Sitrep for July 31-Aug. 03, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Last week, footage emerged of a Russian armored vehicle assault in the Dobropillia direction in the Donetsk region, where such attacks have become relatively rare in recent months. Now, footage has been published from the border area of the Kharkiv region showing the Armed Forces of Ukraine launching a tank assault. The video shows Russian drones striking abandoned Ukrainian tanks near the villages of Khatnie and Ambarne. The tanks are fitted with large improvised cope cages, making it difficult to identify their models. The fact that the footage shows strikes against abandoned vehicles suggests that these were far from the first attempts to destroy them: after the initial strikes—likely the ones that immobilized the tanks—the Ukrainian crews apparently abandoned the vehicles and scattered in search of cover.
Over the past two to three weeks, there have been reports of Russian activity in the border area north of the bridgehead established a year ago near the village of Milove, in the same region, specifically around the village of Artilne. Russian assault troops appear to have spent this period conducting infiltration operations toward the villages of Ustynivka and Ivashkyne, while also operating near the village of Chorne. These movements became apparent through videos showing AFU drone strikes against detected Russian assault troops.
In addition, in the Vovchansk direction, the Russian Armed Forces continue their attempts to expand the area under their control. Southeast of the town of Vovchansk, they are advancing in small assault groups toward the village of Bilyi Kolodiaz. As early as last summer, some observers suggested that the attacks in this area and the border bridgeheads were intended to support a future Russian advance toward the village of Velykyi Burluk. At the time, we considered that interpretation of Russia's plans overly optimistic. Now, a year later, isolated Russian assault troops are only just reaching Bilyi Kolodiaz, while there has still been no significant expansion of the other small border bridgeheads.
With the start of the new month, various analytical teams are publishing their calculations regarding the outcomes of the Russian offensive in July. According to DeepState, the rate of RuAF advancement continues to decline: factoring in counterattacks by the AFU, the net gain of captured territory amounted to 36 square kilometers, with 88 square kilometers captured and 52 square kilometers lost. DeepState analysts reiterated that some of the liberated territories cannot yet be displayed on the map or factored into the statistics due to operational security protocols. On a new chart, they indicated that the updated results for May yield a negative value, meaning that overall, the RuAF did not capture 14 square kilometers, but rather lost 11. For June, taking newly declassified information into account, the figure is 57 square kilometers instead of 84. Consequently, the July tally is also not definitive, although this month, according to the analysts, Ukrainian successes were smaller than in previous months.
According to the pro-Russian project Slivochny Kapriz, the rate of RuAF advancement increased in July compared to June, rising to 175 square kilometers from 112. At the same time, due to their methodology, these estimates must be approached with caution: they are consistently reluctant to acknowledge successful Ukrainian counterattacks and, conversely, immediately mark any Russian flag photo op as a genuine advance.
Although both assessments currently align with our hypothesis that the peak of RuAF activity has shifted from May and June to the second half of the summer, a definitive conclusion cannot be made until the July results from the Blackbird Group. If our observation is correct, the July statistics reflect the trend only partially, as the surge has not yet had enough time to fully play out. In our view, the peak of activity has not yet passed, meaning it is reasonable to expect an intensification of attacks to continue in August. Although the pace remains extremely low—especially when compared to Putin’s objectives—the frontline is still moving.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The campaign of Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian logistics, specifically trucks in the occupied territories of Ukraine, continues at pace. Contrary to the expectations of a segment of the public, several months of intensified mid-range strikes have still not led to a lull on the frontline; on the contrary, as noted above, the pressure from the RuAF intensified somewhat in July, and this trend may continue in August.
As calculated by Clément Molin, in July—unlike in previous months—the AFU failed to double the number of successful strikes against trucks, while he recorded an average of twenty-one hits per day.
In addition, according to Molin, fifteen hundred undocumented cases remain. It is unclear to us whether this refers to videos that were not geolocated or an estimate of the number of strikes lacking objective control data. Notably, Molin previously asserted that this strike campaign could have a "devastating" effect on frontline logistics. We doubted the validity of that conclusion even then, and the current movement of the RuAF refutes it entirely. Undoubtedly, strikes on logistics complicate offensive operations, but at their current scale, they cannot halt them completely. Furthermore, Molin suggested that it is not necessary to destroy all trucks to seriously impact logistics—destroying a portion of them would suffice to terrify the remaining drivers and deter them from driving close to the frontline. This conclusion has also failed to materialize: logistics have not stopped, and transport moves not only individually, but occasionally in entire convoys. Most likely, these include civilian drivers who have agreed to drive along dangerous roads for increased compensation.
Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU, Robert "Madiar"Â Brovdi, shared footage of strikes against a convoy consisting of three tanker trucks and three escort vehicles carrying mobile fire teams in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region. Unfortunately, the video does not allow for a reliable determination of whether the mobile fire teams attempted to shoot down the drones, but in any case, at first one tanker, and then a second, were struck and caught fire.
The deadline for the 40-day operation aimed at pressuring Russia, announced by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is approaching. If the day of the announcement is excluded, the deadline falls on Aug. 4; if it is included, the operation concludes on Aug. 3. Clearly, the effort has failed to compel Russia to agree to a peace settlement, and the Kremlin is clearly not prepared to accept Ukraine's proposed terms for freezing the war in the near future. It remains unclear how the Ukrainian leadership intends to proceed and what changes, if any, will follow once the operation's deadline expires.
Researcher Brady Africk has published satellite imagery showing the aftermath of Ukrainian missile strikes on Russian military-industrial facilities: the Avitek plant in Kirov, struck on July 24, and the VZPP-S or VZPP-Mikron plant in Voronezh, struck on June 22. The Avitek imagery reveals a significant hole in one of the buildings, suggesting that a FP-5 Flamingo missile was responsible for the damage, which is much greater than what would typically result from a drone strike.
However, it is difficult to assess the overall extent of the damage because it is unclear whether the building housed production facilities containing critical equipment. Africk also published an image provided by Vantor (formerly Maxar) showing the aftermath of the June 22 Storm Shadow missile strikes on the Voronezh Semiconductor Devices Plant.
Two enterprises, VZPP-S (where the "S" stands for "sborka" [assembly]) and VZPP-Mikron, are registered at the same address. According to Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR), VZPP-S is involved in producing Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems, as well as Iskander ballistic missiles and Kh-101 cruise missiles. Since the location of these plants' production workshops within the industrial complex is unclear, it is impossible to determine exactly which facilities were hit. Nevertheless, the visible damage appears substantial. Ground-level footage of the strike's aftermath had previously been published. According to Governor Gusev, the attack killed six plant employees and injured 68 others, including two minors.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force's report, Russia launched four anti-ship missiles and 27 ballistic missiles during the early hours of Aug. 1, only one of which was intercepted. Over the previous several weeks, Ukraine had been intercepting roughly half of all incoming ballistic missiles, lending credence to reports that it had received a relatively small batch of PAC-3 interceptor missiles. Those interceptors now appear to have been exhausted, as confirmed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In total, during July, Russia exploited Ukraine's shortage of interceptor missiles by launching 126 Iskander-M, S-400 48N6-series or KN-23 ballistic missiles at Ukrainian territory. Including Zircon missiles—which also require PAC-3 interceptors to be engaged—the total reaches 136.
As we have already mentioned, the Ukrainian authorities are seeking permission to use Starlink over the Russian Federation and have made a corresponding request to the US. The Atlantic reported that Trump might agree if he considers that using Starlink to support strike operations would accelerate the end of the war and push Putin toward negotiations. Trump undoubtedly strives to end the Russo-Ukrainian war as soon as possible. However, judging by his public statements and actions, the terms of the resolution are not very important to him. According to the article, former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov was already working on resolving this issue prior to his dismissal and had agreed with Musk that he would grant access if Trump gave the green light. Fedorov's return to the post of Defense Minister could contribute to more effective interaction with the American side and the achievement of agreements more favorable to Ukraine.
Permission to use Starlink over the territory of the Russian Federation is important for the AFU because it would enable more timely detection of Iskander short-range ballistic missile launchers and S-400 air defense systems, both of which are difficult to track using satellite imagery alone. Reconnaissance UAVs operating with Starlink connectivity could significantly improve the quality of Ukrainian intelligence. In recent weeks, these systems have been used extensively to carry out ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine. Because of the missiles' extremely high speed, civilians often do not have enough time to reach shelters after an air raid alert is issued, resulting in additional casualties. Moreover, Russian forces frequently employ so-called double-tap strikes.
As a result of the massive combined strike on Kyiv, nine people were killed and 33 others were injured, including four children. Among the dead was a police officer who was killed in a double-tap missile strike. Large craters from ballistic missile impacts can be seen near residential buildings.
In addition to missiles carrying high-explosive warheads, however, Russia also used missiles equipped with cluster munitions. The characteristic sound of submunitions detonating can be heard in several videos. It is worth noting that the use of cluster munitions against residential areas is prohibited under international law. These are area-effect weapons designed to maximize casualties, making their use in urban areas particularly deadly. We do not know which specific missiles carried cluster warheads. Moreover, the missiles often strike indiscriminately, with impact craters visible near residential and administrative buildings. For example, one missile struck near the administration building of Kyiv's Darnytskyi district.
As we expected, the number of people killed in July surpassed the previous monthly record. We recorded 634 people killed and 4,590 injured during the month. Of these, 411 were killed and 3,222 were injured in Ukrainian-controlled territory. Approximately 70 percent of all casualties in July occurred in Ukrainian-controlled areas. Previously, this figure had been around 75 percent. Although the number of casualties in Russian-controlled territory has increased in recent weeks, the vast majority of victims remain on the Ukrainian side of the frontline.
On July 31, the RuAF struck a Nova Poshta terminal in the Vinnytsia region with reportedly Geran-4 jet-powered drones.
Later that evening, another strike hit a Nova Poshta sorting facility in the city of Poltava. Over the following two days, Russia targeted a Rozetka warehouse and the adjacent parking lot in the town of Brovary, Kyiv region, with Shahed jet-powered drones. One employee was killed and seven others were injured. The Russian side routinely justifies such strikes by claiming that the warehouses are being used for military purposes.
Ukrainian forces, in turn, continue to strike Wildberries warehouses on the grounds that they are being used to store military equipment:
In addition, Ukraine struck the Saratov oil refinery for the fifteenth time. As with the repeated strikes on the Ilsky Oil Refinery, this clearly demonstrates that such attacks can damage a refinery, though not destroy it entirely. Russia, for its part, seeks to repair the damage and return the refineries to operation as quickly as possible.
On Aug. 3, Ukrainian drones struck Belgorod State Technological University, setting off a large fire. The targeted building housed facilities where UAVs were being developed and tested. According to the university's Telegram channel, these systems were intended for monitoring power transmission lines and heating pipelines, as well as for conducting aerial photography. Although some commentators have argued that this work was almost certainly connected to the Russian military, we have not seen evidence that the university was training military drone operators or developing military technology. Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that the university constituted a legitimate military target.
A similar incident occurred on June 8, when the Protasovo airfield in the Ryazan region was attacked. The site also hosted a center for developing unmanned systems, but we likewise saw no evidence linking it to the Russian military. Despite the ongoing war and the RuAF's efforts to recruit as many students as possible into its drone forces, we do not believe that everyone working with UAVs is necessarily affiliated with the Russian MoD or assisting the frontline as a volunteer.
The Russian side has once again accused Ukraine of striking the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. This time, a UAV reportedly hit a gallery connecting the plant’s reactor units. The structure is not associated with the storage of nuclear fuel or other radioactive materials, meaning the strike itself did not pose a risk of a radiation accident, let alone a nuclear catastrophe. Numerous videos have confirmed that Russian troops and military vehicles have long been stationed on the premises of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. We believe that Ukrainian strikes on the facility are intended to target these military assets rather than the plant’s nuclear infrastructure. However, responsibility for creating such risks lies primarily with the Russian side. Placing military facilities on the grounds of a nuclear power plant is categorically unacceptable.
According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an assassination attempt targeting Ihor Obolenskyi, commander of the 2nd Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine "Khartiia," was thwarted on July 31. According to Ukrainian law enforcement, Russian intelligence services recruited a 69-year-old Kharkiv resident by posing as Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) officers. They allegedly convinced the man that Obolenskyi was a traitor collaborating with Russia. The suspect attempted to shoot the commander outside a barbershop in Kharkiv, but the weapon malfunctioned. The attacker and his alleged accomplice were subsequently detained. Zelenskyy vowed that Ukraine would respond to the attempted assassination.
The following day, an explosion occurred at Balzi Rossi, a restaurant on Kudrinskaya Square in Moscow, which had been closed to the public for a private event. The blast killed three people and injured 21 others. Two of the wounded later died in the hospital. Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee stated that an improvised explosive device (IED) had detonated inside the restaurant. The apparent target of the attack was reportedly Col. Gen. Aleksandr Chaiko, the recently appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Chaiko had reportedly been celebrating his 55th birthday at the venue. The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber, which is associated with the Russian Aerospace Forces, claims that Chaiko survived. However, there has been no official confirmation that Chaiko was present at the event or that he was the intended target.
According to reports, a woman brought a box into the restaurant, claiming it contained a gift. A security guard stopped her at the entrance and attempted to inspect the package, at which point the explosion occurred. The woman herself, the security guard (reportedly an officer of Russia’s Federal Protective Service), and one of the guests—possibly Chaiko’s son-in-law, Daniil Peredrii—were killed instantly. According to unconfirmed reports, the general’s daughter was injured.
According to the preliminary account of the incident, the female courier may not have known that she was carrying an explosive device. She was essentially used as an unwitting suicide bomber. If so, this incident would be consistent with a pattern in which intelligence services recruit unsuspecting individuals for sabotage operations without informing them of the true nature of their assignment or considering the likelihood of their death. A similar method was reportedly used with the truck driver whose vehicle exploded on the Crimean Bridge on October 8, 2022.
Despite the apparent similarities, the attempted assassination of Obolenskyi and the explosion in Moscow are most likely not related. The two incidents occurred only one day apart, but planning an operation targeting a high-ranking military officer under state protection would have required significantly more time. Chaiko is indeed likely to be a high-priority target for Ukrainian intelligence services. He currently commands the Russian Aerospace Forces, which regularly employ air-dropped bombs and missiles against Ukrainian cities and towns. According to CIT's tally, Russian air-dropped bombs killed 57 civilians in May, 53 in June and as many as 96 in July, including five children. Thus, the number of civilians killed by air-dropped bombs nearly doubled over the past month. It is not possible to reliably calculate the number of victims killed by air-launched missiles. In addition, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Chaiko commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District and the Group of Troops "East," which participated in the offensive against Kyiv. Units under his command operated in the Kyiv region, including around Borodianka and Bucha. For this reason, he is likely to remain one of Ukraine’s priority targets even after combat operations end.
We would also like to highlight the repeated use (1, 2) of Russian air-dropped bombs against the city of Pavlohrad in the Dnipropetrovsk region, located approximately 90 km from the frontline. The Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) has an effective range of roughly 40-70 km, depending on launch conditions, so it remains unclear what type of munition was used in this strike. We previously suggested that it may have been the new version of the Universal Inter-Branch Gliding Munition (UMPB). Clément Molin reached the same conclusion, suggesting that the weapon could have been the UMPB-5R variant, featuring extended wings and a greater range. However, no reliable evidence has yet emerged to confirm this assessment.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
Moscow Region Governor Andrey Vorobyov has issued a decree introducing a special management regime for public utility infrastructure, once again prompting speculation that Russia is preparing for a new wave of mobilization. However, the document itself provides no basis for such conclusions. Its provisions apply not only in the event of mobilization but also under martial law, a counter-terrorism operation, a national state of emergency, and other special legal regimes. The decree aligns regional regulations with Russian Government Decree No. 844 of July 4, 2026, which governs the operation of the electric power sector under these administrative and legal regimes, including procedures for accounting for power outages and undersupply, calculating compensation, carrying out repairs and other related measures. Most likely, the document is intended to prepare for the consequences of possible strikes on energy infrastructure. It is worth noting that martial law has been in effect since October 2022 in the occupied territories of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, which Russia claims as its own. The mere mention of martial law or mobilization in legal acts is not, by itself, evidence that a new wave of mobilization is being prepared.
The same approach should be taken toward reports of a surge in vacancies for military registration and mobilization specialists. According to attorney Kaloy Akhilgov, the increase is primarily driven by the growing workload placed on employers and the steep fines imposed for military registration violations. HeadHunter currently lists 268 such vacancies across Russia. The positions are being advertised mainly by private companies, government agencies and state-owned enterprises rather than draft offices. Many of these vacancies are concentrated in Moscow, home to the headquarters of many large corporations. However, neither these new regional regulations nor the increase in job postings indicates a higher likelihood of mobilization. Furthermore, even if such a decision were made, local authorities and organizations would likely not be informed beforehand. Therefore, the measures described above are more plausibly explained by routine bureaucratic preparations for one of several possible contingencies than by any advance knowledge of the Kremlin's plans.
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