Sitrep for June 22-26, 2026 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Reports have recently emerged regarding the alleged withdrawal of Russian forces from the Kinburn Spit and increased activity by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area. Supply difficulties caused by increasingly frequent Ukrainian drone strikes on occupied territories and the land bridge to Crimea were cited as the primary reason.

Following widespread media discussion of newly published footage featuring a Ukrainian flag on the spit, the claims were officially denied by the Spokesman for the Ukrainian Navy Dmytro Pletenchuk, who emphasized that the area remains an active combat zone. DeepState also pointed out that the flag had been dropped from a drone rather than raised by service members on the ground, noting that Russian forces continue to use the spit to launch Molniya UAVs. Additionally, videos have emerged showing HIMARS MLRS strikes targeting Russian deployment locations on the Kinburn Spit, though there is currently no information regarding casualties. The strategic importance of the spit lies in its use by Russian troops to deploy electronic intelligence and warfare equipment, as well as to launch drones toward the cities of Mykolaiv and Kherson. The dropping of flags from drones for propaganda purposes has been repeatedly observed from both sides.

The most critical sector on the frontline remains the Kostiantynivka direction: the entire Kostiantynivka is already a contested area, and the Russian Armed Forces are appearing in its northern districts.

According to a BBC report, the Ukrainian military stated that strikes on Russian logistics, particularly in the area of the land bridge to Crimea, are not yet having a noticeable impact on the Kostiantynivka direction. In the near future, an increase in alarming statements claiming that the city is practically lost for the AFU is expected. If these statements are not understood as an announcement of an immediate Ukrainian withdrawal from the town but rather as an acknowledgment that the town can no longer be held or retaken, then this interpretation is generally reasonable. Nevertheless, a swift and complete retreat by the AFU from the northern part of the town is not expected.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Ukraine's campaign of strikes against crossing areas in Crimea continues. A video shows that as a drone approached a military truck escorted by a mobile fire team, the anti-aircraft gunner panicked and ran away from his machine gun instead of engaging the drone.

Russia continues to form what could be described as non-military air defense units. In the Leningrad region, recruitment into these mobile fire teams is underway, but contracts are signed not with the MoD, but with the Leningrad Regional Civil Protection Directorate. Recruits are promised a one-time payment of 250,000 rubles [$3,330], matching the bonus offered by the Ministry of Defense to contract soldiers, a salary starting at 200,000 [$2,700] rubles per month, mandatory life and health insurance worth 2 million rubles [$27,000], and a bonus of 100,000 [$1,330] rubles for every drone shot down. How exactly they intend to determine which team brought down a particular drone remains unclear. It is also unclear how these mobile fire teams are expected to be trained to repel drone raids.

Ukraine's FP-2 drones, which have been used extensively in strikes against Russian targets, have recently been upgraded: their payload has been increased to 200 kg while maintaining a range of 370 km. This is particularly noteworthy in the context of cutting Crimea off from its logistics routes, both from the occupied territories and from Russia itself. We believe Ukraine is preparing to strike the Crimean Bridge within the next several months. It is entirely possible that such an attack could take place in the very near future. At the same time, Ukrainian forces may instead choose to wait for a more favorable opportunity while continuing to build up resources and degrade Russian air defenses in the area, with footage of such strikes being published on a regular basis.

As we have noted repeatedly, destroying bridges is an extremely difficult task, so it is hard to predict how much damage heavy drones alone could inflict on the Crimean Bridge. A substantial number of Flamingo or SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow missiles would be required to cause significant damage, particularly since the former, despite their large warhead, are not especially accurate.

The Special Operations Forces of the AFU have claimed that they destroyed a railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal near the village of Rozdolne using UAVs; we recently discussed an earlier strike on the same bridge. Some sources corroborate the claim, although we have not yet seen any objective verification footage confirming its destruction. Given that this bridge is much smaller than the Crimean Bridge, comparisons between the two are not particularly meaningful.

We recently came across a post by a Russian combat engineer explaining to a pro-war audience why bridges are so difficult to destroy. He noted, in particular, that many bridges built in the Soviet Union during the Cold War were designed to withstand missile and air strikes, making them harder to demolish. In other cases, bridges were reportedly engineered in a way that would facilitate rapid repairs after sustaining damage.

According to the engineer, bringing down a heavily reinforced permanent bridge typically requires multiple sequential explosions at specific points on its supports. The warheads carried by most UAVs are generally insufficient for this purpose, although, to be fair, a 200 kg payload is already approaching the size of some missile warheads. We cannot independently verify all of these technical claims, but it is indisputable that destroying bridges has proven difficult for both sides in the conflict.

In addition to striking Russian logistics in Crimea, Ukrainian forces continue to target the peninsula's power grid. Recently, reports have appeared almost daily indicating that various parts of Crimea and Sevastopol have been left without electricity and, at times, without running water, as power outages have disrupted the operation of pumping stations. As a result, living conditions for civilians on the peninsula are becoming increasingly difficult, while the impact of these strikes on military personnel appears to be comparatively limited.

In apparent retaliation for strikes on Crimea, Russia has stepped up attacks on electrical substations in Ukraine. In the Mykolaiv region, a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition reportedly struck a 110 kV substation in the village of Kazanka. Russia has also intensified drone attacks on Ukrainian gas stations in response to Ukrainian strikes on fuel tankers and oil refineries. Recent examples include attacks in the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Sumy, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk region. The head of the board of Naftogaz [the largest national oil and gas company of Ukraine] reported strikes on filling stations and gas infrastructure in the Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava regions.

Because Ukraine relies on imported fuels and lubricants—by 2019, only one oil refinery remained operational in the country, and it ceased functioning in 2022—Russian forces have few targets beyond civilian filling stations. However, such attacks are likely to have limited military impact given the large number of gas stations and the difficulty of disabling enough of them to meaningfully disrupt military logistics. Moreover, heavy military vehicles are generally not refueled at civilian filling stations.

Russia is attempting to retaliate for Ukrainian strikes on the bridges and pontoon crossings linking Crimea with the occupied part of the Kherson region by conducting air strikes against bridges spanning the Dnipro River. For example, following an unsuccessful strike on the bridge in Zaporizhzhia on June 20, five impact craters from missed bombs were identified around the target. Another FAB glide bomb fell more than 4 km short of the bridge, impacting the southern part of Khortytsia Island. The impact locations of two other bombs remain unclear, and some may have fallen into the river. At the same time, the Zaporizhzhia regional police reported that nine air-dropped bombs struck the area, killing five civilians and wounding another 13. Air strikes against the city and the surrounding region continued in the following days. During a daytime strike on June 24, one bomb hit a municipal beach, injuring five people, while another struck a municipal utility facility, killing one person and wounding five others.

The reason for the poor strike accuracy remains unknown. Possible explanations include the effects of Ukrainian electronic warfare jamming or difficulties releasing the bombs from the preferred altitudes and stand-off distances due to the threat posed by Ukrainian air defenses.

Following Zelenskyy's ultimatum, the Belarusian authorities shut down relay stations used to support Shahed drone operations. At present, it is unclear whether these relay stations have been dismantled or merely deactivated. It is worth noting that in Dec. 2025, the Ukrainian president stated that Russian drones were able to circumvent Ukrainian air defenses by using relay stations located in Belarus. Subsequently, in an interview with a Belarusian media outlet on Feb. 23, 2026, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine had already made inoperable three to four such relay stations, after which the number of drone attacks originating from that direction declined significantly. Several days later, on Feb. 27, Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Ukraine had neutralized the network that enabled Shahed drones to enter Ukrainian airspace from Belarus. No details were provided on how the network had been neutralized, although drone strikes appear to be the most likely method. If so, this would indicate that the AFU has already conducted strikes against Russian military facilities located on Belarusian territory.

Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, said Ukraine will have to form new brigades because of the threat of an offensive launched from Belarusian territory. According to Syrskyi, having failed to achieve success on its main axes of advance, Russia may seek to widen the frontline by another 160 kilometers [100 mi] from the north.

We see no indications that Russia is preparing to attack from Belarus. Even if it were to carry out a large-scale mobilization and deploy newly raised units to the frontline, those forces would require the support of well-trained drone operator units capable of striking targets inside enemy territory, as well as anti-drone units to protect these newly deployed formations advancing along the new sector of the frontline. At present, the RuAF has no such units available, and we consider their creation to be an almost impossible task.

Jompy, a researcher who tracks equipment losses in the war, reported that refurbished infantry fighting vehicles and tanks have begun to be sent back to the 349th Storage Base in Topchikha, in Russia's Altai region. This may indicate that the RuAF has reached a point in replenishing its armored vehicle fleet where it no longer needs to send every restored vehicle directly to active units, allowing some to be placed in reserve instead. It is worth noting, however, that armored vehicles are currently seeing very limited use on the frontline.

Footage has been published showing a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian unmanned surface vessel in the Black Sea. Based on the interface visible in the video, the researcher known as "Special Kherson Cat" suggested that the strike was carried out by a Bayraktar TB2 UAV. These drones have not been frequently used in recent years, but when they do appear, it is typically over the sea, where they are not threatened by air defenses.

The AFU have been spotted deploying a new universal launch platform for air defense weapons.

The US-made MAAWLR system consists of a mobile chassis with a launch platform that is compatible with different types of missiles: APKWS II laser-guided missiles, IRIS-T surface-to-air missiles, AIM-9, AIM-120, AIM-132, and Soviet R-27 air-to-air missiles. Documentation indicates the system may integrate two X-band RPS-82 radars, also used in the Tempest anti-drone suite, though published footage does not show them installed.

The ongoing war has exposed limitations of legacy air defense systems, developed in past decades, against swarm attacks by cheap, small UAVs, prompting Russia, Ukraine, and Western allies to accelerate testing of new countermeasures, including air defense systems compatible with various types of missiles.

On June 23, the Republic of Korea Air Force demonstrated counter-drone tactics during exercises simulating a mass drone swarm attack. Using eight 20mm M61 Vulcan autocannons, personnel engaged and destroyed 44 of 50 low-altitude drones from roughly 1 km [0.62 mi] away. The remaining six drones were neutralized with one portable laser system and five shotguns. In our view, such drills, in which attacking drones approach from a known direction at a known altitude and speed, do not replicate real combat conditions. Furthermore, such a battery of anti-aircraft guns is vulnerable to ballistic missiles with cluster munitions.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

Maksim Mironov, a 20-year-old from the Ural town of Rezh, was conscripted on Oct. 22, 2025. and sent to serve in Naro-Fominsk, near Moscow. On April 25, he called his mother to report that he was being forced to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense. As an alternative, he was offered the contract, he was offered a transfer to the border in the Kursk region as a conscript. Mironov refused the contract, and by April 30, he was in the border area. His phone was confiscated there, and he was only able to contact his family three times before his death to say he had arrived in a safe, peaceful place. On May 15, however, an unknown major called Mironov's mother and reported that her son had died from a gunshot wound to the head. The accompanying death certificate does not indicate the cause of death and states that it is not related to military duties.

We expect the MoD and local draft offices to try to pass it off as suicide. However, there was already a case in which an officer who shot a conscript from Russia's constituent Republic of Tatarstan in 2024 escaped punishment by going to war.

We urge you to avoid conscription by any means necessary. Receiving a fine or a suspended sentence, though rare, is much better than becoming disabled or killed in war. We also want to remind you that conscripts sent to Russia's border regions, which are not considered the "special military operation zone," are frequently killed in missile and drone attacks. To evade conscription, we recommend contacting trusted organizations (1, 2, 3).

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