Sitrep for Sept. 7-10, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Playfra has partially confirmed AMK Mapping’s assessment that the Russian Armed Forces have reached the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk highway. In particular, Russian soldiers have been spotted south and southeast of the village of Novotroitske, as well as in the northern part of the village of Raiske. Later, Playfra, citing the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard, reported that three Russian soldiers were captured in the village of Staroraiske, in the immediate vicinity of the western outskirts of the town of Druzhkivka. Thus, the situation in the Dobropillia direction remains difficult: the RuAF continue to infiltrate the area and are gradually moving closer to Druzhkivka.
In the village of Mohrytsia in the Sumy region, a group of Russian soldiers who had waved a flag for a video were killed by Ukrainian forces shortly afterward. The Ukrainian soldiers then recorded their own video with flags and, presumably, the bodies in body bags. In such cases, Russian commanders are not concerned with the fate of the assault troops—what matters to them is merely the opportunity to report another small advance. Thus, the practice of claiming territory “on credit” is dangerous primarily for the Russian soldiers themselves (the Severny Veter Telegram channel similarly describes such actions by the AFU; the MoD, meanwhile, announced the capture of Mohrytsia as early as July 30).
The Ukrainian offensive in the Donetsk region continues, with the AFU attempting to cut off the Shandryholove salient, advancing from the village of Katerynivka in the north and the village of Kolodiazi in the south. According to analyst Clément Molin, more than 200 sq. km of the salient is no longer under Russian control, and Ukrainian forces have pushed the RuAF back to the Zherebets River. While we consider cutting off the salient roughly along the Zherebets River quite realistic, we have doubts about clearing it completely. Although this territory is no longer fully controlled by the RuAF and has become contested (though this is not yet reflected on the DeepState map), small assault groups may still be hiding there. Completely clearing it is just as difficult as verifying claims that it has been cleared. Notably, satellite imagery shows areas with no signs of active fighting, such as impacts from air-dropped bombs or artillery fire. This may be because the AFU have not yet reached these areas, but it may also indicate that Russian forces, having assessed the danger, withdrew without a fight.
This success by Ukrainian forces can be attributed to a combination of several factors. Despite the importance of the Lyman axis for the fighting around Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, its northern sector, the Rubtsi direction, had not been among the priority directions for the RuAF in recent months. Had a similar salient existed near Kostiantynivka, Ukrainian counterattacks would most likely not have been as successful, since this is where Russian forces have concentrated most of their attention. It should also be noted that the high standard of staff work within the AFU's 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Andriy Biletsky, played a significant role in the success of the operation.
According to War Unit Observer, the AFU's 46th Airmobile Brigade was redeployed in July from the Oleksandrivka direction to the Kostiantynivka direction in order to reinforce the junction between the areas of responsibility of the AFU's 19th and 11th Corps, both of which are under the operational command of the AFU's 3rd Army Corps. This grouping has been named "Center." The Omega special forces unit of Ukraine's National Guard was also redeployed to this sector of the frontline. Thus, part of the forces previously committed to the Oleksandrivka direction, which had previously been a priority for the AFU, has been redeployed to strengthen the defense on the Kostiantynivka direction, one of the priority directions for the RuAF.
Ahead of Ukraine's Military Intelligence Day, celebrated on Sept. 7, an interview with Oleh Ivashchenko, head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence [HUR] of the Ukrainian MoD, was published. We will highlight several key points from the interview. Ivashchenko stated that Russia is currently significantly weaker economically than it was at the beginning of the full-scale war, although it still possesses sufficient resources to continue the war. According to HUR's assessment, Russia may have sufficient resources to continue the war in 2027 and possibly even into 2028. Therefore, sanctions pressure must be maintained while ensuring that measures already adopted are effectively enforced.
According to Ivashchenko, more than 60 percent of Russians oppose the war, though he acknowledged that it is impossible to say whether this discontent could translate into meaningful protest activity. Although we generally agree with that assessment, it was likely made primarily for political purposes. Indeed, even many pro-government Russians are growing disillusioned with the "special military operation," but they are unlikely to express their views publicly under current censorship conditions. Ukraine's intelligence services, however, have an interest in emphasizing growing discontent with the war in Russia, because that allows them to demonstrate the presumed effect of military and economic pressure—including strikes on oil refineries and energy infrastructure, warehouses belonging to online marketplaces, and so on. By that logic, continuing this pressure will further raise the cost of the war for the Kremlin and reduce its ability to continue the war.
Ivashchenko also said the RuAF are currently losing about 1,200–1,400 personnel killed or seriously wounded per day, with the figure reaching 1,500 on some days. That puts these frontline losses at about 40,000 a month (most of the seriously wounded are not considered irrecoverable losses and eventually return to duty — CIT note). We have seen similar estimates, but Ivashchenko went on to say that current recruitment into the RuAF is enough to offset losses and maintain the grouping's strength. Ukrainian authorities had previously said that recruitment of contract soldiers was insufficient to offset losses—citing this as one of the reasons for a likely new wave of mobilization. Available data, however, indicate that recruitment into the RuAF currently remains at about 30,000 a month. At the same time, Ivashchenko explicitly stated that the agency sees signs that Russia is preparing for a new wave of mobilization after the elections to the State Duma [lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly]—a wave that could take place primarily in remote regions, even without a high-profile public announcement.
We tend to believe that the MoD will intensify pressure on vulnerable groups and will more aggressively coerce men, including conscripts, into signing military contracts. Roundups like those in the Penza region may spread to more regions. As the end of the year approaches, regional authorities will have to meet their recruitment targets for contract soldiers one way or another, so the pressure will intensify in any case. Ukrainian authorities regularly use the word "mobilization" to mean all forms of personnel replenishment for the Russian army, so we cannot rule out the possibility that they meant a "mobilization" that does not involve sending out draft notices. We still believe there will be no mobilization of the kind carried out in September 2022. We cannot guarantee this, however, because the final decision depends solely on Putin.
In this regard, we consider Russian companies’ efforts to obtain draft deferments for their employees to be a reasonable precaution rather than evidence of preparations for mobilization. It makes sense for company executives to secure deferments for their employees in advance so that a sudden decision by the authorities does not leave the company without a significant portion of its workforce.
Human rights activist Artyom Klyga of the Movement of Conscientious Objectors [a human rights organization supporting those who refuse to perform military service] advises those concerned about mobilization to leave the country for a while after the elections if they have the opportunity. We agree with the general recommendation: if doing so does not involve excessive expense, it makes sense to take precautions.
A road bridge has opened between Russia and North Korea. On the one hand, rail transport remains considerably more efficient for moving large quantities of munitions. On the other hand, it was precisely the reliance on rail transport that made deliveries from North Korea easier to monitor and allowed researchers to roughly estimate their scale. Previously, there was effectively a single bottleneck: containers accumulated at the port and were then transferred to trains. The addition of a road link now allows some cargo to be transported directly. This makes the supply network more dispersed and less transparent to outside observers.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Russian forces carried out particularly intense drone attacks on Ukrainian trains this week. On Sept. 7, a video was published showing a strike on a freight train carrying tank cars in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Russia’s MoD claimed that the train was carrying foreign UAVs, but this claim is contradicted by footage published by the ministry itself. If the train was indeed carrying military cargo, it would be much more plausible to assume that the tank cars contained fuel and lubricants. Moreover, according to geolocation data, the train was traveling west, that is, away from the frontline.
Strikes on passenger trains have also become more frequent:
- on Sept. 8, a commuter train in Sumy was struck, injuring 12 people;
- on the same day, the Dnipro-Zaporizhzhia train was attacked in the Zaporizhzhia region, killing a conductor, while the Kyiv-Sumy train was attacked in the Sumy region, with no injuries reported;
- on Sept. 9, the Kharkiv-Izium train was attacked in the Kharkiv region, injuring six people.
Judging by one video, jet-powered drones, among other weapons, were used in attacks on the trains.
On Sept. 8, a Russian ballistic missile struck Ukraine's largest wholesale and retail market in Odesa, located in an area with numerous warehouses. Three people were injured, and about 200 retail pavilions were damaged.
Overall, following the departure of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and the end of the brief hiatus in airstrikes on the capitals, Russian forces have resumed large-scale strikes on Kyiv. Of particular note was an attack by two ballistic missiles on the same facility—apparently a Varus supermarket in Kyiv, with a large crater left nearby. The use of two expensive missiles at once against a commercial facility points to a further escalation: previously, cheaper drones had been used more often for such attacks.
As a result of strikes on Kyiv and the Kyiv region on Sept. 7-8, seven people were killed and another 42 were injured, including a two-year-old girl. Among the targets hit on Sept. 8 was a pharmaceutical warehouse in Kyiv.
On Sept. 8, the Russian MoD claimed that it had struck the Vasylkiv airfield in the Kyiv region. In a video published later, a Ukrainian Mikoyan MiG-29 flies close to a Russian drone, which then strikes a target on the ground. The camera subsequently shows what appears to be a destroyed MiG-29, although it is unclear whether the aircraft is a mock-up or an actual MiG-29. If confirmed, the loss of another MiG-29 would be significant for the AFU. These fighters, equipped with cannons and air-to-air missiles, are used to intercept jet-powered Shahed drones, which interceptor drones generally cannot catch up with.
On Sept. 9, Ukrainian forces attacked the area around Novorossiysk. As a result of drones or their debris hitting residential buildings, four people, including a child, were killed and another 29 were injured.
AFU Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Robert “Madiar” Brovdi reported that on Sept. 9, USF drones struck several Russian warships, including missile boats. The Ukrainian Navy also stated that during the attack an R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missile hit the Admiral Essen, a frigate capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles regularly used to strike Ukraine. Satellite imagery of the aftermath was later published, showing damage to three ships: the Buyan-M, Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov.
During the Sept. 9 Ukrainian attack on Sochi involving unmanned surface vessels and possibly aerial drones, 28 people were injured, according to officials. Pro-Russian sources reported that a damaged USV washed up on a beach and subsequently exploded, destroying a coastal café. Videos published online show eyewitnesses remaining at the scene after the explosion and continuing to watch and film the events. Such behavior significantly increases the risk of further casualties: while an attack is ongoing, people should immediately seek shelter rather than film what is happening.
The Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel reported the destruction of several Russian Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems during the summer of 2026, one of which was allegedly hit near Saint Petersburg. While UAV control in border regions can be maintained through relay stations, maintaining such a link near Saint Petersburg, so deep inside Russian territory, is far more challenging. It is possible that autonomous target recognition and guidance were used, although there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. It remains unclear how a Ukrainian drone was able to detect and strike such a mobile air defense system from such a distance.
Earlier this summer, reports emerged of fuel rationing for one of the frontline units, which were then cited as evidence of a fuel crisis affecting the Russian army. We suggested that the issue might have stemmed from commanders selling military fuel for personal gain rather than from actual supply shortages.
This hypothesis is indirectly supported by a criminal case opened in the Moscow region against Interior Ministry Major General Sergey Malkov and other officials. According to investigators, they embezzled fuel intended for police vehicles, selling it through gas stations while forcing subordinates to refuel official vehicles at their own expense, promising to reimburse them later. The scheme reportedly involved executives of the Evrotrans fuel company and employees of the organization that supplied fuel to the police. This case demonstrates that localized fuel restrictions within security agencies do not necessarily indicate an actual fuel shortage.
Western Assistance
Amid intensified Russian strikes, Germany announced the urgent transfer of PAC-2 interceptor missiles for Patriot systems from its own stocks to Ukraine. They are significantly less capable than PAC-3 interceptors against modern ballistic missiles, but can be used against other types of airborne targets.
In addition, the European Union authorized Ukraine to use part of the €90 billion two-year loan to purchase US-made surface-to-air missiles for Patriot systems. The funds were originally intended to be spent primarily on European-made weapons, but EU countries agreed to make an exception due to the acute shortage of PAC-3 missiles. According to Ukrainian Defense Minister Yevhen Khmara, Ukraine plans to purchase around 1,000 missiles, most of which will be delivered in subsequent years, although the first deliveries could take place as early as this winter.
The Ukrainian authorities will likely try to use a similar arrangement again: obtain missiles immediately from European countries' stocks and later replace them with newly manufactured munitions purchased by Ukraine. It remains unclear whether the partners will agree to this arrangement and how many interceptor missiles Ukraine will be able to obtain in the near term.
The German Aid to Ukraine project reported that production of three new variants of Ukrainian Bars cruise missiles will soon begin in Germany, with the first missiles expected to arrive in Ukraine as early as Oct. 10. Bars missiles have already been used to strike targets in Russia, including during attacks on Moscow in May and June 2026. The new variants reportedly have a range of up to 1,000 km and can carry warheads weighing up to 60 kg, although these maximum specifications probably cannot be achieved simultaneously: increasing the range requires carrying more fuel and reducing the payload.
This pattern is particularly evident with long-range drones. On Sept. 9, a Ukrainian drone attacked the Novourengoy condensate processing plant in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region [Russia’s federal subject], located roughly 2,800 kilometers from the border between Russia and Ukraine's Chernihiv region. Fire Point, the company whose FP-1 drone was used in the attack, said that the drone's standard range is 3,400 kilometers with auxiliary fuel tanks and 2,700 kilometers without them. Fire Point estimated the actual flight path, accounting for maneuvers, at 3,200 to 3,300 kilometers.
For oil refineries and fuel storage facilities, even a small warhead can be enough to trigger a large fire. For less fire-prone industrial targets, such as factories in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, a significantly larger warhead is needed. For such targets, heavy cruise missiles like the Flamingo are better suited.
Finally, regarding reports that Volodymyr Zelenskyy's plane nearly collided with a drone while flying from Chisinau to Oslo, as Norway's prime minister claimed. Some commentators linked the incident to a jet-powered Shahed that had entered Moldovan airspace shortly before. While the claim of a near-collision was exaggerated, the flight was indeed delayed by roughly 20 minutes after two Russian drones entered Moldovan airspace: one came down in a field, while the other flew toward Romania.
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