Sitrep for Aug. 17-20, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Zaporizhzhia region, the Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed the capture of the village of Novosoloshyne, which lies west of the current frontline. In our assessment, the boundary of the contested area runs through the villages of Vozdvyzhivka and Rizdvianka, putting Novosoloshyne even farther behind the current line shown on the DeepState map, which is often updated with a delay.

The footage published from Novosoloshyne, however, appears to indicate isolated infiltrations rather than control of the village. We would not even classify the village as part of the contested area at this point.

Given the current nature of the war, we assess flag footage as follows: if there have previously been no reports of active fighting or infiltrations in an area, the infiltration has only just begun, meaning that a flag-planting photo op merely indicates the presence of a handful of assault troops, who are highly likely to be eliminated by the enemy. If footage of Russian soldiers in a particular area begins appearing regularly, we can then classify it as contested. We would not speak of control until the frontline has shifted toward neighboring settlements and assault troops have begun accumulating in the captured village in preparation for further advances. We also try to take into account information from other military analysts.

Another difficulty in analyzing Russian flag-planting footage is that it is often impossible to determine with confidence whether the fighting shown before the footage of the flag actually took place in the same settlement. Some of the videos are difficult to geolocate and could have been filmed in similar-looking terrain elsewhere.

The situation is becoming more difficult for Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillia direction. Earlier, there were reports that the Russian Armed Forces had reached the town of Dobropillia and the villages of Kucheriv Yar and Torske. According to Playfra, Russian assault troops advancing toward the town of Druzhkivka were cleared out in the area of the village of Novomykolaivka and the villages of Krasnyi Kut and Torske. He did not provide any footage of objective control. On the one hand, this sounds like a standard crisis-management statement: all infiltrating soldiers (or "sabotage and reconnaissance groups") have been promptly eliminated and the settlement remains under AFU control. This is partly because commanders are often reluctant to report enemy infiltrations into their rear areas. At the same time, Russian forces have released flag-planting footage from Novomykolaivka. We would tentatively classify it as contested, where Russian assault troops will attempt to establish a foothold.

On the other hand, Playfra reported problems in the adjacent sector, around Kucheriv Yar, which falls within the area of responsibility of the 1st National Guard Corps "Azov." According to him, the situation there may have deteriorated recently, forcing Ukrainian personnel to withdraw from their positions. Thus, the researcher’s sources within the AFU have reported not only successes, but also difficulties.

According to Ukrainian drone warfare specialist Dmytro Putiata, contrary to widespread perception, the boundaries of the "kill zone" are determined less by the range of conventional FPV drones than by the capabilities of reconnaissance UAVs. These UAVs detect enemy personnel and equipment and direct drones, artillery, missiles and air-dropped bombs against them. As an example, he cited footage captured by such a drone 100 km from the frontline, showing approximately 30 Russian trucks in shelters. The vehicles were neither protected nor camouflaged from above. A distance of 100 km from the frontline is within the operating range of middle-strike drones. Despite Ukraine’s campaign against Russian logistics, the RuAF have nevertheless been able to establish such a large truck parking area.

The Verkhovna Rada [Ukraine’s parliament] approved Yevhen Khmara, former head of the Security Service of Ukraine, as Minister of Defense. Under Ukrainian law, the Minister of Defense must be a civilian, meaning Khmara must already have been discharged from military service. Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, realizing that he will not be reinstated, recorded an address to Ukrainian society, calling for a way to hold elections during wartime. According to Fedorov, Ukrainian democracy is effectively being held hostage by Putin, who, by continuing the war, determines when elections can once again be held in Ukraine. Fedorov will clearly not return as Defense Minister; however, this fairly oppositional statement also suggests that we are unlikely to see him remain part of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s team, while part of Ukrainian society has already rejected his call.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces have begun equipping "ambush" drones with microphones. These drones are landed along roadsides, where they wait for a suitable target, such as vehicles or personnel. Rather than remaining airborne and continuously draining their batteries, the drones can wait for extended periods; however, they have a very limited field of view and are relatively easy to detect. The AFU are attempting to identify and destroy such UAVs. Russian forces have now begun fitting these drones with microphones that detect engine noise, allowing them to be concealed in positions where they are much harder to locate.

In late July, Reuters reported that the Ukrainian company Skyfall unveiled a new version of the P1 Sun JetKiller interceptor drone at an air show in the United Kingdom. The drone can counter jet-powered Shaheds. It is worth noting that ordinary interceptor drones lack the speed to intercept jet-powered munitions such as cruise missiles. The JetKiller reaches 370 kilometers per hour, compared with 310 for the original P1 Sun. The gain appears modest, especially compared with the Geran-5’s maximum speed of about 600 kilometers per hour. Nevertheless, such interceptor drones can catch Russian UAVs when they fly at cruising speed rather than maximum speed. For example, the AFU’s 81st Air Assault Brigade intercepted a jet-powered Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, presumably using one of these P1 Sun JetKiller interceptor drones.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The most important news at the moment is another massive Russian strike on Kyiv in the early hours of Aug. 20. Reports put the toll at 15 killed and 39 injured. Eight more people were injured and one was killed in the Kyiv region. The strike damaged civilian infrastructure and 30 residential buildings, some of them partially destroyed.

As reported, Yandex's mapping service no longer blurs images of secret military facilities in satellite imagery and instead covers them with copied images of the surrounding terrain (a forest, for example). In some cases, however, the facilities remain visible on street-level panoramas. In our view, Yandex is thereby complying with the requirements of the Federal Security Service (FSB) for the protection of state secrets rather than actually trying to conceal military facilities from other countries' intelligence agencies. This may nonetheless slightly complicate the work of researchers and journalists, because previously, when they encountered a blurred object, they could check those coordinates on Google Maps, Wikimapia, or another service.

In the early hours of Aug. 16, Ukrainian forces used R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles to strike the Kamensky plant in the Rostov region, a facility that produces solid rocket fuel for the Smerch and Tornado-S MLRS systems. These systems remain in active use in the war against Ukraine—the MoD regularly publishes reports featuring them. The General Staff of the AFU interpreted satellite imagery as showing the complete destruction of two workshops and damage to four more. The CyberBoroshno project, meanwhile, found that the strike hit the workshop where solid-fuel motors for Tornado-S and Smerch, as well as for the S-300 and S-400 SAM systems, are manufactured; the raw-materials warehouse of the solid rocket fuel production unit; the polymerization workshop, where thermal processing and the final forming of fuel grains take place; and the warehouse of raw materials for explosives production. This could create a bottleneck for both the MLRS systems and the S-300 and S-400 SAM systems (it is worth noting that the latter are regularly used to launch missiles at ground targets).

In Zaporizhzhia, underground protective structures have been built at two power substations, while the transformers are being reinforced with concrete structures. These measures are intended to protect energy infrastructure, which the RuAF are likely to target increasingly as winter approaches. According to regional authorities, half of the key facilities are already protected, and all of them are expected to be protected by winter. In previous years, by the end of summer we had observed energy infrastructure facilities being protected with concrete structures, sandbags, and anti-drone nets.

Ahead of winter, Ukraine will likely shift to retaliatory strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. Apparently, as part of preparations for such strikes, the Rostec state corporation has launched serial production of so-called mobile power substations—essentially large generator units. According to estimates, 2–4 such units are sufficient to cover a region’s emergency needs. Notably, this year the Russian authorities appear to have taken Ukraine’s increased long-range strike capabilities into account and begun preparing for winter.

Following a UAV raid on the Moscow region on Aug. 18, there was a partial power and internet outage: according to reports, more than 5,000 consumers and 46 critical public facilities were left without electricity.

On Aug. 18, Russian forces struck the village of Pechenihy in the Kharkiv region with two Bandril cruise missiles, killing 10 people and injuring 18 others. Footage from the scene of the attack shows a khaki-colored UAZ with black military license plates, as well as an injured person in military uniform. Some users suggested that the minibus parked nearby also had military plates; however, in our view, its license plate had simply fallen off, as an empty frame can be seen hanging from it. Therefore, we can confidently identify only one military vehicle.

The presence of a UAZ and military personnel does not in itself make the entire site a legitimate military target. Even if the RuAF intended to strike AFU soldiers who had stopped near a shop or gas station, their deaths would not have provided a significant military advantage capable of justifying the use of two missiles and the numerous civilian casualties. We therefore consider this strike a war crime.

The same logic applies to strikes on Wildberries warehouses, Nova Poshta terminals, and other civilian facilities. The presence of individual drones, items of gear, or military cargo does not make it permissible to indiscriminately destroy the entire complex. Earlier, following a strike on Sumy, pro-Russian military bloggers found boxes labeled "Korobky" [boxes] in photographs of the destroyed building, with drones visible inside, and regarded this as confirmation that the attack was lawful. The strike did not provide a significant military advantage, but it did result in the destruction of residential buildings and civilian casualties.

Ukrainian diver Volodymyr Zhuravlyov was detained in the Croatian city of Pula on suspicion of involvement in the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines. According to Der Spiegel, citing intelligence sources, Zhuravlyov had worked as a consultant on the film "Snake Island," starring Sean Penn, which depicts a dangerous underwater operation by Ukrainian divers against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war. Germany issued an arrest warrant for him in 2024, but Poland effectively allowed him to leave for Ukraine in a car belonging to the Ukrainian military attaché. He later returned to Poland and was detained but released after Prime Minister Donald Tusk said extraditing a Ukrainian national to Germany would be against the country’s interests. Zhuravlyov is the second Ukrainian detained in connection with the Nord Stream case; former special forces soldier Sergey Kuznetsov, suspected of coordinating the sabotage, was previously arrested in Italy.

We consider the actions of European investigators to be an expression of the rule of law: alleged crimes should be investigated regardless of whether they may have been committed by citizens of a country Europe supports. The "different rules for our own side" approach, increasingly common in Russian anti-war circles, creates double standards and reproduces the logic of Putin’s regime.

On Aug. 16, the Greek tanker Skyros was attacked in the Black Sea after loading at a Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk. The CPC primarily handles exports of Kazakhstani oil, but Bloomberg sources say the tanker was carrying Russian oil, which we cannot independently verify. In any case, the attack shows that agreements brokered with U.S. involvement, in which Ukraine agreed not to strike CPC infrastructure and associated vessels, have not yet halted such operations. Supporters of strikes on the CPC, including Ukrainian military blogger Tatarigami, note that Russia holds a significant stake in the consortium and profits from oil transit. However, disrupting Kazakhstani supplies could raise global prices and demand for Russian oil, boosting Russian budget revenues and casting doubt on the strategic value of such attacks for Ukraine.

The next day, near Novorossiysk, the Greek-flagged bulk carrier ANNA S was attacked while en route to load Russian grain. The crew was unharmed. On Aug. 18, Bloomberg reported that at least five grain carriers had been hit in the areas around Novorossiysk and Tuapse within just a few days. Thus, Turkey’s proposal for a mutual moratorium on attacks against commercial vessels in the Black Sea has also failed to bring the strikes to an end.

At the same time, Russia continues to attack the ports of Odesa, Pivdennyi, Chornomorsk and Izmail, as well as vessels entering them. This hampers Ukraine’s exports of grain and metallurgical products and reduces revenue for the Ukrainian budget. We view Russian strikes on Ukrainian ports and vessels—and a potential winter campaign against energy infrastructure—as retaliation for Ukrainian attacks in the Novorossiysk area. But that connection does not make the Russian strikes lawful or justified.

Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] analyzed federal budget expenditures and calculated that in the second quarter of 2026, 60,100 people received sign-up payments for joining the RuAF, compared with 131,300 in the first half of the year as a whole—an average of about 21,900 a month. That is roughly in line with the recruitment rate in the first half of 2025 and significantly below the 200,000 people that Dmitry Medvedev said had signed contracts in the first six months of this year. In 2025, recruitment also declined during the first half of the year but rose sharply in the second half. As a result, Russia met and, according to Kyrylo Budanov, even exceeded its annual target of more than 400,000 recruits. It therefore cannot be ruled out that the authorities will again try to make up the shortfall in the second half of 2026. Vazhnyye Istorii’s figures also differ from Janis Kluge’s calculations based on regional budget data. He estimates that 172,000 people signed contracts in the first half of the year—40,700 more than indicated by federal budget data. The discrepancy may be explained by the timing of payments and other features of budget accounting: federal budget expenditures do not necessarily correspond to the number of contracts signed during the same period.

At the same time, we see no signs on the frontline that recruitment has declined substantially. Russian forces continue to advance in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. It would therefore be premature to conclude that recruitment has fallen to around 20,000 people a month. The rate is likely higher, although the available data do not allow for a precise estimate.

Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] has analyzed satellite imagery showing the aftermath of the strike on Samara on Aug. 15 and concluded that, in addition to the Progress Rocket Space Centre, where Soyuz-2 rockets are manufactured (they are used, among other things, to launch Rassvet satellites), the Aviakor plant, which repairs Tu-95MS strategic bombers, was also hit.

The strike is unlikely to affect Soyuz-2 launches scheduled for 2026, even if the plant halts operations. However, damage to the production workshop could lead to production delays in the future. Whether it will impact the Rassvet program in 2027 will depend on the scale of the destruction and the timeframe for the plant's restoration.

According to the Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, as a result of the Aug. 15 strike on the Savasleyka airfield in the Nizhny Novgorod region, five of 22 fuel tanks, a technical facility, and Hangar No. 18 were damaged. No casualties among servicemen were reported. MiG-31Ks—carriers of Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles—are based at the airfield; according to the Main Directorate of Intelligence, production of these missiles has been suspended due to insufficient accuracy, with resources redirected to the production of other ballistic missiles. Judging by the known consequences, the strike on Savasleyka caused limited damage and did not noticeably affect the capabilities of Russian aviation.

On Aug. 17, Al Arabiya, citing sources, reported that the US and Iran agreed to extend the truce for another 60 days. However, as early as Aug. 19, Donald Trump announced the launch of a large-scale campaign of economic pressure and isolation against Iran. This once again demonstrates how quickly the US president’s position can change, including his position on Ukraine: it is worth noting that on July 8, 2026, in the presence of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, he publicly hinted at granting Ukraine a license to produce interceptor missiles for Patriot systems, but subsequently began speaking against their transfer. At the same time, according to the Wall Street Journal, rather than putting faith in negotiations with the US, Iran’s leaders used the past two months to prepare for a larger conflict.

We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.