Sitrep for Sept. 21-24, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Kupiansk direction, in the Kharkiv region, DeepState has expanded the area under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine west of the village of Dvorichna and north of the town of Kupiansk, which first appeared on its map at the end of August. Forces of the 2nd Khartia Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine have now advanced farther south and liberated the village of Zapadne—according to reports, the 23rd Assault Regiment is taking part in the fighting, with many foreign nationals serving in its ranks. It is worth noting that former journalist Pyotr Ruzavin also serves as a drone operator with the 13th Khartia Brigade.
In the Donetsk region, the most notable developments are currently taking place in the Dobropillia direction. According to Clément Molin, in the area between the towns of Druzhkivka and Dobropillia, the Russian Armed Forces are actively attempting to break through the Ukrainian New Donbas defensive line, which Molin marks on his map as Line 1.0. Line 0.5, located in front of it (unfinished and therefore weaker), was breached by the RuAF relatively recently in the area of Bilytske.
Russian forces are now actively penetrating the main line of fortifications at various points, marked by white dots on Molin’s map. These are locations where assault troops have managed to breach the fortifications at different times, but this does not mean that there are permanent gaps in the defenses through which the RuAF can pass at any time.
As Molin points out, on the one hand, the RuAF’s objective in this area is to gain a foothold on the heights beyond the New Donbas fortifications by winter, in order to facilitate further advances toward Druzhkivka and cut off the nearest Ukrainian supply routes to Kramatorsk. On the other hand, Russian forces are attempting to wedge themselves between Lines 1.0 and 0.5 and gain a foothold there in preparation for a further offensive toward Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk.
We were somewhat surprised that an independent Western analyst repeated the implausible assessment by Denys Prokopenko, commander of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, that the RuAF outnumber Ukrainian forces six to one in the Dobropillia direction. At the same time, the 425th Skelia Assault Regiment, which was placed under Azov's operational control, is currently conducting counterattacks in this direction. According to Playfra, Ukrainian forces have managed to stabilize the situation in the area north of the village of Sofiivka, specifically in the area where Russian forces have wedged themselves between the fortifications.
The return of Russian armored vehicles to the battlefield has recently become a subject of active discussion. We already discussed this in the summer and even in early spring 2026. In particular, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] recounted the story of a T-90M tank, call sign Krepysh, which reportedly survived more than 40 drone strikes and the detonation of several magnetic mines during a 12-km march in the Dobropillia direction. According to the account, the tank was stopped only after a Vampire [Baba Yaga] drone dropped a tear-gas grenade on it, prompting the crew to abandon the vehicle and take cover in the vegetation. Meanwhile, Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, stated in a joint interview with Dmytro Putiata that the 20th Mechanized Brigade of the AFU, during an engagement with the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the RuAF, required approximately 125 FPV drones to stop two tanks.
Heavily protected tanks fitted with massive additional anti-drone protection, similar to the so-called "turtle tanks," effectively serve as armored mine-clearing vehicles and decoys for Ukrainian drones. They cannot actively engage in combat because their turrets cannot fully traverse, but they draw the attention of enemy drones. The tanks are also being equipped with the Arena-M active protection system, which has proven fairly effective. It can protect a tank against a smaller number of UAV attacks (the current modification carries only 12 interceptor munitions), while allowing the tank to have less cumbersome anti-drone protection and actively fire its main gun. Thus, the return of tanks to the battlefield is the result of a trend that has been developing for roughly six months. At the same time, dismounting troops is more effective during the warmer months, when dense vegetation provides cover from enemy drones.
In the Oleksandrivka direction, according to Z-blogger Anatoly Radov, Ukrainian forces managed to cross the Mokri Yaly River and gain a foothold in the western part of the village of Komar. We cannot confirm this information, but on Sept. 23, Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces had successfully crossed the Mokri Yaly and that fighting had begun for Komar and the neighboring settlement of Perebudova.
Amid Ukrainian offensive operations in various directions, an active debate is underway over the impact of OPSEC on the success of these operations and the extent to which the Russian military leadership relies on information from major Z-bloggers, including a prominent pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar, as well as Radov, Poddubny, and others. Some argue that the Russian General Staff and the Ministry of Defense may not receive timely information about Ukrainian advances and a serious deterioration of the situation in a particular sector until major pro-war channels report on it publicly. If that were the case, then, assuming the AFU maintains OPSEC and false reports are widespread within the RuAF, one might expect the Russian military leadership to fail to respond to developments in these areas. However, satellite imagery of areas of combat operations shows that this is not the case: signs of airstrikes begin to appear relatively quickly.
For example, Clément Molin argues that, thanks to OPSEC, the Russian General Staff did not learn about the AFU offensive on the Shandryholove salient and therefore did not send reinforcements there in the form of airborne troops or marines. However, as our analyst noted in his thread, the intensification of airstrikes in an area that the Russian side had until recently described as being under its control indicates that commanders reported the deteriorating situation to the headquarters of the regiment or brigade and requested air support. Accordingly, the Russian Aerospace Forces received up-to-date information, meaning that it could, in one way or another, have reached the higher command as well.
This, however, does not negate the fact that the practice of concealing failures is indeed widespread in the Russian army. And while in many cases we can be confident that commanders on the ground are aware of the situation, the picture presented in public reports by Putin and General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, differs substantially from the objective situation on the frontline, and even from what is known to operational commanders. At the same time, it is impossible to say unequivocally who is misleading whom, or to what extent. For example, when Putin claimed that Sviatohirsk had been captured, it is unclear whether he was aware of the actual situation.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Satellite images have emerged of the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on a major drone launch site near the village of Tsimbulova in Russia's Oryol region. The "droneport" was attacked on Aug. 30 and again on Sept. 21. The images show localized scorch marks and craters, damage to two bunkers and several hangars, and what appears to be the wreckage of several burned UAVs at the launch preparation area. Given the facility's vast size, however, the damage looks minor, and most of the infrastructure remains intact. The images therefore do not support claims that the "droneport" was destroyed. At the current pace—one strike a month—the Russian side probably has enough time to repair damaged structures and replace destroyed drones. Much more frequent and larger-scale attacks would be needed to significantly reduce the site's capabilities.
The first video has emerged showing a Russian Geran-5 cruise missile (jet-powered UAVs) being intercepted by a Spys interceptor drone—a joint German-Ukrainian design capable of speeds of up to 600 km/h. The analyst known as "Special Kherson Cat" counted five published videos of Geran-5 interceptions: two by Sting drones, two by a still-unnamed jet-powered interceptor drone that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had previously tested, and one by Spys. The actual number of downed missiles may be higher.
Reuters reported on the difficulties of intercepting jet-powered Shaheds, citing members of Ukrainian mobile fire teams. Piston-engine versions of the Shahed usually flew at an altitude of about 1.5 kilometers, where large-caliber machine guns and anti-aircraft guns could shoot them down. Jet-powered UAVs fly at altitudes of 4-7 kilometers—beyond the reach of most of these weapons. Intercepting them requires scarce anti-aircraft missiles or F-16 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft.
The speed of jet-powered Shaheds, which can reach about 600 km/h, creates an additional problem. A three-person mobile team that spoke with Reuters has only a few seconds to detect, aim, and open fire, whereas when intercepting slower piston-engine UAVs, they may have minutes.
In another article, Reuters reported on a sharp increase in the use of Russian RM-48U ballistic missiles. They were originally developed as target missiles for air defense exercises, but after the start of the full-scale war they were converted for strikes against ground targets. There are versions guided by satellite navigation and by radio commands from the launch position. Citing Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General, Reuterswrites that RM-48Us accounted for more than half of the 228 ballistic and hypersonic missiles launched at Ukraine in July and early August. Ukrainian specialists believe that the widespread use of relatively simple RM-48Us allows Russian forces to stockpile more advanced Iskander missiles, North Korean KN-23s, and Zircons for the winter campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure.
The average deviation of an RM-48U from its intended target is estimated at around 300 meters. Prosecutors have linked these missiles to several recent strikes that caused numerous civilian casualties, including an attack on a railway station in the area of BroÂvary. The warhead of the RM-48U scatters prefabricated fragments over a wide area, and the combination of low accuracy and a wide fragmentation area poses a particularly high threat to civilians.
On Sept. 22, the Russian MoD stated that it had struck the JTI tobacco factory in the city of Kremenchuk, where it claimed that the production of small-arms ammunition had been organized. This justification sounds unconvincing. In theory, ammunition could have been produced in a converted facility on the company's premises, but in the footage released we did not notice characteristic secondary detonations or any special measures during firefighting.
In the same statement, the Russian MoD announced that it had struck the Sovrakhim facility in Pavlohrad, which it described as a producer of "solid rocket fuel and propellants" for Fire Point's FP-9 ballistic missiles. This claim also appears questionable: Pavlohrad is less than 100 kilometers from the frontline and has already been subjected to strikes by Russian air-dropped bombs. Locating critical production of a new ballistic missile there would be highly imprudent.
Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian gas stations. Whereas such attacks previously occurred primarily in border and frontline regions, over the past two weeks, gas stations in Kyiv have increasingly become targets. Some facilities have installed gabions, which can protect people from fragments but cannot prevent the stations themselves from being destroyed. On Sept. 23, strikes on Kyiv gas stations continued, and a market in the city was also attacked. That day, the attacks killed two people and injured another 45.
In Odesa, a toy warehouse was hit the same day, although no one was injured.
Russia is preparing not only for a winter campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure but also for possible retaliatory strikes by the AFU. According to the Astra Telegram channel, citing eyewitnesses, concrete blocks are being installed around Moscow’s CHP-8 power plant on Volgogradsky Prospekt. The blocks will likely serve as a foundation for anti-drone nets or form part of a more substantial protective structure.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in an interview with Fox News that Ukraine had repeatedly attacked American vessels in recent months, apparently unintentionally. We are not aware of any cases of strikes on US-flagged vessels specifically. Rubio may have been referring to foreign tankers that operated on behalf of US companies and loaded Kazakhstan oil at a Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk. If so, his statement confirms continuing disagreements between Washington and Kyiv over Ukrainian attacks on CPC facilities and the vessels serving them.
Peace Talks
Donald Donald Trump has once again urged Ukraine to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries because they contribute to rising global diesel prices, and has reiterated his call for an end to the war. In response, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that fuel markets are influenced by the volume of ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, not by the volume of fuel from Russia. He said that only an end to Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, critical infrastructure, and food export facilities would lead to "matching de-escalation steps" by the AFU. During his address to the UN General Assembly, the Ukrainian president warned that without an end to the war, the coming winter would be difficult for both sides. In effect, this means that if the Russian campaign continues, Ukrainian forces will expand strikes on energy facilities in Russia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, also addressing the UN General Assembly, has stated that the Russian side is ready to discuss various negotiation formats but will not suspend combat operations while negotiations are underway. Thus, we see no indications of a genuine convergence of positions as both parties continue to interpret the concept of negotiations in fundamentally different ways.
Western Assistance
Zelenskyy has also stated that launching production of Patriot systems in Ukraine could take between one and one and a half years and that Trump views the transfer of the necessary licenses favorably. However, the US president has previously made contradictory statements, first indicating that the licenses could be transferred, then expressing doubt. Even if Trump ultimately agrees, the timeline cited by Zelenskyy appears overly optimistic as building such production from scratch would require complex coordination, workforce training, and the establishment of the necessary technological base. In any case, this would not resolve the current acute shortage of air defense capabilities.
According to an unnamed US official, the Ukrainian delegation also raised the question of using Starlink to strike targets inside Russia. Trump said the matter should be discussed with Elon Musk. Earlier reports had suggested, however, that Musk was waiting for a White House decision on the issue. The US president and the SpaceX chief thus appear to be passing responsibility for a politically sensitive decision back and forth. Trump may also be unwilling to flatly reject Ukraine's request ahead of the midterm elections to avoid the political costs.
The European Union removed Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list as part of a deal that extended sanctions against roughly 3,000 other individuals and entities for three years. France had pushed for Usmanov's removal as part of negotiations with Azerbaijan over the release of French nationals held in custody, while Luxembourg pressed for Fridman's removal after he demanded $16 billion in compensation for losses stemming from the sanctions.
This case highlights a problem that will inevitably arise in future war crimes proceedings: public belief in a person's guilt is not sufficient for a conviction. A court requires evidence that the defendant directly participated in the crimes, gave orders, knew about the crimes, or otherwise bore individual criminal responsibility. If the prosecution cannot establish such responsibility, the defendant will be acquitted, regardless of reputation or public opinion.
A telling example is the MH17 trial. On Nov. 17, 2022, the District Court of The Hague sentenced Igor Girkin, Sergey Dubinsky, and Leonid Kharchenko to life imprisonment, but acquitted Oleg Pulatov of all charges. The court found insufficient evidence that he had personally contributed to the use of the Buk surface-to-air missile system, coordinated its deployment, protection, or use, or could be held responsible for the actions of the other participants.
For the same reason, it is legally incorrect to call all Russian servicemen war criminals solely because they took part in the invasion. The aggressive nature of the war does not automatically make every soldier a war criminal: criminal responsibility attaches to specific acts, such as the murder of civilians, torture, attacks on objects known to be civilian, and other violations. The Ukrainian proceedings against Russian servicemen that we are aware of have also been structured this way. Therefore, what will be especially important for future trials are not emotional statements by politicians and bloggers, but carefully verified materials, precise attribution, and an honest distinction between established facts and assumptions. This is the principle that guides our work, even if cautious conclusions attract less attention than categorical and clickbait statements.
Ukraine handed over to South Korea two North Korean servicemen captured during fighting in the Kursk region almost two years ago. Seoul had stated its readiness to accept them after reports of their capture emerged, since North Koreans are also considered South Korean citizens under South Korean law. It is unclear why the transfer took place only now. Ukrainian authorities may initially have hoped to use the prisoners in an exchange, but Pyongyang showed no apparent interest in their return and did not participate in the relevant negotiations. It is crucial, however, that the servicemen be transferred to South Korea with their consent, since returning them to North Korea could expose them to persecution.
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