Sitrep for May 25-June 5, 2026 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
As June began, various analytical projects have published their estimates of the Russian Army’s territorial gains in May. As noted previously, these figures are of particular interest this year, since in previous years the late spring and early summer period was marked by an intensification of Russian offensive operations and, at times, tactical breakthroughs along the frontline.
According to DeepState, the Russian Armed Forces captured 14 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in May, allowing for the fact that some recent frontline changes have not yet been reflected on the map. However, the analysts note that once those changes are incorporated, the total area occupied by Russia will actually show a decrease over the month.
Meanwhile, the pro-Russian Slivochnyy Kapriz project estimated that Russian-controlled territory expanded by 209.5 square kilometers. That broadly matches our expectations: more than in March, but less than in April, with no significant acceleration or slowdown in the pace of advance. It is worth noting that this project's maps have traditionally depicted Russian gains as more substantial than Ukrainian counterattacks. A recent example is the village of Dobropasove in the Dnipropetrovsk region, near the village of Pokrovske, which Russia's MoD hastily declared captured. In reality, it appears that only the contested zone in that area has expanded.
The independent Finnish analytical Black Bird Group estimated that the RuAF captured 82 square kilometers in May. This is also a relatively modest gain—hardly a collapse, but far from an impressive result. Of the available estimates, this one is the closest to our own assessment, which takes into account both the expansion of contested areas and developments around the town of Kostiantynivka. Although Russian forces continue to make gains, May can still be regarded as a disappointing month for the Russian military. At present, we see no reason to believe that the situation will change dramatically in June. It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions, but we are not observing the redeployment of substantial forces, the concentration of units, or other signs that would suggest the launch of a major offensive.
The most significant direction at present is the Kostiantynivka. The RuAF continue to actively infiltrate Kostiantynivka, with Russian troops reported in the city center. On both the western and eastern outskirts, they have in some areas already established footholds, and several sectors—contrary to the current DeepState map—can already be considered under Russian control. The city center has effectively become a contested area. The example of Pokrovsk demonstrates that, even as conditions deteriorate for the defenders, it is reasonable to expect that the city will not fall in the near term. The AFU may be able to hold the remaining parts of Kostiantynivka for a considerable period.
It also became known that the RuAF once again employed thermite incendiary munitions against Kostiantynivka. It is worth noting that such munitions are often incorrectly referred to as white phosphorus. Video footage shows characteristic smoke trails in the air and multiple closely spaced fire outbreaks at the impact points of the submunitions. It is worth noting once again that the use of such weapons in populated areas constitutes a war crime. We expected that videos of incendiary drones (such as the Dracarys type) being used against forest lines would begin to reappear in mid-spring. However, we have not encountered any such footage so far.
Russian advances have also been reported in the Huliaipole direction. Russian forces reportedly captured the village of Zelene, which the DeepState map has shown as captured since May 31.
In addition, the Russian MoD announced the capture of the village of Huliaipilske (which the ministry refers to as Komsomolskoye) and released footage of flag planting.
The published combat footage indicates that the area is, at minimum, contested.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Recently, official statements from the Ukrainian military have increasingly misused the term "fire control," a phrase that previously appeared mostly in the writings of journalists and bloggers rather than military officials. For instance, the 14th Regiment of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces claimed "fire control" over the Donetsk airport. In military terms, this implies that an enemy is effectively unable to use the infrastructure and faces a high risk of destruction when moving across the targeted area, as any target is expected to be immediately struck by drones, artillery, or missiles. However, the Donetsk airport is still being actively used to launch Shahed drones. While Ukrainian forces have repeatedly struck the facility with UAVs, they have not yet succeeded in destroying it entirely or rendering it unusable. True fire control over this airport would likely be reflected in a decrease in Shahed strikes across Ukraine.
Another example is a post by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense regarding middle strikes, which claimed fire control over the R-280 highway leading from Rostov-on-Don to Crimea. Although the Armed Forces of Ukraine have successfully targeted vehicles on this route using Hornet, FP-2, RAM-2X and Bulava drones, these strikes remain limited in scope. The AFU is currently unable to destroy all traffic along the highway, making any talk of severing this corridor to Crimea premature. Meanwhile, the AFU's 3rd Army Corps published a video of a strike near the Izvaryne checkpoint in the Luhansk region, on the Russian border, and announced it was launching an operation to control logistics routes in the area. Although the exact phrase "fire control" was not explicitly used, statements regarding drone control over logistics convey the same meaning. Such control implies the ability to strike any military transport on any road within the region. However, the mere capability of drones to reach the far border of the region does not equate to total logistical control, given that the Luhansk region is vast, making it physically impossible to monitor every road with drones.
While these middle strikes are having an effect, they are not currently exerting a significant impact on the frontline. They are unlikely to enable the AFU to seize the strategic initiative or launch a large-scale operation to liberate occupied territories in the near future.
According to Dmitry Treshchanin of Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], the scale of the effect from middle strikes will be comparable to the effect of the first mass appearance of FPV drones in the war. We disagree with this: although FPV drones did indeed change the nature of the war, middle-strike drones like the Hornet are not as revolutionary. Furthermore, they are not cheap enough to be produced by the tens or even hundreds of thousands per day—yet it is precisely this scale that is necessary for the systematic disruption of Russian logistics and the sustained cutting of supply lines.
On May 30, the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU struck an airbase in Taganrog. It was claimed that Tu-142MK and Tu-142MR aircraft were destroyed. The inflicted damage is visible on satellite imagery, but it did not appear critical to us—it is highly likely that the aircraft can be repaired.
Ukrainian forces continue to outpace Russian forces in the number of long-range drones launched monthly. According to statistics from the Air Forces of the AFU, the RuAF launched 7,433 UAVs in May, while according to data from the Russian MoD, the Ukrainian side launched at least 8,973 drones.
According to our summaries on strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia, at least 377 civilians were killed and another 2,783 people were injured on both sides of the frontline in May 2026. This is the highest monthly casualty count since we began reporting in 2024. Around 74% of casualties in May were caused by Russian strikes.
On June 3, in the Donetsk region, in the town of Yenakiieve, seven people were killed in a Ukrainian drone strike on a civilian bus. Strikes were also carried out on a lorry parking area. In the city of Horlivka, a dump truck belonging to road workers was also targeted.
On June 4, in the city of Kherson, a Russian drone attacked an ambulance, leaving three people wounded.
On June 2, during a mass aerial attack on Ukrainian territory, 22 people were killed and 130 wounded over the course of the day. In total, according to our data, on that day at least 30 people were killed and 241 wounded on both sides of the frontline that day. The large number of ballistic missiles used by Russia continues to pose a serious problem for Ukrainian air defense amid a shortage of surface-to-air missiles—it is worth noting that, in addition to the Iskander ballistic missile, the RM-48U type missiles of the S-400 SAM system are also used.
According to Bloomberg sources, Ukraine has requested additional deliveries of Patriot SAM interceptor missiles from Germany because its stocks are running low. In exchange, Ukraine is prepared to hand over the Patriot interceptors it is set to receive under a $4.6 billion order that Germany has already paid for through the PURL mechanism. This contrasts with the statement by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles, the main missiles for the Patriot system, are supplied daily to Ukraine. Based on our observations, Rutte has repeatedly exaggerated or overstated information, and we do not trust this statement. Available data suggests the volume of delivered surface-to-air missiles remains insufficient to counter large-scale missile attacks.
Against the backdrop of Ukrainian strikes during the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), we are once again being asked about the effectiveness of Russian air defenses. Without data on the number of drones launched specifically at Saint Petersburg, we cannot assess their performance, even if we make an approximate estimate of the number of successful strikes.
Answering journalists’ questions, Putin confirmed that two Oreshnik missiles were used on May 24. We wrote about one of them, which struck the grounds of a garage cooperative in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv region, in our previous sitrep. We doubted the existence of a second missile, which reportedly fell somewhere in the Donetsk region, because only a single video of the strike surfaced, geolocated near the city of Kramatorsk. According to Putin, the latest Oreshnik strikes were carried out "where it was convenient to observe the results; this applies both to Bila Tserkva and to an area of the DPR within the perimeter of the main fortified area." It should be noted that this wording encompasses not only territory under Russian control but the entire territory claimed as the "DPR."
Overall, this explanation for the choice of targets appears implausible: Russia has sufficient training grounds for missile testing. It is also rather strange to hear from Putin, who constantly speaks about "protecting the residents of the Donbas," that such a missile was used in a test strike against precisely those people. Despite Putin’s confirmation, we are still not fully convinced that there were two missiles. In addition to the already mentioned single video, we find it questionable that neither US nor any European intelligence service commented on a missile impact so close to the frontline. We nevertheless allow for the possibility that Putin may have come across reports of a second Oreshnik missile and, without checking with the MoD, improvised an answer to the journalist’s question.
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