Sitrep for July 27-31, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation UpdateÂ
In the Donetsk region, the situation north of the towns of Pokrovsk and Rodynske continues to develop. A video has emerged showing a Russian soldier with a flag almost in the center of the village of Vodianske, northwest of Rodynske and south of Dobropillia. The presence of a lone Russian assault soldier so far from confirmed positions of the Russian Armed Forces, even if he was able to move freely through the village, does not by itself prove that it has been captured. On the one hand, this could indicate that the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi, has already begun implementing the policy outlined by former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov of straightening the frontline and withdrawing from disadvantageous positions. If so, the flag-planting photo op took place in a village that the AFU had already abandoned. There is no evidence to confirm this version, however. Moreover, the New Donbas fortifications are located in this area, making a Ukrainian withdrawal from these positions somewhat unexpected.
On the other hand, we cannot rule out a local tactical breakthrough by the RuAF in this sector, which may have allowed Russian troops to advance as far as Vodianske. According to researcher Playfra, Russian forces advanced from Rodynske, which is now almost entirely under their control, directly toward Vodianske, bypassing the town of Bilytske, which remains an important element of the Ukrainian defenses. According to Playfra, however, such infiltrations began quite some time ago, and the situation in this part of the Dobropillia direction continues to deteriorate. We currently lean toward the explanation that a localized Russian breakthrough has occurred, although we cannot yet confirm it. This would also fit well with our hypothesis that this year's intensification of the Russian offensive may have shifted from early to mid-summer. Even if a breakthrough has indeed occurred, this does not necessarily mean that the RuAF will be able to exploit it. We will continue to monitor developments in this sector of the frontline.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, a Russian soldier reached the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, which directly adjoins the northern outskirts of the town of Kostiantynivka, and recorded a video in front of a sign bearing the name "Druzhkivka." Despite the name, the sign is not located at the entrance to Druzhkivka, which is still several kilometers away. The video does not provide clear evidence that the area under RuAF control has expanded northward; rather, it appears to be another instance of an infiltration. Ukrainian troops reported capturing the soldier who appeared in the video. The soldier's actions illustrate a tactic that has become typical of the current stage of the war: individual assault troops infiltrate deep behind enemy lines and remain concealed, effectively forming "sleeper cells." Once enough of them have accumulated in a given area, they receive orders to emerge from hiding, attack Ukrainian positions, and seize nearby strongholds or clear the entire settlement.
The appearance of Russian soldiers on the northern outskirts of Kostiantynivka also does not confirm that the town has been fully captured. The situation for the AFU in the town continues to deteriorate, but some areas remain contested.
According to Playfra, Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Druzhkivka from two directions: from Kostiantynivka, pushing into Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, and from the villages of Sofiivka and Shakhove, advancing toward the villages of Torske and Krasnyi Kut. By attacking Druzhkivka from the south and the west, the RuAF seek to complicate the AFU’s logistics along this section of the frontline.
The new leadership of the Ukrainian military has already begun implementing reforms. Commander-in-Chief of the AFU Mykhailo Drapatyi has launched an inspection of troop assignments, as well as the efficiency and fairness of personnel distribution based on the needs of units conducting combat operations on different sections of the frontline. This is the first indication that Drapatyi is reassessing practices established under Oleksandr Syrskyi, particularly the system under which assault regiments—described as Syrskyi’s "personal guard"—were given priority for reinforcements over other units that had suffered heavy casualties.
In addition, Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation, together with the General Staff of the AFU, has launched Operation Honest Draft, conducting searches at Territorial Recruitment Centers (TRCs) across the country. The operation is investigating cases in which officials allegedly accepted bribes to help individuals evade mobilization, as well as abuses of authority by TRC personnel, including the beating and torture of men subject to military service. It is worth noting that Fedorov has been publicly criticized for failing to address problems within the TRC system, even though responsibility for it lay not with the Minister of Defense but with the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff. Drapatyi and the new Chief of the General Staff, Ihor Skybiuk, are now carrying out their own reform of Ukraine's mobilization system.
The new leadership has made another decision concerning the AFU’s 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade. While serving as Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Syrskyi signed the Report of Investigation on July 19, calling for the removal of the brigade’s commander, Shamil Krutkov. However, after taking office, Drapatyi suspended the order and reinstated Krutkov as commander of the brigade. The investigation was based on allegations that the brigade commander failed to carry out timely troop rotations in frontline positions. It is worth noting, Syrskyi’s directive required these rotations to occur at least once every two months. As previously mentioned, this requirement was largely declarative in nature and impossible to implement in some sectors of the frontline. However, Syrskyi appears to have sought to use it as a pretext for removing commanders he considered undesirable or insufficiently loyal.
Another important step in reforming the armed forces was suspending the formation of four new units: the 50th, 55th, 76th and 167th Separate Mechanized Brigades. Many analysts, including us, as well as a significant portion of Ukrainian society, had criticized the decision to create these brigades because they were being formed while existing brigades were receiving insufficient reinforcements or facing severe personnel shortages.
Fedorov gave a lengthy interview to Ukrainska Pravda. Chris Miller, a Financial Times journalist who has lived in Kyiv for many years and closely follows Ukrainian domestic politics—including recently interviewing President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—commented on Fedorov's choice of outlet. Miller believes that Fedorov's decision to speak with one of Zelenskyy's least favored media organizations suggests he has been completely cut off from the president's inner circle, which makes his return as defense minister highly unlikely.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s technology adviser, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, reported that Ukraine has recently recorded a sharp increase in the number of Starlink jamming systems deployed by Russia. In mid-June, Beskrestnov demonstrated an attack on one of those systems, known as the "Volna Kupol Garant." This development aligns with the broader cycle of military adaptation, wherein both sides respond to the introduction of novel weapons and technologies by developing countermeasures.
Michael Kofman and Dmytro Putiata have written about the necessity of expanding the operational range of Ukrainian Starlink terminals into Russian territory. Should SpaceX grant the appropriate authorization, the AFU would be able to strike significantly more vital targets with greater efficiency. Kofman specifically noted that this would enable strikes against Iskander launchers and S-400 systems, which launch RM-48U missiles at ground targets.
To our knowledge, the Starlink ground stations closest to Ukraine are presumed to be located in Poland and Lithuania; these facilities receive data from satellites and connect satellite terminals to standard backbone internet infrastructure. Because Starlink satellites transmit data among themselves, European ground stations would suffice to expand the operation of Ukrainian terminals. Provided that "white lists" are implemented, it is entirely feasible to activate terminals within the territory of the Russian Federation by modifying geofencing settings. Although Russian soldiers might still utilize Starlink terminals verified through strawmen within Ukraine, the strategic advantages for the AFU would be substantially greater.
Citing the Main Directorate of Intelligence, the publication Militarnyi reported that Russia has transitioned to serial production of a new modification of the Banderol cruise missile. This variant features a warhead weighing approximately 150 kilograms [330 lb]—compared to 114 kilograms [251 lb] in the 2025 version—attains speeds of 550 to 600 kilometers per hour [342-372 mph] and possesses a flight range of up to 350 to 400 kilometers [215-248 mi]. Initially, the Orion UAV served as the launch platform for the Banderol, but Russian soldiers have now mastered launching the missile from ground-based launchers as well as Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters. Observers note that Russia is deploying the Banderol with increasing frequency, presenting a challenge for the AFU, as interceptor drones have proven ineffective against this missile due to its high speed.
Photographs have been published of a modified Ukrainian FP-1 UAV equipped with auxiliary wing tanks designed to extend its flight range to 3,400 kilometers [2.112 mi] or more. It is asserted that this modification was used during the strikes on the Wildberries facility in Ryazan on July 29, although added tanks were not visible in the available video footage.
French researcher Clément Molin reported that for the fourth consecutive month, Ukraine has launched more long-range drones than Russia. In his opinion, this is because production of the Geran-2 UAV has declined significantly, while production of the Geran-4 jet-powered drones has increased. Russia is adapting to the growing number of Ukrainian anti-aircraft interceptor drones, which have made attacks by conventional Shahed drones less effective. This decline is also reflected in the Ukrainian Air Force's statistics for July 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 31.
Molin also noted that during this period there were relatively few strikes against western Ukraine, with attacks concentrated mainly on the country's eastern, northeastern and central regions. Nevertheless, such strikes still occur occasionally. On July 30, Lviv was hit by cruise missiles, killing one person and injuring 38 others.
The Lasar’s Group UAV unit published footage showing an anti-aircraft interceptor drone shooting down a Russian Zala Z-20 fixed-wing reconnaissance UAV at an altitude of 6.4 km [3.98 mi]. At such an altitude, the reconnaissance drone is beyond the reach of not only most interceptor drones but also many MANPADS. Only missile-based air defense systems are capable of engaging targets at that height.
Ukrainian milblogger Tatarigami explained how Russia has adapted to Ukrainian electronic warfare. By early 2026, on some sectors of the frontline, up to 60 percent of the FPV drones used by Russian forces were fiber-optic drones.
Firepoint published photographs of a test launch of the FP-7 surface-to-surface missile, or the FP-7.x, an anti-aircraft missile being developed for the Freya air defense system.
Yurii Ihnat, head of the Communications Department of the Air Force of the AFU, stated that Russia had used a North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile for the first time in a long while.
On July 30, a ballistic missile, believed to have been a North Korean KN-23, struck a residential building in the village of Radushne near Kryvyi Rih. According to preliminary reports, six people were killed, including three children, while eight others were injured.
In the previous sitrep, we mentioned that North Korea was preparing to supply Russia with additional launchers for KN-23 missiles. We have not come across any reports indicating that the launchers previously delivered have been destroyed, so it is reasonable to assume that the additional launchers are intended to increase the number of missiles that can be fired in a single salvo.
The first video has emerged showing the AFU using a GBU-64—a 910 kg [2,000 lb]-class JDAM-ER precision-guided glide bomb carrying 429 kg [945 lb] of explosives. Until now, Ukraine had only been seen using GBU-62s (227 kg [500 lb] bombs carrying 87 kg [192 lb] of explosives) and GBU-63s (454 kg [1,000 lb] bombs carrying 200 kg [445 lb] of explosives). The strike is said to have targeted a command post near the town of Lysychansk, and the RuAF's irrecoverable losses came to 18 men, among them the commander of the 201st Separate Rifle Regiment, Colonel Vadim Stremenko, who was killed.
In May 2026, the US administration requested 1,200 GBU-62 kits and 332 GBU-64 kits for Ukraine in a submission to Congress.
It appears that after a brief pause, Ukraine has returned to striking major oil refineries, without letting up on raids against e-commerce logistics. On July 29, an oil refinery and a Wildberries warehouse in the Ryazan region were attacked, as was the Perm oil refinery, where the CDU-5 primary oil processing unit was damaged.
According to Reuters, the NZT and KSK terminals in Novorossiysk, along with ZTKT in Taman, have scaled back their intake of grain delivered by truck. About 40 percent of Russia's seaborne grain exports pass through them. The restrictions stem from the risks to shipping in the Black Sea and from congestion on alternative routes after traffic through the Sea of Azov was cut. Russia has also closed the port of Kavkaz and prohibited nighttime vessel traffic in Novorossiysk.
Russia continues to attack Ukrainian ports in Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi and Izmail. During the first two weeks of July, Russia carried out 23 strikes on port infrastructure and attacked 17 civilian vessels. Insurers then suspended the issuance of war-risk policies, and, as of July 22, ships have stopped calling at the ports of Greater Odesa. About two-thirds of Ukraine's exports used to move through these ports, which in June shipped roughly $70 million worth of goods a day. There is no quick substitute for the route: while the ports can handle 7.4 million tons of cargo a month, all the remaining options—the Danube, rail and trucking—can only handle about 3 million tons.
It is worth noting that at the NATO summit in Ankara in early July, Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could receive a license to produce interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense systems. At a White House meeting on July 28, Zelenskyy asked Trump to provide Ukraine with an emergency winter package of 300 interceptor missiles needed to defend against Russian strikes on energy infrastructure. Following this, in an interview with the Financial Times, Trump stated that the issue of granting a license to produce Patriot interceptor missiles was under consideration, but that he was "not sure" whether he would approve it, adding that licenses for such "absolutely exceptional weapons" should be issued with caution.
Lockheed Martin has signed the largest framework agreement in its history with the Pentagon to produce PAC-3 MSE missiles for Patriot systems. The funds are planned to be directed toward expanding production capacity and tripling output by the end of 2030.We emphasize that the planned production of 2,000 missiles barely cover Ukrainian needs, especially considering that interceptors are also required to replenish the stockpiles of the US military and its allies in the Persian Gulf.
On July 30, after a nighttime attack, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) once again suspended oil loading operations. The Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Nissos Sifnos came under a UAV strike while loading oil at the CPC’s SPM-3 single point mooring. In addition, the Isle of Man-flagged tanker Marathi, which was en route to load oil, was attacked approximately six nautical miles from the terminal. We still do not understand why the AFU are attacking a terminal that serves the interests of Kazakhstan and the United States and is not involved in the export of Russian oil.
On the same day, Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy announced that the country could begin refining Russian crude oil at its own oil refineries and sell the resulting fuel back to Moscow in order to help alleviate the fuel shortage caused by AFU strikes.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that another F-16 fighter aircraft crashed on July 29 while carrying out a combat mission to intercept enemy aerial targets. Preliminary reports suggest the aircraft experienced an in-flight malfunction, prompting the pilot to eject. This marks the fifth F-16 lost over the past two years, and three of those incidents resulted in the deaths of the pilots.
Following a series of Ukrainian attacks on the company's warehouse facilities, Russian authorities are reportedly considering measures to support the country's largest online marketplace, Wildberries, and its associated entrepreneurs. State-owned VTB Bank is expected to play a key role in providing this support. This assistance could take the form of loans for the marketplace or its sellers, as well as tax breaks or subsidies.
We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.