Sitrep for June 29-July 6, 2026 (as of 7:35 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On July 3 evening, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the "complete liberation" of Kostiantynivka. In reality, this is, of course, not the case. It is worth noting that part of our team and several Western analysts had assessed that most of Kostiantynivka would likely fall by mid-summer—now less than a week away. Over the past week, however, the situation has changed very little. We currently assess that the southwestern part of the town, marked in gray on the DeepState map, has been captured and is under Russian control (marked as "red"). The same is true for the northeastern outskirts. The rest of the town is contested territory, with Ukrainian forces still present and heavy fighting ongoing. In an optimistic scenario for Ukraine, the battle for the main part of Kostiantynivka could continue into the fall.

The Russian MoD released numerous videos showing Russian flags being raised in various parts of Kostiantynivka, including the northern sector. The fact that Russian troops were able to reach different parts of the town and record such footage does not indicate that the Russian Armed Forces exercise effective control over those areas. Rather, it reflects the nature of modern warfare. Soldiers from both sides are capable of penetrating deep into territory held by the opposing force, while even moving freely within their own controlled areas has become extremely dangerous because of the pervasive drone threat. In the Russian videos mentioned above, the soldiers remain close to buildings, briefly wave the flag for the camera, and quickly return to cover. Whereas territorial control could once be inferred from troops moving freely through the streets of a settlement, such movement is now severely restricted even in the immediate rear.

In response to the Russian footage, Ukraine released videos recorded in the central part of Kostiantynivka. Under current battlefield conditions, it is simply impossible to draw a frontline with the vast majority of Russian troops on one side and Ukrainian troops on the other. It is more accurate to represent positions as individual points on a map. Russian and Ukrainian defensive positions are often intermingled across contested areas where active fighting is taking place.

The announcement of Kostiantynivka's capture was timed to coincide with President Putin's visit to a forward command post of the Joint Grouping of Forces. During the commanders' briefings, a frontline map reflecting the Russian General Staff's assessment of the battlefield was shown. Normally, such reports display deliberately blurred maps, but this time the map was clearly visible. This was likely related to the planned phone call between Putin and Trump in connection with Independence Day, as well as the upcoming NATO summit in Turkey, which both Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy are expected to attend. By presenting this map, Putin sought to demonstrate to the US president that the military situation in Ukraine is developing in Russia's favor, rather than as portrayed by Trump's European and Ukrainian partners.

It is worth noting, however, that although the Russian MoD's maps differ significantly from the actual battlefield situation—and from DeepState's assessments—in some cases the discrepancies are less dramatic than might be expected. For example, Kostiantynivka is depicted as fully captured, whereas in reality most of the town remains contested. In other words, the Russian map effectively depicts a battlefield situation that has not yet materialized.

Researchers M0nstas and StorMap compared the maps of the General Staff of the RuAF and DeepState and showed that in some cases a fairly large territory has been captured "on credit." Analyst Moklasen noted that the town of Orikhiv is shown as semi-encircled (or even partially captured).

In the Kupiansk direction, according to the map of the Russian MoD, a small section (north of the village of Hlushkivka) of the Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River still remains unconquered. This is notable because at the start of the year, the RuAF command promised to soon seize this bridgehead. In March, they stated that only a 2.5-by-3-kilometer [1.5 by-1.9-mi] patch near the villages of Kivsharivka and Novoosynove remained to be taken.

Yet, the Russian General Staff map does not make any assumptions that would be easily refuted. For example, the frontline is not shown as having approached the city of Zaporizhzhia or as running through Sloviansk or Kramatorsk. However, the frontline in the Sumy direction on this map is indeed located almost 10 kilometers [6 mi] from the outskirts of Sumy (earlier Putin had claimed the RuAF had approached Sumy by 10 km). As a result, the presented picture is one in which the high command can easily believe.

It cannot yet be said how much influence a conversation with Putin could have on Trump. At the upcoming NATO summit, aid allocation to Ukraine and the invocation of Article 5 of the alliance’s charter will be discussed. Article 5 states that an attack on one ally obligates the others to provide assistance.

At the junction of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, the RuAF have filmed new videos showing their flags in the village of Oleksandrivka, south of the village of Pokrovske, and announced its capture.

Although these "flag-bearers" are often quickly killed by Ukrainian drones, it is reasonable to expect a gradual "infiltration" of assault troops toward the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk highway, the route by which the AFU are supplied in this direction.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are counter-attacking northeast of Pokrovske in the area of the village of Komar, advancing toward the village of Velyka Novosilka. According to our assessment, the most dangerous sector for the AFU remains the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, and the situation on the left bank of the Oskil remains challenging. However, instead of shifting reserves to stabilize these sections of the frontline, the AFU are using them for offensive operations in a less significant direction (apparently where Russian defenses proved weaker). Yet this has allowed them to report more advantageous statistics on advances.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of July 3, a Russian strike on the Romny community in the Sumy region killed a family of four, including a child. Unfortunately, incidents in which entire families of civilians are killed in direct strikes occur on a regular basis, and recently such tragedies have become more frequent in frontline regions.

As we expected, the number of strikes on Ukrainian cities continues to increase, along with the number of civilian casualties. According to our sitreps on attacks against civilian infrastructure, at least 451 civilians were killed and no fewer than 3,293 were injured on both sides of the frontline in June 2026. This is the highest monthly civilian casualty toll since we began tracking these figures in 2024. In May 2026, 377 civilians were killed and at least 2,783 were injured. The scale of the strikes has not diminished, so we do not expect the number of casualties to decline in July.

Kyiv and the Kyiv region remain among the primary targets of Russia's air strike campaign. According to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president's advisor and commissioner for sanctions policy, Russia launched 280 ballistic missiles, 36 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles, 341 cruise missiles, five Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and 5,716 drones against Kyiv and the surrounding region during the first six months of the year alone. Intercepting such a large number of ballistic missiles requires roughly twice as many PAC-3 interceptors for the Patriot air defense system, as a single interceptor is often insufficient to guarantee a successful interception. There is currently a global shortage of these missiles, as annual production amounts to only about 600 units.

According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russia launched 106 missiles against Ukraine over the past week, approximately half of them ballistic. Just one week earlier, he reported only 19 missiles. In response to these fluctuations, Defense Express claimed on July 2 that Russia had supposedly changed its tactics and was now conducting large-scale missile attacks every two weeks, noting previous barrages in the early hours of June 2, June 15, and July 2. We have long observed the cyclical nature of Russian strikes: periods of stockpiling precision-guided munitions alternate with large-scale bombardments, making it inappropriate to describe this as a new tactic. Moreover, this cyclical pattern does not mean that the interval between major attacks will always be exactly two weeks. The timing and intensity of Russian strikes depend on many factors, including the season.

In the early hours of July 2, Russia launched the aforementioned massive combined strike against Ukraine using UAVs, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, including those with cluster munition warheads. The attack killed 31 people in Kyiv and injured another 102 civilians, including five children. Four multi-story residential buildings partially collapsed.

Following this, in the early hours of July 6, during a combined attack on Kyiv, debris hit residential buildings in the Darnytskyi and Podilskyi districts. Fifteen people are known to have been killed and 56 injured. Rescue operations are ongoing. According to reports, none of the 29 ballistic missiles launched could be intercepted.

In addition, Russia is expanding its drone production and launch sites. Satellite imagery reveals that the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, where Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions are produced, is growing. A new construction site has been spotted south of the highway.

Satellite images show that the "droneport" near the village of Tsimbulova in the Orel region is expanding to include new facilities for storing Shaheds and launch pads.

On July 3, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported strikes on the Saky and Gvardeyskoye airfields in Crimea. The SBU claimed that the strikes hit UAV storage sites, as well as seven aircraft hangars housing Sukhoi Su-30SM, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft. At least seven aircraft were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the strikes, though this has not yet been confirmed.

The Ukrainian Telegram channel Dnipro Osint revealed that satellite images of Gvardeyskoye taken on June 15 showed a large number of Shahed and Gerbera drones near the hangars. Images taken on June 27 showed damage and traces of fire.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has stated that a MiG-29 was destroyed during a UAV attack on the Belbek airfield in the early hours of June 26. It is unclear why this strike was reported a week and a half later. It is likely that, in recent days, the Main Intelligence Directorate was trying to verify the hit and the damage inflicted on the aircraft. MiG-29 aircraft are hardly used in the current war. However, in anticipation of an attack on the Crimean Bridge, it could be assumed that Russian forces deployed additional aircraft to Crimea for air defense purposes.

In the early hours of July 3, the AFU struck the Michurinskaya power plant substation and the Luch power plant in Belgorod. Some districts of the city experienced power and water supply disruptions.

On July 2, 3, 5, and 6, Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU Robert "Madiar" Brovdi published videos showing numerous strikes on substations in Crimea. Nighttime satellite images of Crimea from July 2025 and July 2026 illustrate the peninsula's power supply difficulties. On July 6, Krymenergo [the largest energy supply company in Crimea] reported a massive power outage in all Crimean cities and districts, though power was quickly restored in Sevastopol.

On July 3, a car carrying administration employees was blown up in the center of Rylsk in the Kursk region, injuring Vladimir Kovalchuk, the head of the Rylsk district.

On July 5, Dmitry Pankov, the head of the Grayvoron district of the Belgorod region, suffered a shrapnel wound to the thigh in a drone attack in the village of Golovchino. According to the Pepel [Ashes] Telegram channel, this is Pankov's fourth injury since the start of the war. Notably, Pankov is often photographed wearing camouflage clothing, which may lead UAV operators to mistake him for a soldier and consider him a legitimate target.

The Russian MoD reported that 10 Flamingo missiles and nearly 500 drones were shot down in the early hours of July 4. Ukrainian CyberBoroshno Telegram channel reported that the AFU launched at least five Flamingo missiles, all of which were shot down. To repel the attack, Russian forces reportedly scrambled a Beriev A-50 AEW&C aircraft to detect the low-flying missiles over rivers and difficult terrain, which makes interception relatively easy. Footage of the missiles' flight and probable destruction over Chuvashia [Russia’s constituent republic] has been published.

In late April, several buildings at the Atlant Aero plant in Taganrog were damaged by R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles. New satellite images show that the buildings have been fully restored. When discussing Ukrainian attacks on any plant, including oil refineries, it's important to remember that the damage is not permanent and the plants are repaired over time.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine will establish a defense line at sea using interceptor drones. Launched from various platforms, including unmanned surface vessels, these anti-aircraft drones will protect the city of Odessa and the surrounding area from aerial attacks. In April 2026, a battalion of unmanned surface vessels from the 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade of the AFU successfully destroyed a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) munition for the first time with an interceptor drone launched from an unmanned surface platform. The interest of Middle Eastern countries in Ukrainian air defense systems, sparked by the Iranian attacks, likely provided impetus for the further development of Ukrainian technologies and the creation of a "floating air defense."

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