Sitrep for March 27-30, 2026 (as of 9 UTC+3 a.m.)

Frontline Situation Update

Russian forces continue their offensive toward the town of Kostiantynivka. Previously, assault troops had already advanced into the central part of the town. Last week, Russian forces conducted another attack. On Mar. 25, two tanks advanced on Kostiantynivka from the direction of Toretsk, likely intended to draw the attention of Ukrainian UAVs. Simultaneously, three infantry groups moved toward the town: one advanced by motorcycle along the highway from the direction of Pokrovsk; a second attacked from Ivanopillia; and a third advanced along the railway line between Ivanopillia and Oleksandro-Shultyne. The assault was detected by Ukrainian drones and subsequently repelled.

Additionally, on Mar. 28, footage emerged showing an attempt to plant a Russian flag on a destroyed building in the southeastern part of Kostiantynivka using a UAV. The absence of Russian personnel moving freely in the area indicates that Russian troops are unable to physically reach the location, even for the purpose of recording such footage.

In the Oleksandrivka direction, spanning the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are conducting offensive operations while the Russian Armed Forces carry out counterattacks. According to Ukraine’s 37th Separate Marine Brigade, the largest Russian attack in recent months occurred on the morning of Mar. 28, involving armored vehicles and quad bikes. Ukrainian forces successfully repelled the assault.

Brigade footage highlights an effective fortification feature—a tank ditch reinforced with barbed wire—serving as an obstacle to both vehicles and infantry. One Russian serviceman was struck by a UAV during the repulse of the counterattack.

Personnel from Ukraine’s 95th Separate Air Assault Brigade reported the recapture of the village of Berezove in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Offensive operations by Ukrainian forces in this sector continue, with troops advancing gradually toward the Huliaipole–Uspenivka–Velyka Novosilka road axis.

In the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces exploited foggy conditions to attempt mechanized assaults toward the villages of Novodanylivka and Mala Tokmachka.

Despite earlier reports that the RuAF mechanized attack had been completely thwarted, with all armored vehicles destroyed and the infantry killed, some Ukrainian military sources claim that only some of the enemy's armored vehicles were eliminated. The remaining vehicles managed to withdraw, while nearly all dismounted infantry scattered. Ukrainian forces are now engaged in difficult operations to track down Russian troops hiding in tree lines and other cover. Thus, the attack cannot be deemed a complete failure. Such infiltrations often allow Russian forces to advance incrementally.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Although fighting for Kostiantynivka has raged for months, civilians remain in the town. A recently surfaced video shows Ukrainian troops evacuating an elderly man with six cats. He said that a projectile had struck his home days before the evacuation, likely prompting his decision to leave for a safer location. While the man survived, such strikes frequently result in civilian fatalities in frontline settlements. Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers and police face additional risks during these evacuation operations.

As we have noted before, the continuing strikes make it necessary to evacuate civilians from the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration as well. On March 28, a boy was wounded in the city of Kramatorsk during a Shahed drone attack. The following day, March 29, five air-dropped bombs struck the city, killing a teenager and two adults and injuring 13 more civilians. Later, another person was wounded by a cluster munition strike. Also on March 29, one person was injured in the city of Sloviansk as a result of drone strikes, while two more were injured in the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, north of Kostiantynivka. Reports indicate that families with children are being forcibly evacuated from the most dangerous parts of Sloviansk, though no such measures have yet been introduced in Kramatorsk.

Another use of the Flamingo missile has been reported. In the early hours of March 28, the missile was observed flying toward the town of Chapayevsk in Russia’s Samara region, where it struck the Promsintez chemical plant. This was later confirmed by the AFU General Staff, and footage showing the launch of several missiles was also published. Promsintez manufactures explosives, though the extent of the damage remains unclear.

Drones of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) once again struck the Ust-Luga oil terminal in the Leningrad region on the morning of March 29. A major fire broke out in the port, with oil storage tanks catching fire. It later emerged that a berth and pumping facilities belonging to Novatek [Russia's second-largest natural gas producer] were also damaged, and the port suspended operations. During the raid, two drones apparently veered off course, likely due to electronic warfare interference, and crashed in Finland. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry issued an apology for the incident. As previously reported, an earlier strike on the same area had targeted not only oil infrastructure but also an ice-class vessel in the town of Vyborg.

In the early hours of March 30, Ukrainian UAVs attacked the city of Taganrog in the Rostov region: one of the drones struck a school, while another crashed in a residential neighborhood, causing a fire. Although the strike took place at night—which likely helped reduce the number of civilian casualties—it was not possible to avoid them entirely: one person was killed and another was injured.

In the Yaroslavl region, during an air attack in the early hours of March 28, a child was killed and his parents were severely injured when a drone fell on their house. A resident of a neighboring house was also injured. It is possible that the UAV was shot down but did not explode in the air.

Russian forces continue to regularly strike Ukrainian civilian settlements. In the Mykolaiv region, during a Shahed attack on the evening of March 28, a 13-year-old girl was killed and nine other people were injured.

According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russian forces used more than 3,000 drones in total over the past week, most of which were Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions. This is significantly higher than the weekly average. In previous weeks, 1,200–1,700 drones were recorded. It is worth noting that almost a third of these three thousand were used on March 24.

One of the main news stories this week was a recent article by Simon Shuster in The Atlantic. Shuster met with Armin Papperger [Director of the Rheinmetall] in Germany and toured the company’s tank factories. In modern warfare, Shuster argues, tanks are no longer defined by armor and firepower, but by their vulnerability to UAV strikes. Yet, when he questioned Papperger regarding the "drone revolution," the director was dismissive, asserting that Ukrainian companies have produced no real innovations and that drones are being made by "Ukrainian housewives" who 3D-print components in their kitchens. This remark ignited a major scandal, leading many to overlook Shuster’s central thesis: that in the era of drones, the tank is an obsolete relic of the past.

In our view, this assessment does not align with reality; tanks continue to be utilized extensively by both sides. Last year, we witnessed several instances in which Ukraine employed tanks to clear specific settlements. Recently, a video was released showing a Ukrainian tank engaging Russian infantry fortifications with direct fire. Commenting on the footage, Colby Badhwar, a columnist for The Insider [independent Russian investigative media outlet], remarked that the Ukrainian tank crew had apparently missed the news that tanks were obsolete.

Tanks remain a necessity on the battlefield, though the nature of their deployment is evolving—for instance, traditional tank-on-tank battles have largely vanished. There may now be a demand for lighter tanks, as the need for heavy armor designed to withstand a tank shell has diminished. At the same time, there is an urgent need for effective drone countermeasures: jammers, smoke screens and protection against shaped charges—such as slat armor, improvised cope cages and blocks of explosive reactive armor. Footage has surfaced showing the AFU equipping M1A1 Abrams tanks with makeshift defenses, including bulky grates that restrict turret rotation and Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armor.

Bohdan Krotevych, former commander of the Azov Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, published a response to Shuster’s article, arguing that it is a mistake to dismiss Ukrainian drone developments as unoriginal simply because drones existed prior to the conflict.

The defining characteristic of "drone innovation" is its inherent replicability. We have seen time and again how Ukraine introduces a novel drone component to gain a temporary edge, only for Russia to copy and scale the technology a few months later—without the need to breach servers for documentation or reverse-engineer the parts. However, Ukraine maintains unique advantages in its implementation processes and the integration of drones with battle management systems, such as the Virazh-Planshet automated process-control system and other air-situation command structures. It also benefits from a streamlined mechanism for rapidly testing the efficacy of new solutions in actual combat. Refining military vehicles at a training range provides no guarantee of reliability in combat operations: for example, the Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled guns proved to be unreliable and ill-suited to modern warfare, frequently breaking down.

We believe Papperger is incorrect in his dismissive stance toward drones; they represent a formidable threat, and manufacturers of tanks and other military vehicles must focus on defensive measures. At the same time, while Shuster’s article implies that tanks have become entirely irrelevant, we find this conclusion equally flawed. Both tanks and drones serve as force multipliers; without artillery, tank and airstrike support, drones cannot be fully effective, and ground troop progression would be severely hindered.

During Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Middle Eastern tour, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia reached agreements on military-technical cooperation, including future contracts, technological collaboration and investments.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

On April 1, the spring conscription campaign begins. Vice Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky, deputy head of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the RuAF, stated that conscripts will not be involved in carrying out tasks related to the "special military operation." However, it is worth noting that the border regions of Belgorod, Rostov, Kursk and Bryansk are not officially considered part of the "special military operation" zone. At the same time, conscripts deployed there are regularly killed or seriously wounded in missile and drone strikes. In addition, conscripts are often pressured into signing military contracts through coercion, threats and physical abuse. There have also been reported cases of forged signatures on such contracts. Given that Russian military losses continue to grow and are now approaching monthly recruitment levels, we expect the situation to worsen this year, with increased pressure on conscripts. For those seeking to avoid conscription, we recommend contacting verified support initiatives such as Idite Lesom! [Flee through the woods/Get lost you all], Kovcheg and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors, a human rights organization that supports individuals who refuse military service.

As our team has learned, authorities in the Ryazan region have required employers to assist in recruiting contract soldiers for the Ministry of Defense. According to an order issued by Governor Pavel Malkov, from March 20 to Sept. 20 of this year, recruitment quotas have been established for all businesses, regardless of ownership type. Companies with 150-300 employees must identify two candidates for contract-based military service. Those with 300-500 employees must provide three candidates, while companies with more than 500 employees must provide five. While this practice is not new, such directives were previously communicated informally rather than published as official documents on government portals.

On March 27, Pussy Riot protested outside the office of the American technology company Ubiquiti, accusing it of facilitating Russian war crimes. We consider this accusation incorrect: Ubiquiti is a manufacturer of civilian networking equipment sold worldwide by numerous distributors and resellers. The use of such equipment does not require mandatory registration, and the manufacturing company cannot restrict its use. While Starlink terminals require registration with the manufacturer, Ubiquiti networking equipment can be used to build internal networks even without internet access, with no possibility of any control by the manufacturer. Similarly, companies such as Apple or Samsung could be accused of complicity in war crimes on the grounds that Russian soldiers use their phones.

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