dispatches
October 30

Sitrep for Oct. 28-30, 2024 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Fighting continues in the southern Donetsk region, currently the most active section of the frontline. Over recent days, Russian forces have managed to capture the villages of Bohoiavlenka and Novoukrainka and advance in the village of Yasna Poliana.

According to a map from the Black Bird Group, showing fortifications and a recent frontline (from two or three days ago), the town of Kurakhove is heavily fortified on all sides except the north, where the Kurakhove Reservoir lies. Kurakhove is essentially a fortified area with anti-tank defenses, trenches and other structures. To minimize casualties in a direct assault, the Russian Armed Forces may attempt to encircle Kurakhove and cut off the N15 highway, a critical supply line for Ukrainian forces from the west. This maneuver would likely require advancing from the villages of Shakhtarske and Yasna Polyana northward toward the villages of Andriivka or Dachne, while potentially approaching the highway from the north by moving west along the reservoir’s northern edge.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have advanced in the town of Selydove, while in the Kurakhove direction, they have seen slight progress around the pocket near the villages of Hostre and Oleksandropil. Meanwhile, Russia's Ministry of Defense has already announced the complete capture of both Selydove and Hirnyk.

It has been shown repeatedly that, contrary to our expectations, large population centers, which we assumed could be defended for extended periods, are captured by Russian forces in a shorter time frame than some smaller settlements. Back in August, during discussions of fighting over towns and villages in the Toretsk direction, our team conducted a detailed analysis of the reasons behind this phenomenon. Recently, we received independent confirmation of our theories from an active Ukrainian soldier, who shared insights into the challenges faced by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in urban combat. During field combat and along tree lines, the AFU’s infantry shortages are largely offset by their advantage in drone warfare; however, this advantage diminishes in urban settings.

Solid urban structures function almost as pre-built fortifications or firing points. However, as we have emphasized before, fortifications alone will not be effective if not manned by trained soldiers. According to military science, defending a city requires significantly more infantry than an equivalent section of the frontline in rural areas. While buildings can serve as natural fortifications, some preparation is essential before fighting begins: selecting key buildings for establishing firing positions, marking fields of fire, digging trenches, erecting barricades, securing areas with wire obstacles and mining dead zones and streets. This process requires not only time, materials and engineering equipment but also substantial manpower.

Due to infantry shortages, the situation for the AFU is becoming dire. If they fail to maintain control over the entire area they are defending, Russian soldiers can outflank Ukrainian positions and occupy buildings. As a result, Ukrainian forces will no longer be able to easily drive the Russians out with drones alone. Thermal cameras, which are effective in forested areas and trenches, cannot detect enemies inside buildings. Even considering a relatively short kill chain within the AFU, Ukrainian drone operators and artillery crews lack the time to hit Russian soldiers running from one building to another. The only way to solve this problem and slow down the Russian advance is to destroy abandoned buildings during a retreat, as has occurred during the storming of many cities.

Thus, it turns out that the AFU lacks sufficient manpower to organize a full-fledged defense of cities, and this issue becomes more pronounced in larger population centers. As a result, in some cases, small settlements endure longer than larger cities.

CNN, citing Western intelligence officials, reported that a small number of North Korean troops are already in Ukraine. However, Pentagon press secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated at a briefing that he cannot confirm this information, although North Korean soldiers continue to arrive in the Kursk region. It remains unclear whether CNN's sources are referring to recently arrived infantry or to those soldiers who assisted with North Korean missiles.

Western Assistance

Details have emerged about the allocation of loans to Ukraine, totaling up to $50 billion: approximately $20 billion each from the United States and the European Union, $3.6 billion from Canada and $3 billion each from Japan and the United Kingdom. It remains unclear whether any restrictions have been imposed on the use of these funds. Last week, reports suggested that Ukraine would have the autonomy to decide how to spend the money. However, if the automatic translation of a report by the Nikkei media outlet is accurate, the loan from Japan cannot be used for military purposes. Additionally, researcher Colby Badhwar noted that restrictions also apply to the use of American funds, which cannot be allocated to Ukraine’s defense industry without special additional authorization.

Speaking at the Ukraine–Northern Europe Summit Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that his victory plan did not imply that Ukraine should become a NATO member during the war. Instead, it envisions Ukraine receiving a formal invitation to join the alliance, which would mean a political decision ensuring geopolitical stability for both Ukraine and the rest of Europe, while also signaling to Russia that the issue has been resolved.

At the same summit, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre announced a €500 million [$543 million] aid package for Ukraine, including €350 million [$380 million] in military assistance.

According to sources among US officials cited by the New York Times, in the classified section of his victory plan, Zelenskyy requested Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 2,400 km [1,491 mi]. We assume that these missiles were referred to in the section about deploying a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package in Ukraine, which would be sufficient to protect the country from any military threat from Russia. However, transferring such missiles is almost impossible due to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which restricts the export of missiles with a range of more than 300 km [186 mi]. It is possible that the real purpose of this request was to obtain permission to use long-range ATACMS missiles against targets on Russian territory.

Some analysts and diplomats interviewed by the NYT also believe that the victory plan was actually aimed not at a Western audience but rather at Ukraine’s domestic one. Its purpose may be to prepare Ukrainians for a potential compromise, demonstrating that Zelenskyy has done everything possible while emphasizing Western responsibility for the current situation. We agree that delays in the delivery of aid and restrictions on the use of Western weapons have significantly impacted the course of the war. If decisions regarding the delivery of Western tanks, aircraft, long-range missiles, and other equipment had been made earlier, and if much more aid had been provided—even at the expense of Europe’s own readiness—the situation on the frontline would be considerably better for Ukraine today. Moreover, the risk of a direct military confrontation between Europe and Russia would be lower, alleviating the need for Western countries to invest heavily in strengthening their own defenses.

The 36th Separate Marine Brigade of the AFU has received 20 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles from Germany and is currently undergoing training to operate them. This is the first Ukrainian naval infantry unit to receive these IFVs, which were previously supplied to units of the Air Assault and Ground Forces.

In France, training continues for the 155th "Anne de Kyiv" Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU. As of September 2024, it was announced that 2.3 thousand Ukrainian soldiers out of the 4.5 thousand regular personnel of the brigade were being trained. The brigade will include:

  • The 1st Tank Battalion, equipped with 31 Leopard 2A4 tanks and including reconnaissance and air defense platoons;
  • The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Mechanized Battalions, equipped with 40 VAB armored personnel carriers each including fire support, reconnaissance and air defense platoons, as well as a mortar battery;
  • The 28th Rifle Battalion, including three rifle companies, one fire support company, one reconnaissance platoon and one mortar battery;
  • An artillery group equipped with 18 CAESAR self-propelled howitzers and 20 MILAN ATGMs;
  • A reconnaissance company equipped with 18 AMX-10RC armored vehicles including an air defense platoon, an engineer battalion and a UAV unit.

Given the situation on the frontline, the brigade might be expected to enter combat before it is fully manned.

By August 2025, the Baykar company is planning to build a Bayraktar UAV factory in the Kyiv region. The project is expected to cost $100 million, with an anticipated output of up to 120 UAVs per year. However, Haluk Bayraktar, the company’s CEO, told Reuters that the production starting date will depend on the course of the war. This suggests that production may not begin until after hostilities cease to avoid jeopardizing the investment in the event of Russian strikes.

In the previous sitrep, we reported on the appearance of Russian UAVs capable of evading interceptor drones. A recently surfaced video shows one of these UAVs successfully performing several evasive maneuvers until the operator of a Ukrainian interceptor realizes that the Russian drone is vulnerable from below and successfully strikes it in the lower hemisphere.

Events devoted to relations between Russia and North Korea have begun in Russian educational institutions. In Khabarovsk, a history teacher spoke to students about Kim Il Sung's memoirs and said that friendship between Moscow and Pyongyang would bring "the collapse of US imperialism" closer. In Sergiyev Posad, Moscow region, the Movement of the First [state-led youth movement] and the Russian-Korean Friendship Club celebrated the anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea with students of a socio-economic college. One of the presentations was titled "Why we are friends with Korea."

On Oct. 29, the AFU struck a military facility on the outskirts of the city of Luhansk. Numerous videos show heavy smoke and explosions, indicating that an ammunition storage facility was likely hit.

According to sources cited by the Financial Times, Russia and Ukraine have begun "preliminary discussions about halting strikes on each other’s energy infrastructure" with Qatar acting as a mediator. A diplomat briefed on the negotiations described them as "very early talks about potentially restarting something." In August 2024, several Western media outlets reported that Russia and Ukraine discussed the possibility of initiating Qatar-mediated negotiations to suspend attacks on energy infrastructure, with Russia targeting power plants in Ukraine and Ukraine targeting Russia’s oil industry. According to these reports, Russia declined to enter such negotiations following Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk region.

A week ago, President Zelenskyy stated that a similar deal with Russia could indicate its willingness to end the "hot stage" of the war.