Sitrep for Sept. 14-21, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

On Sept. 20, parliamentary elections were held in Russia. Contrary to our expectations, the Russian Ministry of Defense did not stage an operation beforehand to send assault troops to the outskirts of Sloviansk to record footage with a flag. Instead, it merely reported fighting "on the immediate approaches to Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka." The same statement said that in Lyman and Sviatohirsk, "the clearing of residential areas of isolated AFU servicemen continues."

Meanwhile, the AFU continued publishing information about the successes of the 3rd Army Corps during Operation Vivaldi—previously, we described the operation as the clearing of the Shandryholove salient. On Sept. 20, Andriy Biletsky, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, reported the liberation of the villages of Shandryholove and Derylove, as well as the establishment of full control over the village of Drobysheve. Following this statement, DeepState analysts updated their map, which continues to show only what has been officially claimed by AFU command. In reality, however, it appears that Ukrainian forces have cut off the salient and are continuing to clear it—the contested area now extends as far as the Zherebets River.

The Russian MoD also claimed that Ukrainian troops had been encircled in the border area of the Kharkiv region. While the DeepState map shows only small bridgeheads along the border and near Vovchansk (but does not show the reported advance southeast of Vovchansk toward the village of Bilyi Kolodiaz) the map published by the Sudoplatov Project’s "Judgment Day" does depict an AFU encirclement. According to this map, Russian forces advanced east of the captured Bilyi Kolodiaz, linking up north of the village of Prykolotne with forces advancing from the village of Melove. Notably, within the allegedly encircled area, Sudoplatov’s drone operators engaged Ukrainian armored vehicles moving freely. This underscores that the area is not actually even contested in the conventional sense, and that only isolated assault troops are infiltrating it.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Russia continues to follow a rough modern equivalent of the chevauchée tactic, destroying Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. On Sept. 18, Shahed strikes completely burned down the building of Ukrainian Railways' (Ukrzaliznytsia) information and computing center in the city of Odesa.

According to the Odesa Regional Military Administration, 11 people were injured, including two first responders who were injured in a double-tap strike. It is difficult to say how seriously this has affected Ukrzaliznytsia's operations, but the RuAF are systematically trying to disrupt its operations as much as possible. According to Politico, the company is currently losing 37-40 locomotives per month. We believe that Ukraine will soon be able to adapt better to these strikes and protect its trains more effectively.

In particular, the development and testing of jet-powered interceptor drones continue: Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had successfully used such a UAV. Two such drones have recently been developed, while a total of 67 companies are working on this type of interceptor.

Almost a year ago, we expressed doubts that strikes on locomotives could have a significant impact on Ukraine. Now—eight months of more intensive strikes later—we believe that locomotive stocks have still not been exhausted. At the same time, in most European countries, the railway track gauge is narrower than in Ukraine, which means Ukraine's allies will not be able to fully help by supplying their own locomotives.

In addition, Russia is attempting to destroy bridges and pontoon crossings over the Dniester Estuary and the Dniester River near the village of Zatoka and the village of Maiaky. These routes are particularly important for the export of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural products, as they connect the southwestern part of the Odesa region with the rest of Ukraine and provide transport links with Moldova and Romania. Following Russian strikes on Black Sea port infrastructure, Ukraine has been forced to make greater use of land routes through EU countries, including road bridges. Strikes on the latter, in turn, cause miles-long traffic jams of trucks along alternative routes, and Russian drones then target these concentrations of vehicles as well.

Ukrainian grain exports are constrained not only by the capacity of these routes but also by EU quotas for duty-free imports. This year's quota of 1.3 million tons was exhausted by the beginning of summer.

Russian strikes kill civilians on a daily basis:

• On Sept. 18, an air-dropped bomb struck a residential building in Sumy, killing the parents of a 7-year-old boy who was admitted to intensive care; nine other civilians were also injured.
• On Sept. 19, a woman and three children were killed in the Kyiv region, while two other women were injured.
• On Sept. 19, four people were killed in the Sumy region when an FPV drone struck a vehicle.
• Also during the day on Sept. 19, five people were injured when the Novy Kontinent shopping center in Dnipro was hit.

The MoD typically does not acknowledge daytime strikes on shopping centers when large numbers of civilians are present. Such strikes constitute another act of terror against Ukraine’s civilian population.

The Financial Times published a new article on Russian strikes aimed, among other things, at inflicting maximum economic damage on Ukraine. It quotes Ruslan Shostak, founder of the Eva and Varus retail chains. According to him, of Ukraine's 5 million square meters of modern warehouse space, 2.1 million have been destroyed, and 900,000 square meters have been damaged in recent months. The destruction of warehouses is forcing businesses to overhaul their logistics, move away from centralized storage, and distribute goods among smaller warehouses. Ultimately, this will drive up prices.

In recent weeks, Russia used ballistic missiles to knock out Ukraine's three remaining large steel plants in the industrial centers of the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, killing 17 employees. Fifteen thousand workers were left without work. The damaged plants, which are now idle, accounted for 90 percent of Ukraine's steel production. It is unclear how long repairs will take. The situation increases Ukraine's need for financial assistance from its allies.

The main development over the past 24 hours was a massive Ukrainian air attack on Moscow and the Moscow region in the early hours of Sept. 20, ahead of the final day of voting in Russia's parliamentary elections. The attack killed three people in the Moscow region and injured 38 others. Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attack involved FP-1, RZ-100, MICH-2000, Palianytsia, Vendetta, Liutyi, Bars, Flamingo, Sichen and Pelican.

Judging by the footage that has been published, one of the surface-to-air missiles, presumably fired by a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system, hit a residential building, while the tail section of another pierced the hood of a car in a courtyard. Similar fragments regularly fall in populated areas: the design of the Pantsir missile provides for the separation of the booster stage, creating an additional hazard when the system is used in urban areas. However, it would be incorrect to attribute all casualties solely to air defense operations. The people killed in the attack were not in the multi-story building hit by a missile, but in a three-story building and a private house where Ukrainian UAVs or their debris fell.

Fragments of a large missile were also found in the Moscow region and, in our view, belong to an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile.

At the same time, the Pelican mentioned by Zelenskyy is almost certainly not the FP-7 Pelican ballistic missile, as reported by some outlets. The FP-7’s stated range is up to 200 km, or up to 300 km with a reduced warhead, so the missile could not have reached Moscow. For strikes on Moscow, Fire Point is developing the longer-range FP-9 Dove of Peace missile. One of Fire Point's executives, Denys Shtilierman, did not post about the use of the FP-7 on social media, while the Russian Ministry of Defense did not report the interception of a ballistic missile. RBC-Ukraine and the CyberBoroshno project claim that Zelenskyy was referring to a Pelican UAV.

The Russian MoD stated that the attack was an attempt to disrupt the elections, but that it had "failed" and did not achieve its targets. Meanwhile, one of the strikes hit the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya. A large-scale fire broke out at the facility and, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the crude oil distillation unit, a combined crude oil processing unit and an isomerization unit were hit. It was later reported that the oil refinery had suspended operations. Thus, the claim that the attack was a complete failure is clearly inconsistent with its actual consequences.

Western Assistance

The US State Department has preliminarily approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Ukraine of air defense equipment and related services at an estimated cost of $2.68 billion. Congress was notified on Sept. 18 and may block the sale within 30 days. If it does not, the deal may be concluded after Oct. 18, although production and delivery timelines remain unknown.

The purchase is expected to be financed through a combination of contributions from European countries and US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriated during the Biden administration. The FMF will be counted as a US capital contribution to the Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund via a 1:1 reimbursement. In September 2025, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) committed $75 million to the fund, matched by an equal contribution from the Ukrainian government.

The published list includes:

• S-300 Clone missiles;
• GAM-67 missiles, which have not previously been publicly reported;
• Range-Extended Air Defense Laser-Guided Rocket systems;
• Improvised Transporter Erector Launcher 1.5 systems;
• mobile launching system modification kits;
• RPS 202 counter-UAS radars;
• erectable mast trailers;
• as well as modifications, maintenance support, spare parts, consumables and accessories, repair and return support, software, publications, transportation support, and engineering, technical and logistics support services.

The exact nature of some of these systems remains unclear. Defense Express reports, citing its own information, that the S-300 Clone designation refers to a new missile designed for the S-300 systems currently in service with the AFU, rather than a replica of the Soviet 5V55 missile. According to the outlet, the new missile has enhanced performance and a different, more modern guidance system. Defense Express describes the GAM-67 as another new development intended for medium-range air defense systems, including both Soviet-era systems already in service and systems currently under development. The Improvised Transporter Erector Launcher 1.5 and mobile launching system modification kits may be intended for these munitions. Based on their description, we suspect that the Range-Extended Air Defense Laser-Guided Rocket systems may be a development of APKWS or something similar.

In September 2024, then-US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the United States, together with Ukraine and several European companies, was developing a replacement for the S-300 surface-to-air missile system and the R-27 air-to-air missile. However, he spoke of replacing the S-300 system itself rather than producing new missiles for Ukraine’s remaining Soviet-made systems, so it cannot yet be said that he was referring to the current S-300 Clone missiles.

This package can tentatively be regarded as the first major arms sale package independently approved by the second Trump administration: previous deliveries had largely been made under decisions taken during the Biden administration or at the initiative of Congress. However, the package consists exclusively of air defense equipment and related support and does not expand the AFU’s ability to conduct long-range strikes on Russian territory.

The MoD of Russia released footage of another Russian anti-aircraft interceptor drone, the Lis-2. It is a kinetic UAV without a warhead: to destroy its target, it must collide with it directly. In the published video, the Lis-2 approached a Ukrainian long-range drone, presumably an FP-1 or FP-2, from below and the side, but failed to ram it. If the interceptor had carried a fragmentation warhead, such an approach could have been enough to damage the target's engine, wing, or other critical components.

In addition, the Lis-2 is significantly smaller than the FP-1, FP-2 and Liutyi, so even a successful collision would not necessarily destroy a large drone. Hitting the pusher propeller is also difficult because it is partially shielded by the tail assembly. A similar problem persists with the Russian Yolka kinetic interceptor drone, which also remains kinetic. Z-channels have already criticized the prolonged failure to equip it with a warhead, which reduces the likelihood of a successful interception.

The Dnipro Osint project published satellite imagery of a large new construction site near the Alabuga Special Economic Zone and suggested that underground workshops were being built there to protect the production of Geran, Gerbera and other drones from Ukrainian strikes. However, in our view, the imagery itself does not support this conclusion: the visible depth is limited, and the site looks more like a conventional excavation for foundations, piles, and utility infrastructure.

It has also not been established whether the construction is connected to UAV production at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, given that it is taking place outside the SEZ boundaries known from open sources. Mark Krutov, editor of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty news service, told CIT that photographs of equipment belonging to the Terum construction company, published in June 2026, were taken at the same location. The contractor’s website states that it is building a construction materials plant and an automotive test track in the SEZ. The rapid pace of work is reminiscent of the construction of previous Alabuga facilities, but does not prove a connection to UAV production.

The company Bureau 1440 reported that it had tested the Rassvet satellite internet system in the village of Nelmin-Nos in the Nenets Autonomous Region [Russia’s federal subject]. The connection was used for remote voting in the State Duma [lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia] elections: a subscriber terminal installed on the ground connected to satellites and distributed internet via Wi-Fi to a tablet. The published video confirms that the system is already capable of providing connectivity in a remote area, although this was still only a single demonstration.

The terminal shown is fairly compact, but judging by the video, it is mounted on a mechanically adjustable stand. This may be because the Rassvet constellation currently has only around 30 satellites, requiring the antenna to be oriented toward an available satellite. By comparison, the modern Starlink Mini does not require mechanical satellite tracking: the Starlink constellation has more than 10,000 satellites, so the terminal can see several of them almost continuously. However, without technical documentation, it is impossible to determine with certainty the purpose of Rassvet’s movable stand.

Based on its visible dimensions, the Bureau 1440 terminal also appears somewhat larger than the Starlink Mini, although its exact dimensions and mass are unknown. The need for mechanical pointing, if it does indeed exist, would significantly complicate the installation of such a system on UAVs. The use of Starlink Mini on Ukrainian UAVs and maritime surface drones provides reliable connectivity over the occupied territories and the Black Sea.

At this stage, Rassvet is already potentially suitable for stationary rear-area command posts and remote units, but its impact on the war will be limited. Significantly more serious consequences would follow if the RuAF acquired a compact terminal capable of operating reliably on moving ground platforms, ships and UAVs.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

Zelenskyy stated on Sept. 17 that Kim Jong Un had abandoned plans to send additional troops to Russia. He had previously said that North Korea might send between 30,000 and 50,000 troops.

Denys Prokopenko, commander of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, said that Russian authorities could mobilize up to 600,000 personnel after the elections. He also estimated that the RuAF have a 6-to-1 numerical advantage in the Dobropillia direction. Such a numerical advantage of Russian troops over Ukrainian forces appears unlikely to us; otherwise, the pace of the Russian advance would be significantly higher. Perhaps Prokopenko was referring to a specific small sector of the frontline or deliberately exaggerated the severity of the situation in an effort to accelerate Western aid.

Overall, these two assertions by Prokopenko are difficult to reconcile. If Russian forces already have a sixfold advantage in one of the key directions, it is unclear why the RuAF would need to mobilize almost as many additional personnel as, according to Ukrainian estimates, are currently fighting on the Russian side.

We consider a further intensification of Russia's existing contract recruitment system more likely: by the end of the year, regions will make greater use of intermediaries, increase payments, and increase pressure on potential recruits to meet the established targets. Some may call this "covert mobilization," but this practice has been ongoing for a long time and differs significantly from the mobilization of September 2022.

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