Sitrep for May 23-25, 2026 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

As of the final week of May, the pace of the Russian offensive still does not appear to have increased. Nevertheless, we believe it is worth waiting until the end of June before drawing firm conclusions about the scale of the problems facing the Russian Armed Forces, when the broader dynamics of combat operations can be more fully assessed. If the rate of advance does not increase significantly, it could indicate that Russia’s offensive capabilities have deteriorated noticeably. Even now, it is clear that the pace of Russian advances in May was substantially slower than during the same period last year, a conclusion supported by statistics even from the pro-Russian Slivochnyy Kapriz Telegram channel.

In the Huliaipole direction, Russian assault troops have reportedly appeared near the villages of Verkhnia Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka. Some sources view this as a continuation of the Russian advance west of the town of Huliaipole, made possible by the exhaustion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ 225th Assault Regiment and its attached units. Others—notably Playfra—argue that this is merely another example of Russia’s current infiltration-heavy tactics and does not pose a major threat. In that assessment, Ukrainian forces retain full control of these villages despite the circulation of Russian flag-planting videos. These advances—or infiltrations—have not been reflected on DeepState’s maps. About a week ago, however, the project did record a Russian advance significantly farther south, near the village of Charivne. Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed the capture of Charivne on May 15 and of Verkhnia Tersa on May 22.

In addition, the DeepState has now marked all of the town of Pokrovsk as being under Russian control. In the town of Kupiansk, meanwhile, the AFU reportedly eliminated the last remaining Russian-held pocket in the town center. The area is now marked as contested, and clearing operations are said to be ongoing.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, according to DeepState, the RuAF advanced near the villages of Illinivka and Pleshchiivka, south and southwest of the town of Kostiantynivka, as well as near the village of Novodmytrivka on the eastern flank of the sector. As previously noted, Russian assault troops have been actively infiltrating the villages of Novodmytrivka and Molocharka. By now, Novodmytrivka has likely been at least partially captured. Russian forces are therefore continuing their efforts to envelop Kostiantynivka from two directions in an attempt to cut Ukrainian supply routes.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The 34th Separate Marine Brigade of the AFU tracked Russian drone operators in Oleshky, in the occupied part of the Kherson region, and carried out a UAV strike on vehicles and a building used both as their base and as a staging site for strike preparations. It is worth noting that drone units deployed on the left bank of the Dnipro River are notorious for so-called "human safaris"—deliberate strikes against civilians, civilian vehicles and scheduled passenger buses. Regarding the latter, the Ot Mariupolya Do Karpar [From Mariupol to the Carpathians] Telegram channel claimed that the units targeted any vehicles drone operators believed to be involved in Ukrainian military logistics. According to Ukrainian military officials, 15 Russian personnel were killed in the strike on the drone operators’ position. The same Telegram channel acknowledged personnel losses but did not specify the number.

Dmytro Lubinets, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that Oleshky and other nearby occupied settlements, including Hola Prystan, Stara Zburivka and Nova Zburivka, are on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe and called for the evacuation of the approximately 6,000 civilians who remain there. According to reports, technical arrangements for a possible evacuation have already been agreed upon, although the process would require the introduction of a localized ceasefire, the start date of which has not yet been announced. Civilians are expected to be evacuated from the riparian zone deeper into occupied territory first, and then transferred to the Ukrainian side, since crossing the Dnipro is currently impossible for military reasons. In response, the Russian-appointed governor of the Kherson region, Vladimir Saldo, accused Ukraine of conducting UAV strikes against civilian transport and stated that Russian authorities continue supplying the area. According to available information, these settlements are effectively closed to entry and exit; such reports began emerging in 2023 following the breach of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam. For Russian forces, the continued presence of civilians serves as an additional protective factor, making a full evacuation of the civilian population strategically undesirable. As a result, civilians there are regularly killed or wounded by drone strikes, incidents that are routinely documented in our "Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia Summaries." One such case was highlighted by Suspilne: a private residence was destroyed in an attack after, according to local residents, Russian soldiers had visited it.

Even if an evacuation agreement with the Russian authorities were reached, it is difficult to imagine the RuAF agreeing to even a localized ceasefire lasting several days, since evacuating 6,000 civilians within a single day would be unrealistic. It is worth noting that the ongoing 1000-for-1000 prisoner exchange is itself being conducted in multiple stages.

Massive Air Attack on Kyiv

In the early hours of May 23, Russia launched a massive combined air strike against Ukraine, primarily targeting Kyiv. According to the AFU Air Force, 600 drones were launched (549 were intercepted), as well as 90 missiles of various types:

• An Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile, marking the third recorded combat use of the system;
• two Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles;
• three 3M22 Zircon cruise missiles;
• 30 9K720 Iskander-M ballistic missiles or S-400 missiles used in a surface-to-surface role, of which 11 were reportedly intercepted;
• and 54 cruise missiles, including Kh-101, 3M-54 Kalibr and Iskander-K missiles, 44 of which Ukrainian forces said were intercepted.

Video footage published online appears to show Kalibr cruise missiles being launched from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet near Novorossiysk.

As a result of the attack, two people were killed and 91 others were injured in the city of Kyiv, including three children. In the surrounding Kyiv region, two more people were killed and 11 were injured. It is worth noting that 24 people were killed during the previous massive strike on Kyiv on May 13-14.

A number of cultural institutions in Kyiv were damaged during the attack, including the National Museum Chornobyl, where a fire reportedly destroyed around 40 percent of the exhibits beyond recovery. Based on eyewitness footage, the museum may have been struck by a Kh-101 cruise missile; distinctive flashes visible in the sky appear consistent with the deployment of countermeasures intended to penetrate air-defense systems.

The US Embassy in Ukraine had warned in advance about a possible large-scale air attack within the following 24 hours. Preparations for strikes of this scale can often be detected via satellite imagery tracking Russian troop and equipment movements. Russia also likely notifies the United States about Oreshnik launches, given that the missile is classified as an intermediate-range ballistic one.

It is also worth noting that intercepted missiles do not always become harmless. Some detonate after falling to the ground and can still inflict significant damage. Footage circulating online appears to show a downed missile falling vertically before exploding on impact. Another video showed the unexploded warhead of a Kh-101 missile, which was almost certainly intercepted before reaching its target.

One missile struck the underground parking garage of the Trinity residential complex, penetrating several concrete floors. Some commentators speculated that the weapon may have been one of the Oreshnik missile’s submunitions, but we disagree, since the complex is located almost in the center of Kyiv.

An Oreshnik missile was launched against Bila Tserkva in the Kyiv region. Video footage captured by eyewitnesses shows six clusters of six combat payloads. The strike hit a local parking garage cooperative. The munitions did not appear to be equipped with explosives and caused no fires upon impact, which complicated efforts to geolocate the strike zone until ground-level footage emerged.

This third non-nuclear deployment of the Oreshnik raises questions. Following its initial use, it was widely assumed that the missile would not be deployed again, given that the minimal damage caused by inert warheads diminishes both the strategic value of this purported "superweapon" and its media impact.

While filming the aftermath of a missile strike in his neighborhood, a Kyiv resident heard the whistle of an incoming projectile, managed to run from the window and accidentally captured the moment it struck an adjacent building. The incident serves as another reminder of the dangers of standing near windows during an air raid, even when an attack appears to have ended.

Satellite imagery of the Russian Orel region has revealed new construction at an airfield near the village of Tsimbulova, a known launch site for Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions. Researchers noted that new pads are being built to accommodate additional systems, including the Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered UAVs. This airfield, along with similar "drone ports" used to launch Geran-2 loitering munitions into Ukraine, presents a viable target for Ukrainian Flamingo missiles or heavy, long-range drones. If these missiles were being produced in the quantities claimed, Ukrainian forces would undoubtedly be actively targeting such infrastructure. This aligns with statements made by the commander of the AFU Unmanned Systems Forces, Ukrainian officer Robert "Madiar" Brovdi, ahead of the May 9th parade. He argued that it is far more practical to target military facilities on the periphery rather than Moscow, as Russia is incapable of defending them all.

On the morning of May 24, Ukrainian drones struck the Vtorovo oil pumping station near the city of Vladimir, sparking a fire that was quickly contained.

According to Sergey Vakulenko, an energy expert and fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, strikes on oil refineries have become systemic. He noted that the attacks are not only regular but have shifted focus from crude distillation columns to secondary processing units—such as diesel hydrotreaters, isomerization units and hydrocrackers—the chemical infrastructure required to turn petroleum fractions into modern motor fuel. The expert suggests that the AFU aims to engineer a noticeable fuel deficit this year for Moscow and Saint Petersburg, systematically focusing attacks on the oil refineries that supply those cities. It remains difficult to assess the exact impact on fuel production because data is classified and independent assessments emerge with significant delays. Vakulenko pointed out that after two months of stability, prices have risen sharply as supply has tightened. It is worth noting that summer prices invariably rise alongside demand and remain well below the seasonal peaks of last year, making definitive conclusions premature.

A drone exploded in Latvia, 50 kilometers [31 mi] from the Russian border and 20 kilometers [12 mi] from the Belarusian border, apparently while en route to either the Leningrad region or Moscow. It remains unclear whose UAV it was, though we assume it was Ukrainian. The cause of the detonation has also not yet been determined. We assume it may have crashed due to fuel depletion or a failed attack attempt.

Estonia and Latvia have urged Ukraine to mitigate unauthorized drone flights, including by implementing self-destruct commands. On May 10, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha announced that Ukraine is prepared to send specialists to the Baltic states to help prevent such incidents.

These countries are not in a state of war, and until recently, had little reason to develop infrastructure similar to Ukraine's for countering UAVs: systems for the early detection of low-flying drones and interception units, such as mobile fire groups armed with machine guns or interceptor drone crews. As a result, stray drones are often detected too late, requiring costly aircraft intervention to intercept them.

It is also worth noting that NATO member states report fewer interceptions or shoot-downs than instances of unauthorized drone incursions. Some of these incidents may stem from Russian jamming systems activity near Europe’s borders, which can disrupt navigation systems, cause drones to lose signal and drift off course under the influence of wind, and, in some cases, resume their programmed route once GPS connectivity is restored.

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