Sitrep for June 26-29, 2026 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed the capture of the villages of Pysantsi and Novoskeliuvate in the Dnipropetrovsk region, both located along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway. If the Russian Armed Forces establish control over a section of this highway, it would complicate logistics for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Oleksandrivka direction, including in the border area between the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

At this stage, however, all that can be said is that Russian assault troops managed to film flag-raising videos and record strikes against Ukrainian forces in these villages. That alone is insufficient to conclude with confidence that Pysantsi and Novoskeliuvate have even entered the contested zone.

The Russian MoD also claimed the capture of the village of Novoselivka in the Zaporizhzhia region, southwest of the town of Huliaipole, releasing a flag-raising video as evidence. However, servicemen from the 92nd Separate Assault Brigade disputed the claim, publishing footage of a captured Russian soldier and stating that all of the assault troops involved had either been captured or killed.

The same videos released by the Russian MoD also include footage showing the interception of heavy Ukrainian Vampire drones.

The situation remains difficult for the AFU in the Kupiansk direction, particularly on their bridgehead along the left bank of the Oskil River. The main challenge is logistics: supplying troops either across the river or overland is extremely difficult, forcing Ukrainian forces to rely on the heavy UAVs mentioned earlier, which the RuAF are actively trying to intercept. Meanwhile, in a recent speech, Putin claimed that around 5,000 Ukrainian troops were nearly encircled "on the left bank of the Stary Oskol River." First, he appears to have confused the Oskil River with the Russian city of Stary Oskol in the Belgorod region. Second, as with similar claims made previously, there is no indication that Ukrainian forces in this direction are actually encircled.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The frontline is gradually moving closer to the city of Kramatorsk. It now lies approximately 12 km [7.5 mi] from the city, placing Kramatorsk well within the effective range of FPV drones, which are increasingly targeting the area and posing a persistent threat to civilians. In addition, the RuAF have intensified striking Kramatorsk with air-dropped bombs, steadily reducing parts of the city to rubble. Newly released footage shows anti-drone netting installed along streets, as well as barbed-wire obstacles, indicating that the city is being prepared for combat.

Notably, despite numerous Ukrainian strikes against the R-280 highway leading to Crimea, we have not observed similar anti-drone netting being installed there. Although such nets are often criticized for their limited effectiveness, they nonetheless complicate enemy drone operations by forcing additional drones to be expended to breach them. Ukrainian authorities continue to deploy these defenses extensively, including around the towns of Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. While there is no way to guarantee the security of road networks, such measures can significantly reduce the damage inflicted.

On the R-280 highway between the cities of Berdiansk and Melitopol, Ukrainian drones partially collapsed a bridge, leaving a large hole in the roadway into which a passenger vehicle fell. Judging by the nature of the damage, the driver may have failed to notice the collapse in the road surface during hours of darkness and drove into it at full speed. We observed no signs indicating that the vehicle itself had been struck by a drone.

Ukrainian forces also brought down another bridge near the village of Rozdolne in the Sovietskyi district, where drones had previously destroyed a railway bridge spanning the North Crimean Canal. This time, the span of a road bridge collapsed onto the railway below. According to reports, local authorities have made little effort to clear the debris, as the railway remains inoperative following the destruction of the canal bridge. In addition, according to the AFU General Staff, a strike was carried out against the bridge near the village of Sovietskyi in the early hours of June 28, triggering a fire that was visible in NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System [FIRMS]. Overall, the situation surrounding railway logistics on the peninsula continues to deteriorate.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on June 25 the start of a 40-day operation by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) intended to exert influence on Russia "compel it to end the war." As part of this operation, the SBU reported strikes on the Volga and Vyatka Project 15310 vessels and Petropavlovsk cargo-passenger ferry at the Zatoka shipyard in Kerch, as well as an attack on an S-400 SAM system protecting the Kerch Strait area. Reportedly, a fire broke out aboard the vessels, but no information on the aftermath has yet emerged.

On June 27, the SBU reported a strike on the Vtorovo oil pumping station in the Vladimir region—part of the Transneft network and an important logistics hub for transporting petroleum products both for export and to domestic consumers. In particular, petroleum products were supplied through Vtorovo to Moscow and the Moscow region, in addition to the now-halted oil refinery in Kapotnya. Thus, if supplies through Vtorovo are disrupted, the fuel crisis in the capital region is likely to intensify further.

Amid Ukraine’s ongoing campaign targeting oil infrastructure, Russia faces worsening fuel shortages. Although Russian propaganda is trying to downplay the problem, queues are forming at gas stations nationwide, with restrictions imposed in at least 56 regions. Some resellers, particularly in the Rostov region and Crimea, have been buying up fuel to resell at inflated prices, prompting a government crackdown. Russian authorities have pledged to secure fuel supplies for Crimea via land and sea routes, as announced by Putin.

Overall, this Ukrainian campaign is specifically aimed at making life more difficult for Russians and increasing public dissatisfaction with the Putin regime. In addition to gasoline shortages, the fuel crisis is expected to lead to shortages of aviation fuel, higher airfares and flight cancellations. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this alone will bring about any change in Russian government policy within the next 40 days, even with the upcoming elections in mind. This raises the question of Ukraine's next steps: whether it will intensify these attacks and further escalate the campaign. At present, we see no reason to believe that such measures alone can compel Putin to make concessions to Ukraine.

Satellite imagery has emerged showing the aftermath of the June 22 Ukrainian drone strike on the Vladimir Space Communications Center, revealing the wreckage of large satellite dishes. On the same day, the Dubna Space Communications Center was also attacked. We believe the objective of these strikes is to disrupt Russia's plans to develop a satellite constellation that is intended to provide internet connectivity for Russian soldiers on the frontline.

Denys Shtilerman, one of Firepoint's executives, stated that Ukraine is expected to gain the capability to conduct long-range strikes with FP-9 ballistic missiles this summer or in early fall. He also said that the company plans to produce more than 60 such missiles per month, at least matching Russia's monthly production of Iskander ballistic missiles.

Footage has been published showing Flamingo missile strikes on the Titan-Barrikady plant in the Volgograd region in the early hours of June 27. The facility is involved in manufacturing launchers for various missile systems, including the 9K720 Iskander-M mobile short-range ballistic missile system. Iskander ballistic missiles are the most widely used ballistic missiles by the Russian army in strikes against Ukraine. At present, we are unaware of any shortage of launchers within the RuAF, so we doubt that this strike on the plant will have any noticeable impact on the number of Russian ballistic missile launches.

Governor of the Volgograd region Andrey Bocharov stated that an attack on a military-industrial enterprise had been repelled and reported the death of two employees. It is worth noting that the strike was carried out during the night and early morning, indicating that the Ukrainian side took the necessary measures to reduce collateral damage and minimize the risk of casualties among the workforce. The Ukrainian Telegram channel Dnipro Osint analyzed satellite imagery of the aftermath and concluded that three facilities had been hit: Workshop No. 2, the production building of Workshop No. 38 (ground-level photographs have been published), and another workshop of unidentified purpose. It is likely that three of the five missiles launched at the plant reached their targets.

Dnipro Osint estimates that only six of the 39 Flamingo missiles launched so far have successfully hit their intended targets, with half of those successful strikes occurring on June 27. One of the successful strikes, carried out in May 2026, targeted the VNIIR-Progress plant in the city of Cheboksary, which manufactures Kometa CRP antennas.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Mark Krutov continues to compile data on the locations of air defense systems around Moscow and has identified yet another ring of air defenses. In particular, he located an S-400 surface-to-air missile position on Sparrow Hills near the offices of Innopraktika, the foundation headed by Putin's daughter, Katerina Tikhonova. It is the closest known position to the Kremlin—less than 10 kilometers away [6 mi]. Its proximity to the foundation is most likely coincidental, however, with the location instead dictated by the terrain: the battery sits on elevated ground well suited for radar operations. S-400 systems are not point-defense assets and are not intended to protect individual buildings.

As noted in our previous sitrep, we expect a Ukrainian strike on the Crimean Bridge within the next several months. We believe the attack will be a coordinated one, involving unmanned surface vessels, aerial drones and, likely, missiles. Russian forces also appear to be anticipating such an attack and are attempting to detect and destroy Ukrainian maritime drones. Videos have been published showing Geran-2 Seeker UAV strikes on storage sites for boats and unmanned surface vessels in the Mykolaiv region. Judging from the footage, the system incorporates machine-vision technology that highlights various objects in the drone's field of view for the operator. Unlike the US-made Hornet drones, however, the Geran's system functions at a more rudimentary level: it detects vehicles but does not classify them by type. Additional footage has also emerged showing drones equipped with the same technology striking locomotives in Zaporizhzhia and the Kharkiv region, as well as a gas station in Zaporizhzhia.

Russia's MoD has released footage of a strike on a Mikoyan MiG-29 at an airfield in the Mykolaiv region. The ministry claims two aircraft were destroyed; the video shows one being hit directly and a strike on a second aircraft inside a shelter. The footage also shows a reconnaissance drone flying freely over the airfield, suggesting weak air defenses in the area and the absence of electronic jamming systems. The Mykolaiv Vanek Telegram channel, which is closely aligned with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, reported the loss of two aircraft: one MiG-29 in the Poltava region during a combat mission—apparently while airborne—and another "because of our own incomprehensible, delayed decisions and reactions." We believe this refers to the aircraft having been left in the open rather than under cover. The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed the loss of a MiG-29 in the Poltava region in the early hours of June 27.

An advisor to Ukraine’s Minister of Defense and military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, commented in an interview with the Suspilne news outlet on the situation with relay stations in Belarus. He confirmed that in February 2026, the relay stations had been disabled but were later restored, since it is very simple to do so. He also discussed the use of Belarusian commercial mobile networks by Shahed drones. According to Beskrestnov, Russian drones are equipped with SIM cards from the Russian mobile operator T-2 and, while flying in Ukrainian airspace near the Belarusian border, connect to Belarusian roaming networks to transmit data to their operators. Ukrainian authorities have approached Belarusian telecom providers, but no action has been taken. It is worth noting that the drones are capable of operating without internet access or relay stations, but doing so makes their missions more difficult: they cannot transmit information about Ukrainian air defenses to operators or receive control signals.

The Movement of Conscientious Objectors, a human rights organization supporting those who refuse to perform military service, reported another case of alleged coercion into signing a contract with the MoD in the Amur region. Unlike the mass roundups in the Penza region mentioned in our sitrep before last, this appears to have been an isolated incident of a kind that has been recorded for a long time and regularly features in our mobilization summaries. According to human rights advocates, on June 18, a single local resident who had recently lost both parents and struggled with alcohol abuse was detained on the street by patrol officers. He was then held in an unknown location for several days and, by June 24, was forced to sign a military contract. According to relatives, information about the man could have been passed to law enforcement officers by the head of the rural administration, who reportedly receives 200,000 rubles [$2,550] for each recruit.

We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.