Sitrep for May 11-15, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Ukrainian and Russian StrikesÂ
On May 13 and 14, Russia launched a massive aerial strike against Ukraine, the largest since the start of the war. A total of 1,567 drones and 56 missiles of various types were deployed. The primary target was Kyiv. It appears that during the ceasefire announced by Trump, Russia accumulated drones in order to conduct a larger-scale raid than has been seen in recent months. In addition to UAVs, more than 50 missiles were launched to further overload Ukrainian air defenses and inflict greater damage.
Against this backdrop, the statement by Fire Point co-founder and chief designer Denis Shtilerman to the Financial Times about the production of around 200 FP-5 Flamingo missiles per month sounds somewhat unconvincing. It is worth reminding that this claim is not supported by available launch data. Until recently, only 23 combat-used missiles had been documented. Another six were apparently launched at the city of Cheboksary, although only one reached its target and struck the building of the VNIIR-Progress defense plant.
In Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district, a Russian missile struck a multi-storey residential building, causing an entrance section to collapse. Following the completion of search-and-rescue operations, authorities reported 24 people killed, including three children, and 48 injured, including two more children. Mayor Vitalii Klytschko reported 57 injured. The high number of casualties was caused by the fact that the building was hit by a missile rather than a Shahed loitering munition. After geolocating the building, we found no military targets in its immediate vicinity.
According to preliminary information from Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a Kh-101 missile struck the building. An Ukrainian Air Force's report indicated that 29 of 35 Kh-101 missiles were intercepted, while 12 of the 18 Iskander-M and S-400 missiles were shot down. However, all three Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles deployed in the attack reached their targets.
It is worth noting that Russian authorities had previously threatened a massive strike on central Kyiv should the parade be disrupted. While the parade proceeded safely, albeit in an uneasy atmosphere, Russia nonetheless carried out an aerial assault of unprecedented scale. This suggests that the Russian authorities may similarly violate any other potential agreements.
Among those killed in the destroyed entrance was a 13-year-old girl whose father died on the frontline in 2023; it was later confirmed that her sister also perished.
Rescuing victims from buildings partially destroyed by air strikes is often complicated. For instance, the explosive force can jam entrance doors, trapping residents inside. In Kyiv, first responders were forced to break down a jammed door to reach a woman who was bleeding profusely.
Additionally, footage surfaced showing a downed UAV crashing into a Kyiv courtyard. The video depicts the drone falling uncontrollably, tumbling through the air.
Another Kh-101 missile struck a residential building in the village of Chabany, in the Kyiv region, though the warhead failed to detonate for reasons that remain unclear.
May 15 has been declared a day of mourning in Kyiv. With 24 killed and more than 50 wounded, this currently stands as the highest casualty count from a single attack since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. While missile strikes often dominate the headlines due to the high number of fatalities resulting from a single hit, it is worth noting that drone strikes cumulatively claim more civilian lives.
During the attack, drones also struck the city of Kharkiv, reportedly injuring 29 people, including three children, in different districts of the city.
On May 13, the Russian Aerospace Forces struck the town of Druzhkivka in the Donetsk region with a FAB-250 bomb, killing two people and injuring one.
On May 14, in the Korabelnyi district of Kherson, white vehicles of a United Nations humanitarian mission, marked with the globally recognized blue insignia, were struck by Russian drones. UN representatives stated that the mission had previously notified the Ukrainian and Russian militaries of the mission's route, a claim that the Russian pro-war From Mariupol to the Carpathians Telegram channel denied. While unloading, the vehicles came under a second strike. One vehicle was seriously damaged, and six personnel were injured.
In response to the Russian attacks, UK Secretary of State for Defense John Healey ordered the acceleration of air defense systems’ deliveries to Ukraine.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, in the early hours of May 15, Russian air defense forces shot down 355 Ukrainian drones. In Ryazan, the Ryazan Oil Refinery was targeted. Two residential buildings were also damaged, resulting in four deaths, including a child, and 28 injuries. We see no conclusive evidence that the strikes on residential buildings were intentional. In the Tricolor residential complex, as often occurs, a UAV struck the upper section of a high-rise building.
In the border areas of the Belgorod region, one person was reportedly killed and three others were injured in drone strikes.
On May 13, in the area of the border village of Staraya Pogoshch in the Bryansk region, a drone strike killed a traveler from the Stavropol region known as Sasha Kon. The drone operator may have mistaken him for a Russian serviceman, as he was wearing camouflage pants and a khaki jacket. It is worth noting that the governors of Russia’s border regions have repeatedly warned residents not to wear camouflage, military, or green-colored clothing due to the increasing frequency of drone attacks, while we have highlighted this danger since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
As discussed previously, some military bloggers believe that Ukrainian UAVs are transiting through European airspace. We assess that the drones are instead operating within Russian airspace along the borders of neighboring states. Such tactics complicate both detection and identification, while also creating hesitation among air defense units: even after identifying a drone as a hostile target, air defense crews may be reluctant to engage it with surface-to-air missiles out of concern that a missile could cross into neighboring territory and cause damage there, potentially triggering an international incident. It is worth noting that in Nov. 2022, during a large-scale Russian strike against Ukrainian infrastructure, Russian missiles attempted to hit the Dobrotvirska Thermal Power Plant near Lviv. One Ukrainian air defense missile reportedly went off course and landed in the Polish village of PrzewodĂłw, killing two people.
Ukrainian military expert Serhii Flash Beskrestnov, while publishing the flight routes of Russian UAVs, suggested that Belarus is not allowing Russia to use its airspace. It is also possible that Russian forces have adopted a similar tactic, launching drones along the border so that Ukrainian air defense forces may hesitate to intercept them out of concern that a missile could accidentally enter Belarusian territory.
In the early hours of May 15, at least one UAV entered the airspace of Finland.
In our previous sitrep, we noted that shutting down mobile internet access appears to provide at least some protection against Ukrainian UAV attacks. According to Alexey Chadayev, the head of the Russian drone center Ushkuynik, Ukrainian mobile operators use a more selective method of restricting internet access that does not disrupt banks, taxis, car-sharing services, delivery platforms, or other businesses. With this method, when a new subscriber appears on the network using a previously unseen SIM card and is moving faster than 60 kilometers per hour [37 miles per hour], the system assumes the card has been installed in a Shahed drone and disconnects the subscriber.
In our previous week’s sitrep, we summarized a Vazhnyye Istorii report on the conflict between Vyacheslav Gladkov and the federal authorities. According to reports, Gladkov resigned on April 13, and Alexander Shuvaev, a major general and former commander of the 1st Slavyanskaya Motorized Rifle Brigade of the so-called DPR, was appointed acting governor of the Belgorod region. It is worth noting once again that although Gladkov was considered a Kremlin appointee, he did not automatically attribute every incident to Ukrainian forces. The information he published often enabled us to form a relatively accurate picture of events unfolding in the region.
On May 13, an electric commuter train traveling on the Razumnoye-Tomarovka line derailed in the Belgorod region. The governor initially said the accident may have been caused by an explosion on the railway tracks, but later edited the statement. In the revised post, the word "explosion" was replaced with "damage." The Telegram channel Moskva. Novosti. Sobytiya [Moscow. News. Events] reported that the damage was caused by an "accidental release of air ordnance"—the unintended drop of an unexploded Russian FAB-500 air-dropped bomb.
Frontline Situation Update
An article by Financial Times, citing unnamed sources, claims that Russia’s top military leadership has convinced Putin that Russian forces will be able to fully capture the Donbas by this autumn, as the Armed Forces of Ukraine are reportedly facing growing manpower shortages and are allegedly unable to hold the frontline.
We consider the article to be manipulative, and the information attributed to its sources not credible. Although the Russian military relies on false reporting, such as Valery Gerasimov’s claims about capturing Kupiansk and 60% of Kostiantynivka, the Russian Armed Forces do not typically announce territorial gains 50-100 km [31-62 mi] ahead of their actual advances (the Ukrainian foothold on the eastern bank of the Oskil River is no more than 15 km [9 mi] deep). It is quite obvious that capturing Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka and the rest of the settlements in the Donetsk region within three and a half months is impossible. At the same time, the article could easily be used for propaganda purposes by Ukrainian public figures and politicians—for example, to claim in the fall that the Russian summer offensive completely failed because it supposedly aimed to fully capture the Donbas.
While we do not doubt that Putin believes the reports submitted by the military command, we also consider it possible that he is satisfied with the RuAF's slow advance. Otherwise, by now, we would likely have seen signs of his negative reaction regarding the 2025 frontline results. However, there have been no major personnel reshuffles, nor any high-profile statements demanding an increase in military production or higher payments to servicemen in order to expand troop numbers (on the contrary, some regions even reduced such payments at the end of 2025). Nor has there been any talk so far of a renewed mobilization campaign aimed at accelerating the pace of advances on the frontline. If, however, it makes little difference to Putin whether Donbas is captured in three months or three years, then his objective likely lies elsewhere: demonstrating that Russia is prepared to outlast Ukraine and its Western backers.
The most active sector of the frontline at the moment is the Kostiantynivka direction, where the RuAF are attempting to partially encircle the town. Small advances have been recorded from the southwest, as well as from the east and northeast. Russian assault troops have been spotted in the villages of Dovha Balka, Novodmytrivka and Molocharka. They are continuing to infiltrate Kostiantynivka from the direction of Illinivka. Russia’s Ministry of Defense has also claimed to have captured the village of Mykolaivka, northeast of Kostiantynivka. Russian forces therefore do not appear to be assaulting Kostiantynivka head-on, but are instead gradually attempting to envelop it from two sides, likely with the aim of also advancing toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, a village through which Ukrainian forces are supplied. These advances have largely been made possible by constant, intensive shelling and strikes involving bombs and drones.
There have also been reports of small advances by the RuAF in the Sloviansk direction. According to DeepState, Russian forces advanced near the villages of Rai-Oleksandrivka, Kalenyky, Minkivka, Holubivka (near Pryvillia), Novomarkove, Zakitne and Riznykivka at the beginning of this week.
Overall, the frontline is changing rather slowly. Both sides are focusing more on operational-tactical and long-range strikes. If the pace of the RuAF's advances does not accelerate in May and June, it would suggest a crisis within the Russian army.
According to an infographic by French researcher Clément Molin, the impact sites of 6,600 air-dropped bombs over the past three months have been concentrated mainly along three priority directions for the RuAF: Sloviansk, Dobropillia and Huliaipole.
There is a view that because the area around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is heavily fortified—the region is even referred to as Ukraine's "fortress belt"—the AFU will hold their positions there to the very end. However, in the current war, the presence of fortifications alone does not determine how stubbornly soldiers will defend a particular settlement. Unfortunately, Syrskyi’s "not one step back" policy requires holding disadvantageous positions, even when it makes little military sense. An example of this is the AFU's position on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. According to RBC-Ukraine, there were no plans to withdraw troops from Pokrovsk on May 13. Meanwhile, in the town of Myrnohrad, where Ukrainian troops are reportedly still present, the situation is more difficult, making a controlled withdrawal possible. In our view, however, the AFU should have abandoned these positions last year.
CNN published data from the Institute for the Study of War indicating that Ukraine is reclaiming more territory than it is losing. In April, Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated more territory than Russia captured for the first time in a while. One of the key reasons for this success is the AFU's advantage in the use of drones. As we have repeatedly reported, it is impossible to clearly define the frontline in modern warfare. The contested area is very large, and estimates of captured territory by different analytical projects vary significantly. We do not believe it is possible to draw such optimistic conclusions based on a single source. Additionally, we do not see a global advantage for the AFU in the use of drones. On some sections of the frontline, Ukraine has the advantage, while Russia has the advantage on others.
It was previously reported that, as part of the ceasefire announced by Trump, a 1,000-for-1,000 POW exchange would take place. On the morning of May 15, it became known that Russia and Ukraine exchanged POWs under a 205-for-205Â formula. Since it is logistically difficult to move two thousand people simultaneously, we assume the exchange will occur in several stages.
The Federal Penitentiary Service has for the first time acknowledged that the number of convicts in Russia is declining because of the recruitment of contract soldiers (previously this had been explained by the humanization of legislation). According to the head of the Federal Penitentiary Service, Arkady Gostev, due to the possibility of signing a contract during the war, the number of convicts in Russia has decreased by almost 40%. By the end of 2021, 465,000 people were held in pre-trial detention centers and correctional facilities. During the war, this number fell to 282,000. It is important to note that these statistics do not include individuals persuaded to sign contracts during the investigative stage.
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