Sitrep for Sept. 28-Oct. 1, 2026 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
DeepState has updated its map in the Dobropillia direction, marking advances by Russian forces near the village of Shevchenko, north of the town of Pokrovsk, as well as near the town of Bilytske. It is worth noting that, according to our team and other analysts, the RuAF achieved a local breakthrough in this direction in August, advancing toward the village of Vodianske north of Shevchenko. As has been the case in recent months, advances are reflected on the DeepState map with a significant delay. At the same time, the contested area can be extended as far as the outskirts of the town of Dobropillia and the village of Hannivka, which Russian assault troops have already reached.
If we now compare the DeepState map with the map of fortifications by researcher Playfra, we can see that the RuAF have already crossed the main line of fortifications known as New Donbas (in the previous sitrep, we cited data from Clément Molin on attempts to breach it). Establishing a foothold beyond this defensive line would give the RuAF a more convenient starting position for further offensive operations, including during the winter period.
In the border area of the Kharkiv region, Russian positions in the village of Vilkhuvatka (not far from the villages of Artilne and Milove) were attacked by two Ukrainian "barn tanks" from the 475th Separate Assault Regiment.
Both tanks were covered with massive additional protection against UAV strikes, and, notably, they were accompanied by Ukrainian FPV drones, a heavy Vampire [Baba Yaga] bomber drone, and a Mavic serving as a reconnaissance and spotting drone, since the crew’s visibility from inside such a "barn" is limited. With this kind of protection, the turret becomes immobile, so the tank can only fire in direct-fire mode and has to move closer to its target. This new adaptation of armored vehicles to the conditions of modern warfare proved fairly successful: the tanks reached the positions despite coming under attack from Russian FPV drones, fired on Russian positions, and successfully returned to Ukrainian positions
On Sept. 29, the Russian Ministry of Defense published a report on the use of BM-21 Grad MLRS against AFU positions in the settlement of Mala Korchakivka, in the Sumy direction (south of the village of Oleksiivka). The video is noteworthy in the context of the widespread misconception that the RuAF cannot strike territories it has declared captured. Mala Korchakivka was "liberated" on Mar. 31, 2026, and the neighboring village of Korchakivka on Apr. 30. In reality, commanders are aware of the actual situation and regularly provide artillery and air support to assault troops. This is also evident in satellite imagery. Throughout the full-scale invasion, the Russian MoD has sought to regularly report the capture of settlements, often claiming them prematurely, while avoiding acknowledgment of setbacks. Consequently, the actual situation has almost always differed significantly from official public reports. This has not prevented Russian forces from making gradual advances while employing artillery and aviation extensively.
The Ukrainian Operation Vivaldi continues in the Lyman direction. In our assessment, the AFU managed to cut off the Shandryholove salient along the Zherebets River quite some time ago. The area is not yet entirely under Ukrainian control, but it has at least become a contested area. Some observers, including Yan Matveev, suggest that Ukrainian forces may have advanced considerably farther—crossing the Zherebets and beginning to move along its eastern bank toward Svatove. We have not yet seen evidence of this and consider the assessment overly optimistic, since crossing a river and establishing a foothold on the opposite bank is a fundamentally different task from advancing farther into enemy-held territory. The latter is also possible, but only if Russian defenses are weak, Russian forces are poorly supplied, and the AFU commits sufficient resources. We continue to assess that the AFU has achieved significant gains on the Lyman axis, but it would be inaccurate to exaggerate their extent to this degree.
The AFU's 3rd Army Corps has issued another statement on the results of the third phase of Operation Vivaldi. It claims that the villages of Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka have been liberated, and that Ukrainian control has been restored in the areas of the villages of Karpivka and Novomykhailivka. It is worth noting that Ukrainian gains in the area of Nove were already known in late summer. The footage released by the 3rd AC shows lush, bright green vegetation typical of summer, suggesting that it was likely filmed during the summer. This confirms that Ukrainian official statements about battlefield gains are published with considerable delays. In addition, the corps commander, Andriy Biletsky, reported that 250 Russian servicemen had been captured. The published footage shows far fewer prisoners, but we consider it entirely plausible that only a portion of them was shown.
Reports also claim that the AFU converted old BTR-60 armored personnel carriers into kamikaze ground robots by packing them with explosives, sending them toward the RuAF positions, and detonating them. Similar tactics were already in use at the start of the full-scale war. In one case, Russian forces detonated an entire KAMAZ truck, although it was not remotely controlled; its pedals were simply jammed. In one case, Russian forces detonated an entire KAMAZ truck, albeit they did not control it remotely, but only wedged the pedals down.
As always in such cases, Russia's MoD responded to the AFU post by showing its own videos from liberated settlements. However, some of these videos were filmed long before the Ukrainian operation, including footage more than a year old, while others were filmed elsewhere. For some reason, it also published a video from the settlement of Yampil, although the Ukrainian side had made no claims about it.
For its part, the AFU's 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade "Kholodnyi Yar" showed an amphibious ground robot that can move on land and independently traverse bodies of water. The robot reportedly delivered supplies to a unit after covering more than 40 kilometers. In recent years, similar robots have repeatedly been displayed at military exhibitions in various countries (for example, in 2020, 2022, 2024 and 2025). Evidence has now emerged that they are being used in the war. Such vehicles are particularly useful in sectors where bodies of water make it harder to resupply forward positions, such as the Kupiansk direction near the Oskil River.
The Telegram channel of the 2nd Khartia Corps of Ukraine’s National Guard published drone footage from the Kupiansk direction showing civilians with bags accompanied by Russian soldiers—some of whom, according to the post, were in civilian clothing. They first walk along a road and then enter a pipe.
The post presents this as an abduction in which civilians were used as cover for the retreat of Russian soldiers, and the channel plans to submit the footage for a war crimes investigation. Such a categorical reaction strikes us as odd amid the humanitarian catastrophe in Oleshky, in the Kherson region, where evacuation is not being carried out even in this form, and civilians receive practically no humanitarian aid. In our view, what is happening in the video from the Kupiansk direction looks much more like an evacuation of civilians (including people with limited mobility) from a combat zone — they are carrying bags of belongings, and among them are people on crutches and in wheelchairs. We see no evidence in this footage that civilians were used as "human shields." What is happening in Oleshky stems primarily from the actions of the Russian authorities and Russian soldiers. The civilians who remain there (about 2,000 people, according to Ukrainian figures) must be moved to a safer place as soon as possible.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated, citing Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, that 8,000 North Korean troops are currently in Russia and that preparations are underway to deploy an additional 10,000. This contradicts his previous remark that Kim Jong Un had refused to send new units to Russia. It remains unclear whether Pyongyang has changed its stance or Ukrainian intelligence has revised its assessment.
Zelenskyy has also claimed that Russian authorities have initiated "additional mobilization," expanding recruitment efforts. This likely refers to an intensification of contract recruitment, including pressure on civilians and illegal methods used by regional authorities to meet their quotas. In our assessment, there are no indications that preparations are underway for a new large-scale official mobilization campaign comparable to that of fall 2022.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
From Sept. 23 to 27, the RuAF carried out near-daily airstrikes on Sumy, using three air-dropped bombs on Sept. 23, two on Sept. 25, two more on Sept. 26, and another three on Sept. 27. These attacks killed four people and injured 56.
On Sept. 29, Sumy was struck by four more air-dropped bombs. One hit a school as children were being evacuated to shelters, though there were no casualties at the school. Other strikes hit a cemetery and a residential area, killing two people and injuring eight, including two minors.
The nearest known AFU positions, near the village of Mala Korchakivka, are 15-20 km [9–12 miles] from the outskirts of Sumy, so the city cannot be considered a frontline city. The near-daily bombing of urban infrastructure, causing civilian casualties and damage to schools and residential buildings, can only be described as deliberate acts of terror against the population.
In recent days, the RuAF have begun attacking power pylons in the Kyiv region. Previously, strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector primarily targeted power plants, substations and transformers. It appears that the RuAF are now targeting power pylons as well. Some sources suggest the attacks were carried out by FPV drones transported to the Kyiv region by larger carrier drones. However, there is no conclusive evidence for this theory yet. Published footage shows a larger UAV, likely a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, directly striking a power pylon.
Ukrainian presidential adviser on radio technologies Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces had, for the first time, used a new warhead on a jet-powered UAV: a cumulative-cutting special payload. It reportedly consists of a 40 kg linear shaped charge and four damaging elements, and is designed to cut through metal structures such as high-voltage transmission pylons and other large metal structures, including bridge components. Unlike a conventional shaped charge, which creates a narrow jet to penetrate a single point, this munition produces a cut along a linear path.
Following these strikes, disruptions to electricity and water supplies were reported in Kyiv, public electric transport was suspended, and emergency power cuts were introduced in the Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv regions. Attacks on power pylons will likely become an additional component of strikes on power plants and substations. The pylons themselves are relatively easy to repair, but their large-scale destruction could cause significant disruptions to the power supply. This is the first known instance of this tactic being used, and the attack was at least partly successful.
Vladimir Putin banned the publication of data on oil-refining volumes and exchange trading in gasoline and diesel fuel. Previously, fluctuations in exchange sales made it possible to determine whether a particular oil refinery had resumed operations after a Ukrainian strike. Now, assessing the condition of such facilities will largely require analysis of satellite imagery, including infrared imagery, as well as the search for insider information.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Rikard Jozwiak reported that Brussels is discussing adding the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation] to its list of terrorist organizations in response to a series of acts of sabotage that European intelligence services attribute to Russian military intelligence. These include incidents in Leipzig and other cities, as well as the arson attack on a Starlink ground station in Poland. At present, this remains unofficial information.
In practice, adding the GRU to a list of terrorist organizations would likely produce prominent headlines and allow European officials to point to new measures against Russian authorities. However, it is unlikely to significantly restrict GRU activities: European companies are already unable to openly cooperate with Russian military intelligence, while procurement for sabotage operations and agent operations is conducted through intermediaries and front organizations.
Western Assistance
Sweden and Germany announced that they would use reimbursements from the European Peace Facility (EPF) to provide further support for Ukraine. The announcement was made on Sept. 28, ahead of a meeting of EU defense ministers in Brussels. On Sept. 25, EU member states agreed to unblock €6.6 billion from the EPF. Of that amount, €900 million will go to the EU military mission EUMAM Ukraine, €1 billion to new joint arms purchases, and the remaining €4.7 billion to reimburse member states for aid already delivered to Ukraine. Sweden and Germany decided to use their shares of these reimbursements for additional aid to Ukraine. The total amount is not yet known, as each country independently decides how to use the funds it receives. EPF reimbursements had been blocked for more than three years. In 2023, Hungary blocked the fund’s eighth tranche of €500 million, after which the unpaid total gradually grew to €6.6 billion.
Zelenskyy said Ukraine had reached an agreement with Belgium to deliver three F-16 fighter jets on an expedited basis by the end of 2026. Belgium plans to deliver seven aircraft this year in total, but four of them are intended for spare parts. Five more F-16s are expected in 2027, 14 in 2028, and 27 in 2029, meaning the transfer of all 53 promised Belgian jets will be stretched over several years. Ukraine has also received urgent shipments of F-16 ammunition from Belgium, Spain, and other countries.
Serious problems have emerged with the maintenance of aircraft already delivered to Ukraine. After every 300 flight hours, an F-16 requires a comprehensive inspection of its engine, avionics, hydraulics, fuel system, and other components. The United States awarded Belgian company Sabena Aerospace Engineering a contract worth up to $235.5 million to service Ukraine’s jets. However, as the Wall Street Journal reports, such an inspection takes two to six weeks in the United States but up to 40 weeks in Belgium. According to one Western source cited by the outlet, more than half of Ukraine’s F-16s are currently awaiting servicing, and at the current pace Ukraine may have no combat-ready aircraft of this type left by year’s end. This assessment may be deliberately overstated to push for faster turnaround, but wartime fighter jet maintenance requires much greater speed.
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