system’s gun has been captured on video causing such collateral damage. As the air war intensifies and inadequately trained BARS (Special Combat Army Reserve) volunteer units are increasingly involved in air defense, including as part of mobile fire teams, the number of such incidents is likely to increase.
A satellite image from Aug. 7, published by the Ukrainian Dnipro OSINT project, confirms the destruction of the Russian Volna Kupol Garant electronic warfare system at military unit No. 2156 in Gelendzhik. The site where the system was located shows signs of a fire and the outlines of burned-out equipment. The Volna Kupol Garant is designed to disrupt Starlink: rather than targeting the terminals themselves, the system interferes with their communication link with satellites, preventing connections within a radius of approximately 10-20 km.
According to OSINT researcher Jembob, the position of an S-400 SAM system near Gelendzhik Airport was attacked the day after the destruction of the electronic warfare system. Footage showing smoke in the airport area, which was geolocated by the Astra Telegram channel, was probably related to this strike.
On Aug. 5, Russian drones attacked the bulk carrier Emil, which was approximately 39 km off the coast of Ukraine’s Odesa region. The vessel sails under the Liberian flag and is owned by a German company. There were no casualties. A grain-carrying vessel, Mera Queen, sailing under the flag of Guinea-Bissau, was also hit, killing one person. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed, without providing evidence, that both vessels were carrying military cargo.
A week earlier, Ukrainian drones attacked the Nadezhda vessel near Novorossiysk. The vessel sails under the Cameroonian flag but is owned by a Turkish company. According to its captain, it was carrying vegetables and fruit. This case also illustrates how much the criteria for selecting and verifying targets have deteriorated. Attacks on civilian vessels are increasingly justified either by unverified claims that they are carrying military cargo or by their supposed broader impact on the enemy’s economy, as in the case of Wildberries warehouses.
Following several attacks on vessels linked to Turkish companies, Turkey restricted the passage through the Dardanelles of vessels bound for Russian and Ukrainian ports. Reportedly, transit permits were no longer issued automatically, and additional document checks were introduced, increasing transit times. It was later reported that Turkey had reopened the strait. Turkey also called on Russia and Ukraine to impose a moratorium on attacks against vessels in the Black Sea. We doubt that the parties will agree to halt attacks, including against vessels carrying grain and other civilian cargo.
Another issue is Ukraine's attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and on vessels loading predominantly Kazakh oil at its terminal. CPC facilities are located separately from the Port of Novorossiysk, handle virtually no Russian exports and impact the interests of major US companies. These strikes have already drawn criticism from the United States and led to the suspension of oil-loading operations.
According to Bloomberg, Ukraine has agreed not to attack CPC infrastructure or vessels operated by the consortium, provided that they are not owned by Russian companies or nationals, are not subject to Ukrainian sanctions and are not transporting Russian cargo. Dedicated communication channels have been established to exchange information about such vessels. However, some companies claim that they had already provided Ukraine with relevant lists yet their vessels were attacked anyway. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the new arrangements will be observed.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
German economist Janis Kluge analyzed (1, 2) Russian regional budget spending on payments to contract soldiers. According to his calculations, approximately 93,000 people were recruited into the RuAF during the second quarter of 2026, averaging 31,000 per month. After smoothing out month-to-month fluctuations, recruitment appears to have remained at roughly 30,000 people per month following a particularly weak January.
On July 28, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council, stated that approximately 200,000 people had signed contracts in the first half of the year. Kluge's estimate is roughly 10 percent lower, suggesting that while Medvedev may be overstating the figures, the discrepancy is not particularly large. Data from national and regional budgets, together with statements by officials, generally indicate a steady recruitment rate of about 1,000 people per day. This level has persisted since January 2025.
In this regard, Kluge is skeptical about the likelihood of a second wave of mobilization. While the campaign to recruit contract soldiers places a significant burden on regional budgets, its political and financial costs are still lower than those of mobilization. In addition, the authorities would have to address the issue of pay. The relatively low salaries of mobilized soldiers would likely cause discontent given the disparity with contract soldiers, who receive about 200,000 rubles [$2,440] per month, as well as sign-up bonuses and other payments. Bringing the pay of mobilized soldiers up to the same level would require enormous additional spending.
To maintain the pace of recruitment, some regions are increasing rewards (1, 2) for intermediaries who help recruit contract soldiers. As a result, the Russian army is still managing to recruit about 30,000 people per month, which appears to roughly offset its losses. This is another argument against a new wave of mobilization involving 500,000 to 800,000 people, a possibility discussed by various sources and media outlets.
Meanwhile, pressure on certain categories of citizens continues. For example, according to his mother, a conscript in the Kursk region was pressured into signing a military contract. She is now trying to challenge the contract, but the proceedings may take a long time, and the conscript could be sent to the frontline in the meantime.
Such a practice has existed for a long time and will likely continue in the fall. Although individual cases of coercion lead to investigations and even criminal proceedings, commanders rarely face serious punishment. Pressure on conscripts therefore remains one way of meeting recruitment targets, but it does not indicate preparations for a new wave of mobilization.
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