Sitrep for Oct. 1-5, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The pro-Russian Slivochnyi Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] project published a video allegedly filmed near the railway station in the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and, based on it, claimed that Russian forces had advanced. However, the station building in the opening shots, which show a strike hitting the building, appears to be much more damaged than in the subsequent shots, which show soldiers against the backdrop of the building. Thus, the footage is either old or, as In Factum believes, AI-generated. We tend to agree, as the soldiers’ facial expressions also look unnatural. Slivochnyi Kapriz, meanwhile, rushed to report Russian gains and did not correct the post, even though all the posts in the original source had been deleted.
Statistics on Russian Armed Forces territorial gains in September have emerged. Rochan Consulting analyst Konrad Muzyka calculated that 235 km² was captured in September — meaning the pace of Russian advances nearly doubled compared with August, although it remained fairly low by the standards of previous years.
The Ukrainian project Deep State has finally resumed publishing statistics and released its calculations of the pace of Russian advances in August and September. Once again, the analysts provided two figures for each month: the first taking OPSEC and publication delays into account, and the second—shown in circles—reflecting Ukrainian advances in the months when they actually occurred in the months when they actually took place. At the same time, they note that the statistics do not yet include another 270-320 km² across several sections of the frontline that were liberated between July and September. These appear to be around the Shandryholove salient, the Oleksandrivka direction, and the Kupiansk direction. However, regardless of the calculation method, the RuAF pace increased somewhat in September, amounting to either 66 or 154 km², depending on the calculation method.
According to Black Bird Group, Russian forces captured so little territory in September while Ukrainian forces retook so much that the RuAF recorded a net territorial loss of 190 km². The September figures included Ukrainian gains in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions.
Slivochny Kapriz notes, however, that the rate of advance has declined compared with August, although the RuAF still managed to seize 177 km².
Taking all the nuances into account, it is becoming increasingly difficult to rely on such estimates. While both sides seek to seize the initiative in the information space, the course of the war is determined more by economic factors. As a result, both sides are seeking to inflict maximum damage on the adversary’s economy. The RuAF are indeed demonstrating extremely low rates of advance while suffering horrendously high casualties. The AFU, meanwhile, have achieved significant results, particularly by slowing the Russian advance toward the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. However, the situation for the RuAF has not become critical in either the Lyman or Oleksandrivka direction, and the frontline has not collapsed. Therefore, both sides can continue making political statements about their own successes and the adversary’s failures while downplaying the adversary’s offensive operations. For Russia, we cannot characterize this slowdown in the advance as a failure; consequently, we still do not expect a large-scale mobilization. In our view, it would be appropriate to speak of a failure in the event of systematic, large-scale withdrawals involving the loss of critically important positions and a threat to the stability of key sectors—stability, rather than the rate of advance, as is currently the case in the Sloviansk direction.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The main development of the past several days has been Russian strikes against Ukrainian bridges. In Kyiv, Russian forces carried out seven strikes on bridges across the Dnipro River in recent days: five against the Southern Bridge (Oct. 1 and 2) and two against the Northern Bridge (Oct. 3 and Oct. 4). As a result, the Southern Bridge was completely closed to vehicular and metro traffic, while the roadway on the Northern Bridge sustained damage. Reportedly, traffic restrictions were also introduced on Kyiv’s other bridges (there are six bridges in total). Severe traffic congestion developed across the city, forcing people to get out of vehicles and cross the bridges on foot. To some extent, this can be described as a transportation collapse, although the term "logistical nightmare," used by some media outlets, appears overly emotional to us. Jet-powered drones struck the Northern Bridge in the mornings, when vehicles were crossing it. As a result, two civilians were injured in each of the two strikes.
It appears that Russian forces are experimenting with strikes on bridges. The strikes involve, among other things, drones equipped with new warheads that we discussed in our previous sitrep. The "cumulative-cutting special payload" is now being used not only against power pylons, but also against bridge stays—the steel cables that support the bridge spans. Footage showing the aftermath of strikes on the Southern Bridge indicates that the cables were damaged but not severed. We do not know the safety margin of such bridges.
Although the Russian MoD stated that the purpose of the bridge strikes was to disrupt the AFU’s logistics, in reality they harm only the civilian population and provide no military advantage. The AFU still have crossings over the Dnipro via the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant dam in Vyshhorod and the Kaniv Hydroelectric Power Plant dam in Kaniv, which cannot be destroyed by drones. The actual purpose of the bridge strikes may instead be, as The New York Times have also noted, to inflict as much economic damage as possible.
Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military expert and an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on technology, has again suggested that Russian relay stations may be located in Kyiv. Such stations can be quite compact and could provide communications for Russian drones targeting bridges. Based on the accuracy of the drones, he suggested that they are controlled remotely, which in the capital would be possible either through relay drones or cellular networks. However, no airborne relay drones were detected during the attacks, and no LTE modems or SIM cards were found in the wreckage of the drones. Ground-based relay stations, meanwhile, could be switched on by Russian agents during air attacks.
Stationary structures such as bridges can be protected using balloons with anti-drone nets suspended from them, or cables. Russian forces are testing similar balloons to protect oil refineries and other facilities. The balloons hover at a considerable height, meaning that before attacking a target, drones would first have to climb above them, making them easier to detect, and strike the balloon itself—which is cheaper than a jet-powered drone.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine is developing interceptor drones based on existing Ukrainian jet-powered platforms. He said that the Bars, a "drone that is almost a missile," is performing well. Ukraine used it for long-range strikes, including one on the Moscow oil refinery on June 18, 2026. One of the Bars variants will now likely be adapted to intercept Russian jet-powered Shaheds.
In addition, Ukrainian authorities are developing a program to develop automatic turrets, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Beskrestnov wrote that 12 such systems have already been installed in Kyiv to counter jet-powered Shaheds, with plans to install more. Beskrestnov attached a photograph to the post of a turret presumably armed with a 12.7mm Sky Sentinel machine gun. Zelenskyy confirmed a total of 12 turrets, including eight with .50-caliber (12.7mm) guns. We believe those guns are suitable only for point air defense, because jet-powered Shaheds can fly at an altitudes of several kilometers, beyond the reach of weapons of that caliber. Engaging them at high altitudes before they begin to dive toward a target will require larger-caliber automatic cannons, or anti-aircraft missiles and interceptor drones.
German Aid to Ukraine reports that Germany has transferred to Ukraine its second IRIS-T air-defense system this year and the 11th since the war began. The system consists of three short-range IRIS-T SLS launchers, two medium-range IRIS-T SLM launchers, ground surveillance radars, a command post, and support vehicles. Germany plans to deliver another system by the end of the year. IRIS-T is not designed to intercept ballistic missiles, but it can engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and UAVs, including jet-powered Shaheds. To strengthen defenses against ballistic missiles, Ukraine expects to receive new radars and missiles for its SAMP/T systems soon.
RBC-Ukraine writes that information about possible Russian attacks on Ukrainian data centers had emerged before they began, allowing operators to prepare in advance. The resilience of the infrastructure is ensured by its distributed and dispersed nature, as well as the ability to back up data and services. This example demonstrates why, when planning strikes of one's own, it is important to assess the adversary's potential response in advance and prepare for it.
According to the publication's sources in the AFU, Russia is currently producing around 2,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 cruise missiles per month. In addition, they estimate that by last week, Russian stocks of conventional strike drones with piston engines may have reached 10,000 units.
Zelenskyy said that Russia has also accumulated around 700 ballistic missiles and several thousand cruise missiles, while monthly production of ballistic missiles stands at 130–140 units. We assume that expensive ballistic missiles are unlikely to be used en masse against bridges: inflicting serious damage on them would require a large number of hits. It is more likely that the main stockpiles are intended for winter strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This may also explain the active use of less accurate RM-48U missiles during the summer while Iskanders, Zircons, and North Korean KN-23s were being stockpiled.
In the early hours of Oct. 2, Ukrainian UAVs carried out a raid on the Volgograd oil refinery; one person was injured in the attack on the region. On the same day, the Samara linear production and dispatch station was attacked in the Samara region. It is a pumping station serving a number of major oil pipelines; several storage tanks caught fire.
In an interview with Reuters, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine would intensify strikes on Russian oil refineries in response to Putin's "new doctrine," which envisages attacks on a broad range of civilian targets ahead of the winter. In turn, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced its intention to intensify strikes. The scale of Ukrainian attacks will depend primarily on the number of available strike assets.
In the same interview, Zelenskyy said that he had contacted Fire Point and asked about the readiness of the FP-9 ballistic missile, which will be capable of reaching Moscow and the Moscow region, as well as striking large launch sites for Russian UAVs in Tsymbulovo, Hvardiiske, and Donetsk Airport. The company promised to complete its development by the end of the fall. It remains unclear whether this refers to the missile becoming technically ready or to its first combat use. It is important that pressure to accelerate the work does not lead to deviations from established technical processes and reduced reliability of the system. Meanwhile, there is still no new information on the results of the first use of the FP-7, which Zelenskyy reported on Oct. 1.
Russia is preparing a campaign of strikes on Ukraine’s energy and utility infrastructure involving up to 1,000 missiles, drones, and air-dropped bombs, The New York Times reports, citing a plan presented to European partners by Ukraine’s Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal. The plan envisages the use of a thousand missiles, drones, and air-dropped bombs to deprive major Ukrainian cities of electricity, heating, and water.
According to the document, the first stage would involve strikes on substations near Ukraine’s western borders to make it more difficult to import electricity from Europe. The next stage would target hydroelectric power plants and substations connecting three Ukrainian nuclear power plants to the national power grid, as well as water supply and sewage systems. Russian forces have attacked most of these types of targets before, with the exception of water supply and sewage systems.
If you would like to help Ukrainian civilians get through the coming winter, support the Davayte project, a joint charitable initiative by the Sluzhba Podderzhki [Helpdesk] Telegram channel, Meduza [international Russian-language online media outlet], and TV Rain [independent Russian television channel]. Such assistance is particularly important amid expected Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the RuAF’s significant stockpiles of ballistic missiles, and Ukraine’s shortage of air-defense assets.
On Oct. 1, a Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighter aircraft shot down another Russian Mil Mi-8 in the Voronezh region after mistakenly identifying it as a Ukrainian UAV. The specialized Helicopterpilot Telegram channel reports that the helicopter was being moved from its parking area to protect it from a possible drone strike and was flying toward the approaching drones. Three crew members were killed. The incident once again illustrates why Russian airports impose the so-called Carpet plan during UAV attacks, requiring all aircraft to land: the danger comes not only from the possibility of a Ukrainian drone striking a civilian aircraft but also from the risk of Russian air defenses opening fire by mistake. In April last year, a mobile fire team near Moscow opened fire on a Federal Security Service (FSB) Mi-8, mistaking it for a drone, although the helicopter was not damaged.
Meanwhile, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that an Oct. 4 strike on a military airfield in Adygea [Russia's constituent republic] destroyed a Su-35, a Su-34, and an ammunition storage facility. Subsequent satellite imagery shows signs of fire on the aircraft parking areas where aircraft of these types had been seen in earlier imagery. The Su-35 is predominantly used to combat air targets and cover strike aviation, while the Su-34 is used to carry out strikes with air-dropped bombs and missiles.
Additional details have emerged regarding the Sept. 29 crash of a Tu-95MS strategic bomber in Russia's Far Eastern Amur region. Russia's Defense Ministry reported that the bomber was conducting a training flight without ordnance. All eight crew members on board were killed, including regiment commander Andrey Lobanov. We omitted this incident from our previous sitrep because we see no indications that it was related to the war. The aircraft crashed in the Amur region, far from Ukraine, and no large-scale Tu-95MS activity, which typically accompanies missile strikes, was observed at the time. The presence of the regiment commander on board is also more consistent with a training flight. A technical failure appears to be the most likely explanation. If confirmed, this would mark the first known non-combat loss of a Tu-95MS during the full-scale war.
The Russian Forces Spotter project highlighted a concentration of vessels in the Gulf of Finland, where roughly 65 tankers and 85 cargo ships are queued to load at the port of Ust-Luga. Waiting times are up to five days. According to the project's assessment, Russia is rerouting exports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, grain, and other cargo to the Baltic, because Ukrainian UAV attacks have complicated the use of Black Sea ports.
Ukraine, whose Black Sea ports are also subject to Russian strikes, is developing alternative grain export routes through Germany and the Netherlands. However, Poland and Romania have refused to expand Ukrainian grain transit across their territory, fearing that some of the grain could remain on local markets, lower prices, and harm domestic producers.
During the Center-2026 drills in Chebarkul, servicemen from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan practiced, among other things, dropping unguided air-dropped bombs and conducting airborne landings from Ilyushin Il-76 strategic airlifter. The practical utility of both tactics in modern warfare is extremely limited. To drop unguided bombs, an aircraft must approach the target and enter the range of air-defense systems. A mass airborne landing is even more vulnerable: large transport aircraft must approach the drop zone, after which the paratroopers themselves are left virtually defenseless during descent.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
The fall period for sending conscripts to military units has begun in Russia and will last until Dec. 31. Draft offices are expected to conscript 120,000 people. The campaign will likely proceed relatively calmly in October; however, toward the end of November and in December, as the deadline for meeting the target approaches, roundups of conscripts, patrols near the metro, and checks at conscripts' places of residence may resume.
We once again recommend avoiding statutory military service by all possible means. As the pace of contract soldier recruitment slows, conscripts will face increasing pressure to sign contracts: contract recruitment targets are also assigned to military unit commanders. Even without a contract, conscripts can be sent to the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, or Rostov regions. Formally, this is not considered a deployment to the "special military operation" zone, but border areas are regularly attacked, and conscripts there continue to be killed.
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