Sitrep for Aug. 10-13, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On Aug. 12, analysts finally marked the results of the Ukrainian six-month offensive in the Oleksandrivka direction on the map, timing the update to coincide with a post by the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces about the operation, which began on Jan. 29, 2026. The Armed Forces of Ukraine made most of their gains in the Dnipropetrovsk region, although they also captured several settlements in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions.

According to the Air Assault Forces' statement, 745 square kilometers and 26 settlements were liberated during the operation—a figure also mentioned by Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Meanwhile, DeepState said in its post that 19 settlements were liberated and that the AFU made gains around six more. It is worth noting that in June, ex-Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that the AFU had liberated 600 square kilometers since the beginning of the year. At the time, it was clear that he was referring specifically to this section of the frontline where the three regions meet. However, the gains were not shown on maps because of operational security restrictions.

Although displaying a large area of newly updated territory on the map all at once may create the impression that the AFU suddenly launched a major counteroffensive and the frontline collapsed, that is not what happened. The current changes are the result of many months of fighting, and a significant portion of the area now shown in blue was previously contested. Previously, when Ukrainian forces regained control of contested areas, DeepState simply removed the gray shading. However, it is now handling such changes somewhat differently. Given the nature of the war, we cannot be certain that all the territory now shown in blue is firmly under AFU control. In many cases, footage released by the Air Assault Forces shows just a few soldiers with a flag, which in itself is not proof of full control over a settlement. Nevertheless, the available footage overall confirms the gradual advance of Ukrainian forces.

At the same time, the AFU have not yet achieved their primary objective, namely cutting the Huliaipole-Velyka Novosilka road in the vicinity of the villages of Temyrivka and Uspenivka in the Zaporizhzhia region. However, they have advanced fairly close to it. In the near term, they will likely continue attempts to reach Uspenivka and cut Russian logistics along this road. An advance toward Temyrivka is also possible.

Ukrainian forces are present in the villages of Yalta and Zirka on the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly River. If they are able to establish a foothold there, they will have the opportunity to advance toward the village of Komar along both banks of the river, as the AFU will likely continue clearing the area west of the Mokri Yaly in the near term.

Their prospects beyond that are more difficult to assess. The AFU may continue advancing toward Velyka Novosilka, push west toward Bahatyr, or begin applying pressure to the Huliaipole axis. This will depend, among other factors, on the extent to which the Russian Armed Forces respond to the situation—specifically, whether the 5th Combined Arms Army commits reinforcements from the Orikhiv direction.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue their infiltration on the Huliaipole axis. The Russian MoD reported the capture of the village of Nove Pole, northwest of the village of Ternuvate, and released video showing a Russian flag there. It is still premature to speak of a secure Russian foothold in the village, let alone Russian control of the area.

In the Donetsk region, on the Dobropillia axis, as previously noted, Russian forces were observed in the villages of Vodianske, Chernihivka and Svitle. This may have resulted either from a localized Russian breakthrough or from an AFU withdrawal from unfavorable positions, though the latter is considered less likely. Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, concluded that it was indeed a localized breakthrough. The RuAF are gradually advancing toward Druzhkivka and Dobropillia. They have already reached the southeastern outskirts of Dobropillia and are advancing toward the village of Hannivka from the direction of Novyi Donbas. Near Chernihivka, Russian forces have reached a coal mine in order to deploy UAV operators on the spoil tip. Russian forces are also present in the village of Matiasheve.

Russian forces have advanced to within nine kilometers of Druzhkivka. They have already reached the villages of Kucheriv Yar and Torske. This will allow them to increase pressure on Ukrainian logistics in the Kostiantynivka direction, while potentially creating another direction of advance toward the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration. These changes have not yet been reflected on DeepState maps.

In effect, the RuAF have repeated last year’s Dobropillia breakthrough. The Russian forces have now managed to create a salient between Dobropillia and Druzhkivka, which they will likely seek to expand further, thereby worsening the AFU’s position in the remaining Ukrainian-held part of the Donetsk region.

As we anticipated, the period of increased activity on the frontline has shifted to the second half of the summer. The RuAF have not merely intensified their offensive pressure but have even managed to achieve a localized breakthrough of the Ukrainian defenses. The reason early summer has traditionally been the preferred time for a major offensive is the foliage on the trees. The so-called "greenery" (dense vegetation) provides assault infantry with better concealment from the enemy in tree lines and helps them establish positions in captured territory. Now, however, the RuAF have only two to three months to exploit and expand the breakthrough before most of the foliage falls, making it more difficult for assault troops to conceal themselves from Ukrainian UAVs.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces servicemen are complaining about a lack of rotation and inadequate supplies. In mid-July, soldiers from the 108th Brigade reported an extremely difficult situation and shared a photograph of a severely emaciated man. At the time, the command of the 118th Mechanized Brigade, under which a unit of the 108th Brigade is fighting, said that it would take control of the situation. Servicemen of the 121st Territorial Defense Brigade have now reported a similar situation. According to them, there has been no rotation since April, and they recently experienced an acute shortage of water and food. Their command claims that, over the course of a month, the unit received 27 packages, each weighing about nine kilograms. This amounts to about eight kilograms a day for the entire unit, which is far too little in the summer heat, even if only six people are stationed there, as shown in the video. An adult man needs two to three liters of water a day, and reports indicate that each soldier received a little more than a liter a day, assuming the deliveries consisted of water alone. Under US Army standards, at a temperature of 24 degrees Celsius and with a daily energy expenditure of 4,000 calories, a soldier needs at least 4.7 liters of water daily. Field rations can weigh about 1.5 kilograms, so the supplies the soldiers received would have only covered food.

The difficulty of using ground robots and heavy drones effectively for resupply in the steppe may have led to this dire situation on the Zaporizhzhia axis. Although the RuAF are not attacking particularly actively on these sectors of the frontline, and the AFU are not semi-encircled, intensive drone operations and other countermeasures have significantly complicated the resupply of Ukrainian troops.

Nevertheless, Ukraine remains the leader in integrating unmanned systems into combined-arms combat and air defense, even if its drones are not the most technologically advanced in the world. At recent exercises in Germany, for example, Ukrainian drone operators defeated US troops operating armored vehicles. Although Russia has also gained significant experience in using drones, it still lags behind Ukraine—not only in communications, where the AFU’s advantage is the ability to use Starlink.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

As of Aug. 11, the Ukrainian Air Force stopped specifying the exact number of Russian missiles launched and intercepted in its situation reports. Yurii Ihnat, head of the Communications Department of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, confirmed the change in format, noting that general information about attacks, including those involving ballistic missiles, would continue to be published. It is known, for example, that Russia launched more than 450 missiles of various types at Ukraine in July, nearly 200 of them ballistic. However, it will now be more difficult to assess the scale of their use in individual attacks.

Early on Aug. 10, Ukrainian drones attacked an industrial zone in Nizhnekamsk, Tatarstan [Russia’s constituent republic]. The Astra Telegram channel suggested that the target may have been Nizhnekamskneftekhim, a company that produces rubber, plastics and ethylene. However, the General Staff of the AFU later said that the strike targeted the nearby TANECO oil refinery.

One of the drones hit a hostel in the industrial zone, striking the cafeteria where workers were having breakfast. Eight Uzbekistani citizens and one Tajikistani citizen were killed. Video of the damaged building shows traces of prefabricated fragments from the UAV's warhead. Another drone crashed into a tree in a residential area of Nizhnekamsk, and the resulting explosion damaged a nearby house. A five-year-old girl who was sleeping on a balcony was killed. A total of 13 people were killed and 78 were injured in the attack.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries continue. Although reports of stabilization in the fuel market periodically emerge, new attacks once again lead to queues at gas stations and restrictions on fuel sales in the affected regions. On Aug. 11, the Orsk oil refinery in the Orenburg region was hit and shut down for up to six months. After the strike on the Ilsky Oil Refinery on Aug. 8, fuel shortages once again worsened in the Krasnodar region, including in Sochi, while regional authorities urged residents to use private vehicles less frequently in order to "reduce the load on gas stations." According to Bloomberg, the first, relatively small shipment of gasoline from India has arrived in Russia—not enough to make up for the current shortage.

Russia, in turn, struck the Zaporizhstal steel plant on Aug. 11, including with ballistic missiles. Seven employees were killed and 21 others were injured. The strike caught workers on their way to a shelter during an air raid alert. The plant suspended operations.

Zaporizhstal produces sheet steel, which, as the Russian MoD claimed, is used to manufacture protective structures, fortification modules, armor for military vehicles and armor plates. Some of its products may indeed be used for military purposes. However, shutting down the plant will not give Russia any significant advantage on the battlefield: armored vehicles have become less central to modern warfare, while infantry plays the leading role. This remains the case despite recently emerging videos of Italian Puma armored personnel carriers in service with the 68th and 81st AFU Air Assault Brigades.

The argument that the strike was intended to "hit the country’s economy" does not make the plant a legitimate military target either—otherwise, an attack on virtually any civilian facility could be justified in the same way. Given that the strike killed and injured plant employees, who are not legitimate military targets even when working at facilities that themselves constitute military objectives, we consider the incident a Russian war crime.

On Aug. 11, UAVs attacked a convoy of trucks at a border checkpoint between the Russian Bryansk region and the Belarusian Gomel region. Several vehicles were hit, with reports of drivers killed and wounded, including, according to unconfirmed reports, Iranian and Belarusian nationals. While there is no official confirmation yet that the drones belonged to Ukraine, all indications point to a Ukrainian attack. Video footage from the scene shows ordinary civilian trucks. Theoretically, they could have been transporting dual-use goods or equipment related, for example, to relay stations on the Belarus-Ukraine border, but there is no evidence of this. Earlier, Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU Robert "Madiar" Brovdi stated that his forces would target Russian trucks on the R-280 highway. This statement, more broadly, illustrates the Ukrainian side’s approach to selecting such targets.

Ukraine’s military intelligence continues to launch FPV drones from unmanned surface vessels in the Black Sea. During an attack on Aug. 10, an S-400 SAM system launcher and an antenna used to control an Orion UAV were reportedly hit in Crimea, along with a decoy S-400 launcher.

The port of Novorossiysk was also targeted. Following numerous Ukrainian strikes, the port has become a major base for a significant portion of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. On Aug. 12, strikes were reported against port infrastructure, air-defense positions, a grain terminal and berths where Russian warships were stationed. According to the Ukrainian Navy, the attack involved Palianytsia, Peklo and Bars missile-drones, as well as long-range R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles. MICH, Fire Point, Ramzai, Sichen, Trast, Khariok, Beaver, Liutyi and Dovbush drones were also used, along with Sargan and Mamai unmanned surface vessels. As a result, operations at the grain terminals were suspended, while two Project 11356R frigates—Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen, both carriers of Kalibr cruise missiles—sustained damage in the area of their launchers, although the extent of the damage remains unclear.

It is worth noting that the Russian Volna Kupol Garant electronic warfare system, designed to disrupt communications between Starlink terminals and satellites, as well as an S-400 SAM system position, were also recently struck near Gelendzhik. This prompted speculation that the nearby "Putin’s Palace" had been left without protection. However, we believe these systems were primarily intended to protect the Port of Novorossiysk, which is located at roughly the same distance and is regularly targeted by Ukrainian forces. Putin likely makes little use of his residence in Gelendzhik, as it is much closer to the combat zone, while its defenses have not been reinforced nearly as extensively as those around his residence in Valdai.

Mutual strikes on energy infrastructure continue, with Russia attacking facilities in the Odesa region and Ukraine targeting facilities in annexed Crimea. Following a strike on the Balaklavska Thermal Power Plant on Aug. 13, Sevastopol experienced a power outage. The intensity of such attacks will likely only increase with the onset of fall and winter.

Meanwhile, according to Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), Russia is increasing its production of missiles. In July, Russia produced 65 Iskander ballistic missiles, surpassing its target of 60, while Kh-101 cruise missile production reached 140 percent of the monthly target and Kalibr cruise missile production reached 111 percent. The annual production targets for Zircon and Oniks missiles were met within the first seven months of the year. Skibitskyi stated that Russia increased ballistic missile production by discontinuing the production of Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and suspending the modernization of Kh-22 cruise missiles into Kh-32s. The resulting savings in fuel, components and funds were redirected to other types of missiles. Thus, Russia’s economic problems have not yet resulted in a decline in weapons production.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

In recent weeks, there has been growing speculation that after the State Duma elections, the Russian authorities will not announce a second wave of mobilization. Instead, they will shift to a "hybrid" model, involving setting recruitment quotas for contract soldiers at enterprises, making greater use of the police, recruiting convicts and putting pressure on socially vulnerable groups. These methods are nothing new—they have been used for a long time.

Even if pessimistic estimates of the RuAF’s rate of advance at the end of the summer prove accurate, this would not necessarily mean that a new wave of mass mobilization is inevitable. While recruitment pressure will almost certainly increase in the fall and winter, this alone would not constitute the beginning of "covert mobilization." As the end of the year approaches, governors will have to report to the federal authorities on whether they have met their targets for recruiting contract soldiers. They will therefore demand that the police, the Federal Penitentiary Service and other agencies increase their recruitment efforts.

A similar pattern emerges every year during conscription campaigns. At the beginning of a campaign, the authorities tend to proceed relatively cautiously, but as the deadline approaches and recruitment targets remain unmet, they begin conducting roundups, checking documents near metro stations and visiting universities and people’s homes. Thus, the expected increase in coercive recruitment methods this fall will be driven by the approaching deadline to meet recruitment targets, not by a new "hybrid" form of mobilization.

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