Sitrep for May 2-9, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Ceasefire

United States President Donald Trump announced a three-day ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine for May 9-11, which was later confirmed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin’s aide Yury Ushakov. A 1,000-for-1,000 POW exchange is also to take place. Previously, neither side had intended to observe unilateral ceasefires announced by the other. Putin had declared a "ceasefire" for May 8-9, while Zelenskyy stressed that a ceasefire should serve to save lives rather than celebrate Victory Day, and announced a cessation of hostilities beginning at midnight on May 6, promising reciprocal responses to Russian strikes. However, Ukraine was struck again that same day, and there was effectively no talk of a real ceasefire in the days that followed—until the agreement was brokered with Trump’s mediation.

We still do not expect the ceasefire to result in a complete halt to all combat operations along the frontline, though a noticeable slowdown is possible. There will likely be significantly fewer shelling incidents and airstrikes from both sides during this time, although we expect Ukraine to continue responding to Russian strikes with strikes of its own.

In recent weeks, the situation along the frontline has already become close to a stalemate: clashes are no longer leading to meaningful territorial gains. At this point, it increasingly appears that both sides have shifted their focus toward air strikes, including long-range and middle-range attacks.

A 45-minute military parade consisting only of marching troops, without armored vehicles, was held on Red Square in Moscow on the morning of May 9—the first such parade without armored vehicles since 2007. In roughly one-third of Russia’s regions, Victory Day parades were canceled altogether. Russian President’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov officially stated that there had been no attempts to disrupt the celebrations.

Earlier, Russian authorities threatened to launch a massive strike on central Kyiv if the parade were disrupted. In addition, after Russian officials urged diplomats to leave Kyiv—a call rejected by the EU—Zelenskyy warned Russia’s allies against attending the celebrations in Moscow. Following talks with the United States, Zelenskyy issued a decree "authorizing" the parade in Moscow and temporarily excluding Red Square from the list of potential strike targets during the event.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes 

Every year, airstrikes become increasingly deadly, as detailed in our new report.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force's sitrep for the period from 6:00 p.m. on May 8 to 8:00 a.m. on May 9, Russian forces attacked Ukrainian territory with one Iskander ballistic missile and 43 drones. If the attack occurred before midnight, it would not violate the ceasefire agreed upon by Trump. However, it would contradict the unilateral ceasefire declared by Russia on May 8.

The previous days, meanwhile, saw many strikes that caused a large number of civilian casualties. The deadliest occurred on May 5, when the Russian Aerospace Forces dropped four half-ton aerial bombs on the city of Zaporizhzhia. As a result, 12 people were killed, 10 of them in the strike on an auto repair shop, and another 45 civilians were injured. According to our data, at least 36 people were killed and 230 were injured on both sides of the frontline that day.

In addition, the practice of repeat strikes, or "double taps," continues. These strikes target individuals who arrive at the scene after the initial attack. On May 5 alone, we recorded three such cases:

• In the town of Druzhkivka, a UAV struck the Phoenix evacuation team, injuring a State Emergency Service employee and damaging an official vehicle;
• During the day in the village of Sahaidachne in the Kherson region, a Lancet attacked an ambulance, injuring five medical workers (a Telegram channel, known for videos of drone strikes on civilians, claimed that the vehicle was allegedly being used by the military and that drone operators target any transport near houses);
• In the early hours of May 5, in the Poltava region, a fire broke out at a gas production facility belonging to Naftogaz [the largest national oil and gas company of Ukraine] after a strike involving Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Geran-2 UAVs. Four missiles then struck again the arriving State Emergency Service rescuers and the employees working to eliminate the aftermath. As a result, three Naftogaz employees and two rescuers were killed, and another 37 people were injured: one police officer, 13 gas workers and 23 rescuers.

Concerns have been raised about potential strikes on Moscow during the parade. Currently, a high concentration of anti-aircraft systems is stationed around the city. Mark Krutov, editor of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty news service, has mapped the locations where these units are deployed. Notably, some of these sites consist of S-300 and S-400 SAM systems, which are generally considered overpowered for intercepting UAVs.

Consequently, it is unlikely they are utilized to repel drone raids. However, this map does not account for mobile air defense assets, such as Kamov Ka-52 [Hokum B] attack helicopters, which were observed intercepting UAVs flying toward Moscow on May 4. During that specific raid, one drone managed to breach three layers of air defense and reach the city, where it crashed into a residential building on Mosfilmovskaya Street.

CNN, the Financial Times and Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] have obtained from sources an intelligence report by one of the EU countries, which among other things stated that the intelligence services do not rule out a possible coup in Russia involving Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu [former Russia’s Minister of Defense]. The report also claimed that Putin allegedly spends all his time in a protected bunker, including in the Krasnodar region, and does not visit residences in the Moscow region or in Valdai in the Novgorod region. Many experts have criticized these materials, and we agree with the criticism. The claim regarding the residences contradicts the fact that Russian forces are strengthening the air defense of the Valdai residence (as RFE/RL pointed out, it was even blurred on Yandex satellite images shortly before May 9), rather than the Krasnodar residence. In addition, the very idea of a possible conspiracy led by Sergei Shoigu is absurd, as he has neither political influence nor friends among the military and other law enforcement officers.

Vazhnyye Istorii has reported on a conflict between Vyacheslav Gladkov [governor of the Belgorod region] and the national authorities—mainly law enforcement officers—because of which he is now reportedly facing dismissal. He criticized Roskomnadzor [Russia's internet censorship agency] for blocking Telegram and the Max Messenger for failing to send push notifications about UAV attacks to residents of the region. In 2023, when asked by a local resident why the enemy was "reaching the district center practically with tanks," Gladkov responded that he had "even more questions" for the Ministry of Defense than the population did, and expressed hope that the ministry would "draw conclusions" from its "mistakes." A source close to the Kremlin claims that "everyone" in the Federal Security Service (FSB) "hates" Gladkov. Thus, when even a "Putin-aligned" official makes overly bold statements, attempts are made to push him out of the system. This is one reason why we don't believe in a conspiracy within Putin’s inner circle—the higher one's position, the more dependent one is on the system.

In the previous sitrep, we reported the destruction of a Russian unmanned surface vessel near the coast in the Odesa region. It was likely equipped with a Starlink terminal, as indicated by a white rectangular module on its bow.

Footage captured by a Russian Gerbera drone of the Verkhovna Rada [Ukraine's parliament] and other central Kyiv facilities has been published. It is unknown whether the UAV was equipped with Starlink or relied on relay stations or a mesh network.

On April 30, Ukrainian maritime surface drones attacked two FSB vessels—a Sobol FSB Border Service's PSKA-300-class patrol boat and a Grachonok-class anti-sabotage boat—patrolling waters near the Crimean Bridge. Eight of the eleven crew members from the FSB’s Grachonok boat were killed. The attack involved ten USVs—eight were destroyed en route, while the two struck the FSB boat. Note that the attack occurred at night, likely because aircraft such as the Beriev Be-12 aircraft and helicopters are significantly less effective against USVs in darkness.

On May 5, the Prymary special operations unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense published a video of another series of strikes on targets in Crimea, including a Be-12 amphibious aircraft.

Also on May 5, a video was released showing a potential retaliatory attack by the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition against Ukrainian patrol and artillery boats in the port of Odesa. No casualties have been reported, and the extent of the damage is unknown.

The New Voice of Ukraine media outlet published data from Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence regarding Russia’s missile stockpiles and production rates. As of mid-April 2026, the Russian Armed Forces reportedly possessed:

• up to 350 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles (launched from Tu-22 bombers and used relatively rarely);
• up to 110 Iskander-K cruise missiles;
• up to 120 Kh-101 cruise missiles for Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers;
• up to 230 3M22 Zircon hypersonic anti-ship missiles;
• up to 100 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles;
• up to 10 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

According to the report, Russia currently produces per month:

• up to 60 Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles;
• up to 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles;
• up to 70 Kh-101 cruise missiles;
• up to 3 3M22 Zircon missiles;
• up to 10 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles;
• up to 25 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles.

The reported ratio between stockpiles and production rates for some missile systems raises certain doubts. For example, the report claims that only up to 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles are produced per month. However, these missiles are frequently employed in attacks, which makes it unclear how Russia could have amassed a stockpile of over 100 missiles. Similarly, if fewer than three Zircon missiles are produced monthly, the claimed stockpile of 230 missiles would represent nearly seven years of uninterrupted production without any operational use. At the same time, the reported production rates for Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Kh-101 cruise missiles are broadly consistent with documentation.

Yurii Ihnat, Head of the Communications Department of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine is experiencing a shortage of missiles for Patriot, NASAMS and IRIS-T systems, with some launchers already "half empty." In addition to intensive Russian strikes and chronic supply issues, the situation has reportedly been aggravated by the third consecutive month of conflict in the Middle East. The United States and Gulf countries expended large numbers of interceptor missiles during the conflict, repelling Iranian attacks, and are now seeking to replenish their own stockpiles.

Meduza [international Russian-language online media outlet] and Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] published a statistical estimate of actual Russian military losses based on data from the National Probate Registry. According to their estimate, the number of Russian personnel killed by the end of 2025 may have reached approximately 350,000.

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