Sitrep for August 20-24, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The end of summer is approaching, but it is too early to speak of the results of the summer offensive: this year's Russian offensive campaign only intensified in the second half of the summer and will continue for at least another couple of months.

In the Oleksandrivka direction in the Dnipropetrovsk region, where, since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian forces have been gradually retaking territory previously occupied by the Russian Armed Forces, footage has emerged of Russian strikes on Ukrainian artillery. In particular, drones struck an AS-90 self-propelled howitzer near the village of Dobropasove (known as Chervonyi Lyman until 2016), in the area of the villages of Pokrovske and Oleksandrivka. It is dangerous to deploy such systems close to the frontline. According to the pro-Russian Slivochnyi Kapriz Telegram channel, the strike was geolocated just 1.5 km from the "declared area of Russian control." SPHs are normally positioned 7-15 km from the frontline, so the deployment of the system near Dobropasove indicates that this area is part of the Ukrainian rear, even though the RuAF allegedly captured the village as far back as May 25. Taking the Ukrainian advances into account, the contested area begins roughly 10-15 km from Dobropasove, as we have said before, not all settlements claimed to have been liberated can be considered to be under firm AFU control. A similar video of a strike on Ukrainian artillery was filmed near the village of Nove Pole in the Zaporizhzhia region. The Russian MoD declared the village captured as early as Aug. 11, but the presence of AFU artillery there contradicts this claim, as well as claims that the villages of Pisantsy, Novoskeliuvate and Bohodarivka had been captured. Thus, footage of strikes by the RuAF, unlike the recent flag-planting photo ops, indirectly confirms Ukrainian gains in this direction.

In the Donetsk region, the DeepState project only marked the town of Rodynske as captured on Aug. 22, while Playfra had reported its capture as early as Aug. 9. The Russian MoD, in turn, announced the capture of Rodynske back in late December 2025. At present, Rodynske is being used to support further Russian advances in the Dobropillia direction, toward the town of Bilytske, the village of Hannivka and the town of Dobropillia itself, where Russian assault troops are already infiltrating.

In particular, according to Playfra, Russian assault troops have infiltrated the area north of Dobropillia and are setting up ambushes along a Ukrainian logistics route. The 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard is responsible for defending this sector but is currently not receiving sufficient supplies, creating weak points in its defenses. Fighting is also taking place near the village of Zolotyi Kolodiaz, where the RuAF are seeking to seize elevated terrain for positioning drone operators and artillery. From there, they would be well positioned to strike Ukrainian logistics in the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction.

The situation is also deteriorating for the AFU in the area of the town of Mykolaivka, east of Sloviansk. The local Telegram channel Mykolaivka-Sloviansk Online regularly publishes reports that Russian assault troops are infiltrating Mykolaivka and occupying buildings, including buildings near the Sloviansk Thermal Power Plant in the northern part of the city, from which they are difficult to dislodge. This information was also confirmed by Playfra. One can easily imagine the Russian command sending assault troops from Mykolaivka on a near-suicidal mission, carrying flags and filming themselves in Sloviansk, in order to stage a propaganda operation ahead of parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation and demonstrate to the public that the capture of the entire Donbas is supposedly within reach. We continue to assess that the AFU’s priority remains an offensive operation in the Dnipropetrovsk region, while in the Donetsk region the RuAF are gradually grinding down Ukrainian defenses and have even achieved a localized breakthrough. In our assessment, reserves need to be deployed to the area and the defending units reinforced.

Speaking to journalists, Volodymyr Zelenskyy provided details of the conflict between ex-Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi. According to Zelenskyy, the main cause was an overlap in areas of responsibility and the Ministry of Defense’s active involvement in the work of the AFU General Staff. As early as January, we noted with surprise that, upon taking office, Fedorov identified tasks normally handled by the military command as his own priorities, which clearly complicated his interaction with Syrskyi. In addition, Zelenskyy said that the MoD had informed him that Elon Musk was not opposed to allowing Ukraine to use Starlink for strikes against targets on Russian territory, with only Donald Trump’s approval still required. Zelenskyy met with Trump and told him that such strikes could accelerate the end of the war, but they were reportedly unable to reach Musk. After the Ukrainian president secured funding from European allies, Trump stated that Musk had in fact never given his approval. This episode may also have contributed to Fedorov’s dismissal.

Simon Shuster published an article in The Atlantic in which, citing military sources, he described a proposed operation to establish a permanent no-fly zone over Moscow using drones. The plan envisaged launching a thousand machine-vision drones every night (i.e. drones resistant to EW interference), with the aim of reaching Moscow airports and paralyzing their operations, triggering the so-called Carpet plan, which calls for all aircraft to land. This causes major disruption at airports: numerous flights are canceled or rescheduled, forcing thousands of passengers to wait for hours. The authors of the idea also suggested that a multi-day disruption would result in international airlines such as Turkish Airlines and Emirates suspending flights to Russia and, consequently, discontent among Russian elites, who would then pressure Putin.

Aside from the fact that the idea of influencing Putin in this way is rather naive, and that voicing such discontent could have all sorts of unpleasant consequences, the economics of such an operation also look questionable. According to the most conservative estimate, one such machine-vision drone costs at least $20,000; at that rate, the operation would cost $20 million per day, or $600 million per month. This appears to be an extremely costly operation with a highly uncertain political outcome. Even if Moscow's airports were rendered inaccessible, this would not result in the city's complete transport isolation, since passengers could be rerouted through other airports (for example, Minsk), but would merely increase costs and cause additional inconvenience for the public. Notably, the idea for this operation is also attributed to Fedorov.

Although many believe that strikes on Russian infrastructure—oil refineries, warehouses, etc.—could weaken the Russian economy and hamper the financing of military production, in practice, this logic does not appear to work. According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), the Russian military-industrial complex continues to increase missile production. Moreover, under the current circumstances, military spending will be the last area to face cuts, and the Russian government still has the means to maintain military spending at its current level.

The RuAF now have North Korean KN-30 missiles with a 2.5-ton warhead and a range of 600 to 900 kilometers, in addition to KN-23 and KN-24 missiles, according to a new report by HUR. We have not yet seen them in use. We cannot yet say what targets a missile with such a powerful warhead might be used against, but the KN-30s may target bridges or large energy facilities. We also consider it possible that North Korea is simply testing new weapons under combat conditions.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of Aug. 21, Russian drones attacked the Tabaki border crossing on the Ukraine-Moldova border, damaging its buildings and other structures. According to available information, no casualties were reported. This may have been a response to the Ukrainian strike of Aug. 11 on a border crossing on the Russia-Belarus border. The attack may also have had another objective, which would not rule out the first: hindering Ukraine's overland grain exports amid regular strikes on the ports of Odesa, Pivdennyi, Chornomorsk and Izmail. Although road and rail can carry significantly smaller volumes of grain, these routes remain an alternative to seaborne exports.

A video has emerged of a Russian Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter attempting to intercept a Ukrainian drone with an Igla-V missile. Judging by the footage, the missile failed to lock onto the target. A missile fired from a MANPADS [man-portable air-defense system] similarly failed to lock onto its target and veered sharply off course after launch efforts to repel a massive attack on Moscow on June 18. The seekers of such missiles likely struggle to lock onto UAVs because of their small infrared signature.

A photo has been published of another Ukrainian jet-powered interceptor drone, the Alexa Spatium, designed to intercept high-speed, jet-powered Shahed drones. Earlier, Mykhailo Fedorov unveiled a similar interceptor drone.

Russian forces continue to attack Ukrainian railway infrastructure. In particular, on Aug. 23, a drone struck the locomotive of a passenger train traveling from Zhytomyr to Odesa. Judging by the footage, the drone specifically targeted the locomotive. Thanks to the timely evacuation of passengers, there were no casualties. That same day, the Lozova-Kharkiv commuter train was also attacked. The train was stopped in advance and passengers were evacuated, but some people remained near the train. As a result, one woman was killed and four others were injured. After first responders arrived at the scene, a Russian drone carried out a second—double-tap—strike. We consider both the attack on the civilian train and the subsequent strike after first responders had arrived at the scene to be war crimes.

Last week saw an unusually high number of strikes on Ukrainian stores, shopping centers and warehouses:

On Aug. 20, Russian forces attacked supermarkets in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. In these cases, it is difficult to say whether the strikes were part of this broader pattern, as both cities have long been subjected to intense attacks.
In Kryvyi Rih, a shopping center was hit on Aug. 21, followed by a double-tap strike after first responders arrived. Sixteen people were killed and another 130 were injured, including 23 children.
On Aug. 20, Russian strikes hit food warehouses (1, 2, 3), Kyiv’s CHPP-6 (1, 2), Red Cross facilities in Boryspil, an oil depot in Brovary (1, 2) and other civilian facilities.
On Aug. 22, an attack destroyed a shopping center in Kherson.

At the same time, Ukraine has expanded its campaign against Russian retail and logistics networks. Following numerous strikes on Wildberries warehouses, Ukraine began targeting Ozon facilities as well:

On Aug. 22, a fire broke out at a warehouse in Chapayevsk, Samara region, after a UAV strike, injuring several people.
On Aug. 23, a warehouse in Orenburg was hit.
In Shushary, Leningrad region, a warehouse next to an Ozon facility caught fire.
In the early hours of Aug. 24, warehouses in Russia’s constituent republics of Dagestan and Adygea, as well as in the Stavropol region were also hit (1, 2).
That same night, UAVs struck a Kuchenland Home warehouse in Krasnodar, also damaging residential buildings and a private children's center—three teenagers were killed, and 12 other people were injured.

Ukraine's Ministry of Defense stated that after the 15 largest Wildberries logistics hubs had been struck, "it was Ozon's turn," and systematic strikes on storage centers for dual-use goods are intended to disrupt Russian logistics and damage the country's economy.

Putin, for his part, accused the Ukrainian authorities, reading from a teleprompter, of having "let the genie out of the bottle" themselves by launching strikes on civilian targets. At the same time, Russia was striking stores and shopping centers long before the current campaign. For example, in the case of the missile strike on the Amstor shopping mall in Kremenchuk on June 27, 2022, which killed 21 people, the Russian MoD denied that the shopping mall had been the intended target, claiming that the strike was aimed at a neighboring factory. In other cases, the Russian side claimed that military cargo was present at civilian facilities or made no comment on target selection at all—as was the case with the Epicentr store in Kharkiv on May 25, 2024, when at least 17 people were killed. Now, both sides are increasingly citing economic damage as justification for such attacks. This represents a further escalation of the "war of the cities," in which each strike becomes a pretext for the next, while none of these attacks can be considered legitimate.

Under international humanitarian law, a military objective is an object which, by its nature, location, purpose or use, makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. This advantage must be concrete and tangible rather than hypothetical, and military rather than economic, political or psychological. General arguments about reducing tax revenues, weakening the economy or limiting future military spending do not meet these criteria. Otherwise, any shop, bank, business or even any employed civilian could be declared a lawful target, since all of them directly or indirectly contribute to the state budget.

A civilian warehouse may become a military objective if it is reliably known to be used systematically to supply the armed forces or to store a specific shipment of weapons or military equipment. In that case, the strike must be directed at that particular facility, or the relevant part of it, while observing the principle of proportionality. Individual purchases of drones, body armor or spools of fiber-optic cable by servicemen or volunteers through a marketplace do not turn its entire infrastructure into a military objective—just as the fact that soldiers purchase food or household goods does not make a supermarket a military objective.

Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions requires each object to be assessed in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. Therefore, an intention to destroy the infrastructure of Wildberries, Ozon or Nova Poshta as a whole amounts to selecting targets based on their affiliation with a particular network rather than on the established military use of each individual warehouse. Moreover, measuring the campaign’s success in billions of rubles of economic damage rather than in disrupted deliveries of specific military equipment further indicates that its primary objective is economic rather than military.

Similar reasoning can be seen in the International Criminal Court's decision to issue arrest warrants for commander of the Russian Aerospace Force's Long-Range Aviation Sergey Kobylash and Black Sea Fleet commander Viktor Sokolov in March 2024 in connection with systematic strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The fact that individual substations supply military enterprises does not turn the entire power grid into a lawful target. Likewise, the storage of military cargo at individual warehouses does not permit attacks on an entire logistics network. Arguments that "they started it first" or that "the adversary acts even worse" likewise provide no justification under international humanitarian law and do not absolve either side of responsibility.

Western Assistance

The launch of Fire Point’s solid-propellant rocket motor plant in Denmark has been postponed from late 2026 to late 2027. Initially, the company intended to repurpose an existing building, but it turned out not to comply with local environmental and other regulatory requirements. Despite assistance from Danish authorities, the site could not be approved, prompting Fire Point to acquire a different plot where the facility will have to be built from scratch. As a result, the project's cost has risen from approximately €50 million to €150 million. It remains unclear how the delay will affect the production of Ukrainian FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles, as well as the FP-7.x interceptor missiles for the Freyja missile defense system. All of these projects rely on solid rocket motors and propellant, but the extent of their reliance specifically on the yet-to-be-built Danish facility is unknown.

An additional challenge remains the shortage of funding. According to Zelenskyy, Ukraine's MoD faces a budget shortfall of roughly $27 billion. Of that sum, $8 billion to $10 billion is required to fund orders for early 2027, while nearly $20 billion is needed to pay military personnel, provide assistance to the families of fallen service members and cover other expenses. According to the president, this funding shortfall also hinders the mass production of Ukrainian ballistic missiles.

Following a Russian strike on a shopping mall in Kryvyi Rih, French President Emmanuel Macron promised to expedite the delivery of new SAMP/T NG systems with radars to Ukraine. Depending on their configuration, these systems feature either Ground Fire 300 or Kronos radars and are expected to be capable of intercepting complex ballistic targets, including missiles launched by 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile systems and S-400 SAM systems. We previously reported that SAMP/T systems are capable of intercepting ballistic targets. However, we recently learned that they face significant difficulties in doing so. The seekers on their interceptor missiles will also be upgraded to address this issue. The first system is expected to be delivered as early as this fall.

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