Sitrep for Sept. 3-7, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
According to estimates by the Finnish independent monitoring group Black Bird Group, the pace of the Russian Armed Forces’ advance increased slightly in August compared with July, with Russian forces gaining 133 square kilometers versus 106 square kilometers. However, compared with the previous summer, this summer can reasonably be described as unsuccessful: Black Bird Group recorded Russian gains of 430 square kilometers in August and 502 square kilometers in July last year. That said, the war is developing differently this year than in previous years, and monthly territorial statistics should therefore be treated primarily as operational indicators useful for assessing changes from month to month. Comparisons with the corresponding periods of previous years are not always meaningful; by comparison with 2022, for example, even 2025 would appear as a failure.
The DeepState project had not published its figures as of Sept. 7, although it normally does so during the first days of a new month. It is worth noting that in August, DeepState analysts mapped the results of the AFU's six-month Ukrainian offensive in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Consequently, comparing the maps from the beginning and end of August does not reflect changes along the frontline during that month. In July, the project had already revised its previous calculations following the declassification of earlier advances.
The Russian command has decided to back up its own and Vladimir Putin's claims regarding the capture of Sviatohirsk in the Donetsk region with footage purportedly providing visual confirmation. Since Russian positions remain a considerable distance from the town, while Ukrainian counterattacks on the Lyman direction have been sufficiently successful and could threaten the entire Shandryholove salient, the Russian Ministry of Defense, instead of a flag-planting photo op, published one old video and another altered using artificial intelligence. In the latter video, Volodymir Rybalkin, the head of the town's military administration, was reportedly replaced with a Russian serviceman claiming Russian control over the town. One clear sign of AI-generated manipulation is the mismatch between facial movements and speech. While Russian forces have learned to generate relatively convincing drone footage, they have not yet managed to do the same with close-up footage of soldiers.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On Sept. 3, Ukrainian forces released footage of a strike on a Russian Buk SAM system in the Lyman direction (south of Svatove in the Luhansk region) using HIMARS, which we have not seen used in a long time.
It is worth noting that on Sept. 2, the 30-day period for reviewing the application for the sale of Turkish weapons to Ukraine expired. The weapons included M26 227mm rockets featuring DPICM (dual-purpose improved conventional munition) cluster warheads for the M270 and HIMARS MLRS, as well as ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles. This does not mean that Turkish munitions arrived in Ukraine within a single day and were used against the Buk on the same day, but it is reasonable to assume that the AFU can now use scarce HIMARS munitions more freely while awaiting new deliveries.
The destruction of each SAM system reduces the capabilities of Russian air defenses and opens the way for Ukrainian UAVs to fly deeper into Russian territory. However, UAVs continue to face not only air defenses and electronic warfare, but also high-rise buildings on their way to their targets. For example, on Sept. 7, a Ukrainian
UAV crashed into the upper part of a high-rise residential building in Perm. According toGovernor of the Perm region Dmitry Makhonin, one person was killed and four others were injured.
In the early hours of Sept. 4, Ukrainian UAVs struck a position of an S-400 or S-300 SAM system in the area of Sochi. Footage shows surface-to-air missile debris scattering in a manner typical of such strikes, leaving white smoke trails from burning solid rocket propellant. The strike almost certainly hit not only the munitions but the system itself. Satellite imagery shows that two S-300 or S-400 launchers were located at the strike site, along with a tower-mounted Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system—all of which were hit. These systems formed part of the air defense of the Black Sea coast of the Krasnodar region, which is home to oil refineries, oil depots and the port of Novorossiysk.
According to reports, that same night, a fuel facility operated by Basic Aviation Fuel Operator LLC near Adler Airport was attacked. The company supplies aviation fuel to aircraft at airports in the Krasnodar region. Footage shows that the tanks were protected by metal structures ("cope cages"), which nevertheless did not prevent them from being hit. As we have noted repeatedly, this type of protection means that more drones are required to inflict damage. Satellite imagery shows several burned-out tanks.
As reported by the Vyorstka media outlet, aircraft refueling at Sochi Airport was restricted "for technical reasons," and is now provided only by Lukoil. This suggests that the Ukrainian strike may indeed have caused local disruptions to Russian civil aviation. Regular attacks on oil depots near airports represent another way of putting pressure on Russia, in addition to UAVs flying near airports.
Russian forces, meanwhile, struck Kyiv’s Boryspil and Zhuliany airports in the early hours of Sept. 5. According to one version, the purpose was to disrupt a visit by US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a US aircraft had been scheduled to land in Kyiv, which became impossible following the Russian strikes. Nevertheless, after visiting Moscow, the negotiators still arrived in Kyiv, but their aircraft landed in Rzeszów, Poland, from where they traveled by train. Even if they had been unable to reach Kyiv, we do not believe this would have derailed the negotiations. It is possible that the strikes on the airports were, in part, a response to Zelenskyy’s "warning" about the dangers of flying over Russia.
Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Honcharenko stated that decommissioned Yak-40 aircraft were hit at Zhuliany. They are visible in satellite imagery. As in the case of the strike on Belgorod Airport, where a similarly decommissioned civilian Yak-40 was hit, we see little point in such a strike.
The only result of the recent visit by American negotiators Witkoff and Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv was a three-day halt to airstrikes on the capitals. On Sept. 4, the Ukrainian side proposed a full ceasefire covering the entire territory and the frontline, but Russia’s MoD rejected this initiative. Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that, in connection with the preparations for and meetings involving the American negotiators, Putin ordered a halt to strikes on Kyiv for three days starting at midnight on Sept. 5. Statements about "progress," efforts to achieve lasting peace, and hopes for a resumption of talks barely differ from comments after previous meetings. As far as we can tell, the American representatives offered the parties no new incentives or pressure mechanisms capable of changing their positions. We still see no grounds for substantial progress in the talks and expect the war to continue at least until spring.
The Shahed Tracker project, after analyzing Ukrainian Air Force reports, calculated that 83 percent of Shaheds were intercepted in August, but did not specify the share of jet-powered versus conventional drones. Since May, the intercept rate for Russian UAVs has gradually declined from 92 percent in May to 90 percent in June, 87 percent in July, and 83 percent in August. That decline is clearly linked to a drop in the share of conventional Shaheds, which Ukraine has learned to counter effectively with interceptor drones.
RBC-Ukraine, citing sources, reported that Russia plans to produce 2,700 conventional Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions, 1,200 Geran-4s, 800 Geran-5 cruise missiles, and 5,000 Gerbera drones in September. Russia initially used the latter as cheap decoy targets that mimic Shahed-136 loitering munitions and deplete Ukraine's stocks of anti-aircraft missiles and drones, but about a year ago it began to fit them with warheads. By November, Russia expects to raise the share of jet-powered UAVs in attacks to about 80 percent, leaving propeller-driven versions at about 20 percent.
The War&Sanctions portal of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) reports that Chinese Telefly engines are used in jet-powered Shahed drones. However, according to RBC-Ukraine, only about 3,000 such engines have been supplied from China—roughly one-sixth of Russia’s production needs. Russia is therefore attempting to establish domestic production of jet engines, which are significantly more expensive than piston engines. A large-scale shift to jet-powered UAVs will also increase the cost of Russian air attacks.
According to Ukrainian Air Force representative Yurii Ihnat, the Ukrainian Air Force is currently intercepting just over 60 percent of jet-powered Shahed drones. On Sept. 1, however, 57 of 72 UAVs were shot down or suppressed, roughly 80 percent. We expect this figure to rise again in the coming months as Ukraine scales up production of new interceptor drones.
In the early hours of Sept. 5, Russian forces launched a ballistic missile strike on the Kametsteel metallurgical plant, part of the Metinvest group, in Kamianske, in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Five people were killed and four other workers were injured. Key production facilities and infrastructure were also damaged, forcing the plant to completely halt operations. Metinvest Chief Operating Officer Oleksandr Myronenko said the plant produced steel and pig iron exclusively for civilian purposes. Russia’s MoD, by contrast, described Kametsteel and the Dnipro Metallurgical Plant as Ukraine’s largest suppliers of metal products for military production.
This justification is based solely on an indirect connection between the plant and the defense industry and dangerously blurs the distinction between military and civilian targets. Following this logic, virtually any business that serves military personnel alongside civilian customers could be declared a legitimate target. Although the RuAF have carried out similar strikes since the start of the full-scale war, such attacks have become noticeably more frequent this summer: the sides are increasingly targeting clearly civilian objects, justifying their choice of targets by citing increasingly indirect links to military needs.
Recently, strikes on civilian buses on both sides of the frontline have become more frequent:
- on Aug. 28, a Russian drone dropped a munition onto the roof of a bus in the city of Kherson, injuring four people;
- on Sept. 1, in the Troitske municipal district of the occupied Luhansk region, a bus belonging to an agricultural enterprise was attacked, injuring one worker;
- on Sept. 3, a Ukrainian UAV attacked a bus in the occupied city of Horlivka in the Donetsk region—one woman was killed, and six other people were injured;
- on the same day, a drone struck a bus at the bus station in Shebekino in the Belgorod region: a passenger was killed, and the driver suffered blast-related injuries;
- on Sept. 4, in Kherson, a Russian UAV attacked a bus stopped at a stop at around 11:00 a.m., injuring a 25-year-old woman. Approximately an hour later, another drone struck another bus and a nearby passenger car—one person was killed, and 12 were injured.
We do not see any signs in the published footage that any of these vehicles were used for military purposes. We consider all these attacks to be war crimes, regardless of which side carried them out or which side first resorted to such tactics. The possible use of individual buses to transport military personnel does not turn all civilian transport into a legitimate target.
On Sept. 4, a Russian drone struck a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Kyiv, flying through the window of acting agency head Oleksandr Poklad’s office. Fifteen civilians were injured. Apparently, Poklad himself was not in the building: since the start of the full-scale war, the heads of Ukrainian security agencies are unlikely to work in ordinary offices vulnerable to Russian strikes. It is worth noting that in 2022 and 2023, drones twice attacked the HUR building in the capital.
After the attack, Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Poklad and, against the backdrop of a painting depicting the Kremlin on fire, discussed options for an "adequate, tangible and, if possible, symmetrical response."
Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov suggested that the drone could have been guided to a specific window via a ground-based relay station with internet access, set up by a Russian agent nearby. In support of this version, he points to the absence at the time of any other Russian UAVs that could have served as airborne relay stations. It is also unclear whether the strike was intended as a signal marking the start of a new campaign against Ukrainian "decision-making centers," or whether it had some other purpose.
On Sept. 3, a video emerged showing a Russian jet-powered Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition with no visible damage diving onto a roadway in Kyiv. The UAV does not roll or deviate from its trajectory, making it appear that it was not affected by air defenses.
In the recording, the dashcam displays an obviously incorrect vehicle speed — 200 km/h instead of 40-50 km/h — and coordinates of 12° south latitude and 77° west longitude, corresponding to the Peruvian capital of Lima. These are precisely the false coordinates broadcast by Ukraine’s Lima electronic warfare system, which takes its name from them. Thus, the recording confirms that GPS spoofing was active in the area where the UAV fell. The false GPS coordinates (possibly together with incorrect altitude data) may have caused the flight controller to lose orientation. In addition, as we recently reported, Lima has not demonstrated effectiveness against Shaheds equipped with the Kometa satellite-navigation antenna. We do not know whether one was installed on this UAV, so for now we can only say that spoofing was active nearby, while its connection to the drone’s crash remains unproven.
The Ukrainian MoD published an article on the Air Force Capability Coalition, established in 2023 on the initiative of the United Kingdom and the United States to help Ukraine build a modern Western-style Air Force compatible with NATO standards. The coalition’s work involves not only transferring combat aircraft, but also training pilots, engineers and technical personnel, as well as creating the infrastructure needed to operate and maintain the aircraft. Its most notable achievements have been deliveries of F-16 fighter aircraft and Mirage 2000s, while Swedish JAS 39 Gripen aircraft are also expected to be transferred.
The article also states that the ASC 890 airborne surveillance and control aircraft transferred by Sweden has been conducting combat sorties since March 2026. The aircraft was first spotted in Ukraine at that time, but no new information about its use has emerged since then. According to the Ukrainian MoD, it is used to monitor the airspace.
The Russian government has authorized Russian Post [the company responsible for the delivery of mail in Russia] to use counter-UAV systems. In 2024, many other state agencies were also authorized to use counter-UAV systems. The result is a kind of "zoo" of air defense units subordinated to various state agencies and commercial entities.
Likely in an effort to address this, "war correspondent" and United Russia member Evgeniy Poddubny proposed expanding the Kursk region's air defense model nationwide during a meeting with Vladimir Putin. Under the Kursk setup, airspace monitoring data from the MoD, border guards, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Interior Ministry is consolidated at a single situational center. Putin noted that a coordinating body alone would be insufficient, arguing instead for a single commander empowered to issue orders to all the forces involved. The initiative appears sensible: units from the MoD, Rosgvardia [the Russian National Guard], the Ministry of Emergency Situations, state corporations, and private enterprises report to separate chains of command, meaning an army general cannot directly order a mobile fire team from another agency to move.
Putin also backed Poddubny's proposal to involve volunteers classified as fitness category "D" (unfit for military service) in air defense. It remains unclear how this would be implemented legally, as under Russian law, a person classified as category "D" cannot serve in a military air defense unit. At present, those willing to do so can work in anti-drone units operated by state and private companies without signing a contract with the MoD. However, we doubt that the pool of such volunteers will be large enough to significantly strengthen the protection of Russian facilities.
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