Sitrep for June 8-15, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update 

With only two weeks remaining until the end of June, it is already possible to draw some preliminary conclusions from the past two months, which have highlighted the growing challenges facing the Russian Armed Forces. As noted earlier, the pace of Russian advances in May was exceptionally slow. Although the rate of advance has picked up somewhat in June, the increase has not been significant enough to suggest any fundamental shift in the trend. Nor is there much reason to expect the Russian offensive to accelerate dramatically over the remaining weeks of the month.

The town of Kostiantynivka, which forms the southern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, is currently the primary objective of the Russian offensive. Russian forces are likely to prioritize its capture above all else. RuAF commanders have also already claimed control of most of the town well ahead of the actual situation on the ground.

The town is divided into two parts by the Kryvyi Torets River. Russian assault troops began infiltrating its western (southwestern) half long ago from the direction of the villages of Illinivka and Berestok, where a tactically advantageous elevation provides favorable conditions for UAV operators. Russian forces gradually built up their presence in these villages before expanding into Kostiantynivka itself. The priority given to the Kostiantynivka direction is also reflected in the sheer volume of air-dropped bombs and drones being employed there.

On June 11, the day before Russia Day, Russian servicemen published—before later deleting from their Telegram channel—a large collection of flag-raising videos filmed in western Kostiantynivka during May. While such flag-planting videos are not normally reliable evidence of territorial control, this case appears to be different. Taken together with the other available information, the footage suggests that the RuAF now exercises near-complete control over the western part of the town.

In early June, we reported that Russian assault troops had already begun appearing in the town center, while the outskirts had come under Russian control. Ukrainian sources are also reporting a deterioration in the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In this context, the numerous videos emerging from the area are more indicative of Russian control over the western part of the town than of a mere infiltration operation, as was the case, for example, in the village of Stepnohirsk in the Zaporizhzhia region, where assault groups penetrated the village only to be eliminated afterward.

Nevertheless, there is no reason to conclude that the entire town will fall in the near future. On the contrary, established AFU General Staff practice suggests that any decision to withdraw will be delayed as long as possible. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi's approach has been to hold positions he considers important at virtually any cost, even when troops are effectively encircled. Although the DeepState map presents a relatively optimistic picture for the AFU in this direction, it still reflects the difficult situation of Ukrainian forces in central and southern Kostiantynivka. However, in the northern part of the town, troops may be able to hold out for an extended period even after conventional supply routes become unusable, as current battlefield conditions allow essential supplies to be delivered by drones. It is also possible that Ukrainian forces will conduct media-oriented actions, including filming flag-raising videos in western Kostiantynivka, in order to officially rebut Russian claims of control over that part of the town.

In addition to operations within the town itself, Russian forces continue to exert pressure on Ukrainian logistics north of Kostiantynivka, specifically by attempting to sever supply routes near the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and the town of Druzhkivka. This is increasingly complicating the AFU's position in Kostiantynivka and facilitating further Russian advances.

At the same time, the AFU has reportedly achieved some success in the Dnipropetrovsk region near the borders of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. Footage has been published showing Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian positions near the villages of Komyshuvakha, Zaporizke and Novohryhorivka. The locations of these strikes suggest that Ukrainian forces have advanced toward the Velyka Novosilka-Uspenivka highway.

According to Clément Molin, the AFU has been conducting two localized counteroffensives in recent weeks. The previously mentioned one, in the Novopavlivka direction, and another in the Lyman direction, on a section sometimes also referred to as the Rubtsi direction. Over the past several weeks, reports have emerged that Ukrainian forces, advancing from the village of Rubtsi, attacked Russian positions near the villages of Ridkodub and Katerynivka. Given these AFU advances, it is possible that by the end of June, some monitoring projects will record close to zero—or even negative, after accounting for liberated territory—net territorial gains by the RuAF.

Playfra, citing information likely based on reports from Ukrainian military personnel, mentioned encouraging news for the AFU coming from one of the directions (possibly the Novopavlivka direction). At the same time, the situation around Kostiantynivka appears almost hopeless.

Russian infiltration operations continue near the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, which may be considered part of either the Kupiansk or Borova direction. Videos have appeared showing Russian flags in the village of Kivsharivka and on the northern outskirts of the village of Hlushkivka.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes 

Ukrainian forces continue to actively target Russian trucks on the R-280 "Novorossiya" [New Russia] highway with medium-range strike drones. As of now, Molin has counted 415 confirmed strikes since the beginning of May—roughly ten per day. Although visual confirmation footage is not available for every truck reportedly hit, the number of strikes—even if the actual figure is closer to 100 per day—is still not high enough to support claims that Ukraine has established fire control over the route or effectively severed the land corridor to Crimea. We consider strikes on the bridges and pontoon crossings connecting Crimea with the occupied part of the Kherson region to be more effective. These crossings are located near Henichesk, between the Dzhankoi checkpoint and Chonhar, and near Armyansk. Such strikes have caused traffic jams of cargo trucks. One of them can be seen in satellite imagery of the pontoon crossing near Chonhar. These concentrations of vehicles become relatively easy targets for Ukrainian drones. Although these bridges and crossings are often closed after strikes, traffic can usually be restored fairly quickly, at least for light vehicles. As far as we understand, heavy trucks primarily rely on the pontoon crossings.

In the early hours of June 15, Russia launched a large-scale aerial strike across Ukraine. According to the Air Force of the AFU, the attack involved 611 UAVs of various types and 70 missiles: six 3M22 Zircon anti-ship missiles, 34 Iskander-M mobile short-range ballistic missiles and S-400 (RM-48U) missiles, as well as 30 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles.

The strike on Kyiv resulted in five fatalities and 35 injuries. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that two UAVs hit the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, while the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) released images of debris from a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition. The impact sparked a fire in the Dormition (Uspensky) Cathedral. Additionally, the roof of the adjacent building of the National Art and Cultural-Museum Complex "Mystetskyi Arsenal" caught fire in the attack. The strike also set ablaze the building of the Dovzhenko National Film Studios. According to Culture Minister Tetiana Berezhna, the costume workshop was damaged, and the largest and oldest costume collection in Ukraine was destroyed.

The Russian MoD claimed that a UAV production and preparation facility was struck at the film studio, while the Lavra was hit by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile, possibly an expired one.

In Dnipro, a strike hit the House of Organ and Chamber Music, a building constructed in the early 20th century.

On the evening of June 14, in the city of Kharkiv, the roof of the Art Museum caught fire after being struck by a drone. A subsequent strike killed four first responders from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and one civil defense specialist from the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration. Five other people were injured.

It is worth noting that on June 10, a Ukrainian drone struck the building of the panorama museum "Defense of Sevastopol 1854-1855" in Sevastopol, reportedly causing significant damage. It can be assumed that the strikes on Ukrainian cultural sites on June 14-15 were not coincidental, but were carried out in retaliation.

Both sides continue to target energy infrastructure. On June 13, Ukrainian strikes on energy facilities in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region resulted in a complete power outage across the entire occupied territory of the Kherson region.

Also on June 13, Russian drones attacked the Kryvyi Rih Thermal Power Plant in Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk region. The extent of the damage is currently unknown.

During an AFU briefing, Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba, a senior researcher at the Ukrainian State Scientific Research Institute for Testing and Certification of Arms and Military Equipment, reported that Russia is continuing to modernize its Iskander missiles. Specifically, he highlighted the "Iskander-1000" (9M723-2) model, which boasts a range of up to 1,000 kilometers [620 miles]. While our previous sitreps detailed Russia's use of the 9M729 long-range cruise missile, current developments point toward a long-range ballistic modification. It is worth noting that intercepting ballistic missiles is significantly more difficult than stopping cruise missiles; only SAMP/T systems and Patriot systems equipped with PAC-3 anti-aircraft missiles are capable of doing so. Furthermore, Russia is upgrading the electronics within Iskander missiles—utilizing a new processor that allows image data from the missile's cameras to be processed more efficiently—while also experimenting with air defense countermeasures.

Colonel Zaruba also detailed a new version of the Kh-101 cruise missile featuring a reduced fuel tank. This modification shortens the flight range from 5,500 to 2,500 kilometers [3400 to 1550 miles], but allows for the installation of an additional warhead weighing between 350 and 510 kilograms [770 and 1120 lbs], supplementing the main 450-kilogram [990 lbs] warhead. The integration of an additional warhead on these missiles was first reported in January 2025.

In addition, the Russian army is significantly expanding its use of new cruise missiles (some media outlets refer to them as "jet-powered drones"):

• Geran-3 (range: 1,500 km [932 mi]; warhead weight: 50-90 kg [110-198 lbs]);
• Geran-4 (range: 850 km [528 mi]; warhead weight: from 50 kg [110 lbs]);
• Geran-5 (range: more than 600 km [373 mi]; warhead weight: from 60 kg [132 lbs]).

Since the beginning of 2026, Russian forces have launched approximately 1,400 of these cruise missiles. For example, on June 12, footage was published showing a Geran-5 cruise missile flying over the Sumy region. In comparison, Ukrainian air defense forces recorded only 180 similar incidents during the whole of 2025. These cruise missiles require specialized infrastructure, and we have previously reported on the construction of so-called "drone ports."

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that additional anti-aircraft missiles for Patriot air defense systems have been secured. These are munitions that are approaching the end of their service life or have already exceeded their official expiration date. Instead of being dismantled, they may be transferred to the AFU for operational use.

About two months ago, British newspapers reported that, despite Keir Starmer’s promises, the British government was not seizing vessels of Russia’s "shadow fleet" because of concerns that maintaining them would cost tens of millions of pounds. On June 14, the UK Ministry of Defence announced the detention of the oil tanker SMYRTOS in the English Channel. The operation involved Royal Marine Commandos, the National Crime Agency, helicopters of the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm, a Royal Air Force P-8 aircraft, as well as the frigate HMS Sutherland and the minesweeper HMS Ledbury. It is unclear to us why such a large amount of equipment was used, but it can be assumed that an operation of this scale was very expensive.

We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.